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ABSTRACT

SECURITY WITH SOLVENCY: RETRENCHMENT AND STRATEGIC
REORIENTATION
Travis E. Robison
Alex Weisiger
What explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes when great power leaders
attempt this course of action in response to relative decline? I argue that retrenchment
fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and,
therefore, is unable to free resources to address more critical security challenges. In broad
terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off
responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by
abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. I use primary and secondary
sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis and structured, focused comparison of two
cases of United States retrenchment – from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, and
the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. My findings illuminate that ally availability, the
outcome of rapprochement with rivals, and the ability of leaders to abandon a foreign
interest provide a coherent explanation for observed outcomes. Moreover, I find that
retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. These findings contribute to the
literature by situating retrenchment within a larger foreign policy process and identifying
the necessary conditions for retrenchment to succeed. More importantly, my findings
deliver policy-relevant knowledge to decisionmakers by providing an analytic framework
for assessing the utility of retrenchment.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“A political equilibrium is neither a gift of the gods nor an inherently stable condition. It
results from the active intervention of man, from the operation of political forces.”1
The Puzzle
Sustainable foreign policies balance a state’s international security commitments with
its available domestic resources.2 At times, however, rising foreign competition, costly
overcommitment abroad, and declining domestic resources unbalance a state’s foreign
policy or constrain its ability to project power abroad.3 Given these circumstances, how
does a great power realign its strategic priorities? In other words, how can leaders
effectively respond to international relative decline? History shows that leaders must
respond to these conditions or risk strategic insolvency that jeopardizes national security.
For example, the Roman’s failure to mitigate the effects of trade disruption, political
discord, and multiplying security threats during the late third century ultimately led to
imperial collapse. The seventeenth century Ottoman and Safavid empires experienced
numerous security crises that exacerbated the effects of faltering domestic economies and
the rising costs of warfare. Ottoman leaders implemented policy reforms that extended
their rule, while their Safavid counterparts failed to realign their priorities and were
subsequently defeated. Britain’s relative economic decline at the turn of the twentieth
century constrained its military spending just as several competitors emerged; however,

1

Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power
(New York: Routledge), 25.
2
International commitments are obligations outside of a state’s borders that may have to be defended, and
“foreign policy consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the
nation’s commitments and…power.” See Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), 9.
3
This is the often referred to as the “Lippmann Gap.” See Samuel Huntington, “Coping with the Lippmann
Gap,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 3 (1987), 453-477.
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British leaders realigned their priorities and continued their global hegemony for several
more decades. These examples oversimplify complex histories, yet they highlight the
importance of remedying the security dilemma of relative decline caused by increasing
foreign policy challenges and declining domestic resources.
Conventional academic wisdom holds that relative decline generates serious security
concerns for great powers. Hegemonic stability theorists contend that relative decline
undermines the ability of systemic leaders to uphold a preferred international order.4
Power transition theorists argue that relative decline creates opportunities for revisionist
powers to challenge the status quo.5 Balance of Power theorists note that sudden power
shifts can upset the equilibrium necessary for preserving peace.6 Rationalist theories
argue that differential growth can lead to commitment problems, one of the leading
causes of war.7 Each of these theories cites the influence of relative decline on the
devolution from peaceful stability to conflictual instability. These theories suggest that
leaders must act, yet each is unclear about whether the best course of action is to delay,
fight, or cut costs to improve a state’s capacity for providing security.
Leaders generally have three options for responding to relative decline.8 One
possibility is to muddle along and hope for the best. Another option is to fight to restore

4

Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 10-11;
and Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4
(1988), 591-613.
5
A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 19-22;
and Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extension of the War
Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 7-12.
6
Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1962), 118; and Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random
House, 1962), 42.
7
James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995), 379-414;
and Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006), 169203.
8
Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 191-194; Jack Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive
Motivation for War,” World Politics 40, no. 1 (1987), 82-107; Stephen Rock, Appeasement in

2

an equilibrium. In fact, policymakers often increase military spending and replace bluff
and bluster for diplomacy, provocation for deterrence, and preventive war for inexorable
decline.9 These options, however, ignore a new strategic reality marked by international
disruptions to the status quo and domestic resource constraints. Simply stated, the rising
costs of security exceed a state’s available resources.10 In these circumstances,
reorienting a state’s foreign policy and realigning its security resources are necessary
despite the inherent risks of this course of action. Reducing the near-term cost of
overcommitment and marshalling resources (i.e. retrenchment) may provide the best
opportunity for realigning a state’s strategic ends and available means even though it can
be politically disruptive and strategically risky.11
Retrenchment is the intentional reduction of costs associated with a state’s foreign
policy, where costs are the product of security expenses, risks, and burdens.12 It alleviates
the “dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources.” Retrenchment reduces risks,

International Politics (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000); Harold Sprout and Margaret
Sprout, “Retreat from World Power: Processes and Consequences of Readjustment,” World Politics 15,
no. 4 (1963), 659-660; and Daniel Treisman, “Rational Appeasement,” International Organization 58,
no. 2 (2004), 345-373.
9
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), xxii; and Paul Kennedy, “Conclusions,” in The Fall of
Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy, ed. Gier Lundestad (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994), 374.
10
For example, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and Mancur Olson, The Rise and
Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1982).
11
Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and
Retrenchment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), 5; Alex Weisiger, Logics of War (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2013), chapter 2; Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2000), 41; and Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline,
1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 17.
12
For similar definitions see Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany
Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 13; Richard Rosecrance and Arthur
Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 4;
Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2006), 13; and Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose
in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2014), 2-6.
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shifts burdens, or economizes expenses to improve a state’s political and strategic
solvency.13 Retrenching states can economize expenses by reducing military spending or
force structures. They can reduce international risks by eliminating foreign policy
liabilities, restraining foreign policy goals in certain geographic areas, or demoting the
importance of some foreign interests. Regardless of a retrenchment’s form, it allows a
state to redistribute resources from peripheral to core security interests.
Ultimately, states implementing retrenchment have more sustainable foreign policies
that are less active, ambitious, and burdensome relative to the status quo.14 This
sustainability is important to the long-term strategic solvency of a great power, without
which relative decline may become absolute. States that successfully retrench end up
with more sustainable foreign policies and perform comparatively well in subsequent
military disputes.15 However, not all retrenchment attempts succeed. Therefore, what
explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes?
Core Argument
In what follows, I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to
extricate itself from existing commitments and, therefore, is unable to free resources to
address more critical security challenges. In broad terms, a great power might extricate
itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through
rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the
consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are a possibility.

Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, “The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources,”
World Politics 20, no. 4 (1968), 660-661.
14
MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 8.
15
Ibid., 3 and 8.
13

4

Contrary to prevailing wisdom, retrenchment will generally succeed unless 1) there is no
ally willing and able to accept responsibility, and 2) a great power fails at rapprochement,
and 3) the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest. Retrenchment
arguably has the best potential for improving a great power’s strategic solvency relative
to the uncertain options of muddling along or launching costly preventative wars, but the
merits of the policy are mired in debate.
The Retrenchment Debate
Studies of retrenchment remain divided between critics and advocates – pessimists
and optimists.16 According to critics, retrenchment is a rare, high-risk endeavor that
signals waning power and damages a state’s reputation among allies and adversaries.17
They assert that retrenchment from even peripheral commitments signals weakness and
demonstrates a lack of resolve,18 both of which diminish the benefits derived from
leading an existing security order.19 Since retrenchment sacrifices relative power, critics
contend that it lowers a state’s likelihood of winning if war occurs. Therefore, critics

16

For an overview of the debate, see Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth,
“Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security 37, no. 3 (2012),
7-51.
17
For theoretical and historical arguments against retrenchment see, Stephen Brooks and William C.
Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 40-41; Gilpin, War
and Change in World Politics, 192-197; G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and
Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Nuno P.
Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011), 940; and William R. Thompson, “Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment – Peril or Promise?”
International Security 36, no. 4 (2012), 193-197.
18
For instance, Thomas Donnelly, “We Can Afford to Spend More, and We Need To,” New York Times, 9
September 2012, at https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/09/09/how-big-should-the-defensebudget-be/we-can-afford-to-spend-more-and-we-need-to.
19
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America.” According to critics, retrenchment
may convince followers to seek another partner. This is the first part of the “hegemon’s dilemma,” in
which a hegemon may lead an order, but it needs followers. See Arthur Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma:
Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,” International Organization 38,
no. 2 (1984), 358.

5

believe that leaders adopting this policy hasten their state’s decline, and retrenchment is
rational only when using force is not a viable option.20 From this perspective, the
outcomes of retrenchment are all negative – diminished power, influence, and security –
so it should only be a policy of last resort.
In contrast, retrenchment advocates argue that the policy can have positive outcomes.
They contend that critics overstate the costs of retrenchment while minimizing those of
prolonged overcommitment.21 Great powers often accrue peripheral commitments with
little inherent value, so advocates note that retrenchment can be a beneficial policy that
facilitates reallocating resources to core interests.22 Moreover, advocates find that
retrenchment is less costly and is often an effective policy adopted by great powers
during periods of relative decline.23 Advocates also downplay reputational concerns,
noting that a state’s reputation is often context-dependent, so reducing peripheral

Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 40. This is the “turbulent frontier” theory: although leaders prefer
non-expansionist policies, they pursue expansionist strategies in pursuit of security. See John S.
Galbraith, “The ‘Turbulent Frontier’ as a Factor in British Expansion,” Comparative Studies in Society
and History 2, no. 2 (1960), 150-68.
21
For theoretical and historical arguments in favor of retrenchment see, Daniel W. Drezner, “Military
Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly as Much as You Think),” International Security 38, no. 1 (2013), 52-79;
Kyle Haynes, “Decline and Devolution: The Sources of Strategic Military Retrenchment,” International
Studies Quarterly 59, no. 1 (2015), 490-502; Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; John
Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); MacDonald and Parent, Twilight
of the Titans; Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of
Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011), 7-44; Joseph M. Parent and Paul K.
MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. (2011), 34; and Daniel Treisman,
“Rational Appeasement,” International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004), 345-373.
22
MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans; MacDonald and Parent, “Graceful Decline?”; and Barry
Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (2013): 116130.
23
Douglas B. Atkinson and George W. Williford, “Should We Stay or Should We Go? Exploring the
Outcomes of Great Power Retrenchment,” Research and Politics 3, no. 4 (2016), 1-6; MacDonald and
Parent, Twilight of the Titans; MacDonald and Parent, “Graceful Decline?” 9-10; Parent and MacDonald,
“The Wisdom of Retrenchment.” Since 1870, great powers in relative decline opted to retrench in 15 of
18 cases. Of those powers that did retrench, six regained their previous standing and states that retrenched
were less likely to experience interstate conflicts.
20

6

commitments may signal resolve in more vital regions.24 States may even be able to
identify a successor to uphold a preferred security order,25 or use retrenchment as a
screening mechanism to assess a rising rival’s intentions.26 Finally, advocates suggest
that when a state refuses to retrench it may undermine its legitimacy and increase the
likelihood of conflict or the formation of counterbalancing coalitions.27
Both sides of the retrenchment debate generally agree on the conditions under which
retrenchment will likely occur, and about retrenchment’s potential costs. Internationally,
retrenchment may signal weakness which alarms allies and encourages adversaries.
Disengagement may also destabilize regions and undermine the international order.
Domestically, special interests might mobilize to defend their parochial interests, and
elite consensus could fracture as hardliners conflate retrenchment with defeat and accuse
advocates of appeasement. Critics view retrenchment as a reactive and unfavorable
strategy that is rare and only viable when vital interests are at stake or when the costs of
preventive war are likely to be prohibitive.28 Advocates consider retrenchment a viable
option, but “only after decline has generated overwhelming incentives [to retrench].”29

See Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in
International Politics,” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015), 473-495; Joe Clare and Vesna
Danilovic, “Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 29,
no. 1 (2012), 3-27; and Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
25
Haynes, “Decline and Devolution.”
26
Brandon K. Yoder, “Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and
Credible Signals,” American Journal of Political Science 63, no. 1 (2019), 130-145.
27
This is the second half of the “hegemon’s dilemma,” in which a dominant state may have to make
concessions to retain the support of followers. See Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma,” 358. For similar
arguments see Christopher A. Preble, The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us
Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); and Harvey M.
Sapolsky, Benjamin H. Friedman, Eugene Gholz, and Daryl G. Press, “Restraining Order: For Strategic
Modesty,” World Affairs 172, no. 2 (2009), 84-89.
28
Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 40-41; and Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 192-194,
197, 232.
29
Kyle Haynes, “Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment: Peril or Promise?” International Security 36,
no. 4 (2012), 192.
24
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Critics and advocates view retrenchment as a costly policy that a declining state will only
reluctantly adopt.30 This ignores the positive outcomes that may occur if leaders conduct
retrenchment well, and misses the potential that retrenchment may be more likely to
succeed if leaders meet certain conditions.
The literature recognizes that leaders may opt for various retrenchment policies, but it
fails to examine the effects of these choices on retrenchment outcomes. Critics accept that
retrenchment may be a viable option under some conditions and note that the way a state
retrenches may avoiding some negative consequences.31 Advocates show that
retrenchment occurs more frequently than critics predict, but they do not explain the
conditions necessary for it to succeed. By focusing debate on retrenchment’s merits
instead of its outcomes, the literature ignores the purpose of the policy and fails to
provide criteria for evaluating the utility of retrenchment against alternatives.32
Under certain conditions it may be wise to retrench to facilitate prolonging the
duration of a state’s power and influence. For example, between 1889 and 1914, Britain’s
leaders debated how to realign the costs and distribution of its naval assets during a
period of rising regional competition and relative economic decline. Some realignment
decisions were relatively easy, such as removing naval assets from the Pacific coast of
North America, but others entailed more risk. During this period, British leaders
abandoned interests to the United States, allied with Japan to facilitate naval
redeployment, and sought rapprochement with France and Russia to lower regional

Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 194; Haynes, “Decline and Devolution,” 192; and
MacDonald and Parent, “Graceful Decline?” 21.
31
Gilpin, chapter 5; and Haynes, “Correspondence,” 192.
32
David A. Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000),
167-182.
30

8

security costs. These efforts, along with domestic reforms, alleviated Britain’s resource
constraints. After Germany enacted a policy of naval expansion in 1904, Britain’s
improved resource base provided its leaders with options for countering the rising
German threat. Although retrenchment risked strengthening potential regional
competitors, it enabled British leaders to confront a higher priority threat without
jeopardizing Britain’s strategic solvency.33 This example demonstrates that retrenchment
can succeed, so the ongoing debate about its merits likely stems from a fundamental
misunderstanding about what retrenchment is and what is its purpose.
Retrenchment and its Purpose
Leaders compete internationally to improve their state’s security.34 The intensity of
this competition varies, which causes the pattern of a great power’s foreign policy to
resemble a punctuated equilibrium model of organizational evolution.35 During stable
periods with few threats and more abundant resources, leaders typically make
incremental and adaptive security commitments that align with their state’s primary
geostrategic orientation.36 Periodically, however, new threats may lead to increasingly
maladapted or inflexible foreign policies that contribute to crises, raise the chances for
war, or exacerbate the effects of relative decline.37 These episodes often reveal that a state

See Nicholas Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 1999) and Jon Sumida, In Defense of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval
Policy, 1889-1914 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
34
Leaders reside in a group comprised of the head of state and officials charged with deciding security
policy. Membership in this group varies, but it remains distinct from bureaucracies charged with
implementing decisions. See Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro,
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 25.
35
See Michael L. Tushman and Elaine Romanelli, “Organizational Evolution: A Metamorphosis Model of
Convergence and Reorientation,” in Research and Organizational Behavior, eds. Larry L. Cummins and
Barry M. Staw (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1985), 171-222.
36
Ibid., 173.
37
Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999), 85; James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,”
33

9

has insufficient resources or is overcommitted to a foreign policy goal. During these
periods, a great power may face security challenges on multiple fronts; however, the lack
of resources and overcommitment often prevents leaders from reacting effectively. In
these circumstances, leaders may opt to attempt strategic reorientation, a process intended
to change the direction of their state’s power projection from lesser to more important
security interests. The challenge is how to successfully realign resources by cutting
commitments in one region to provide additional resources for addressing more critical
challenges.
Strategic reorientation occurs over time as a four-stage life-cycle that reflects the
interrelated dynamics of international structure and domestic politics. These mutuallyreinforcing, sequentially-linked stages have an undefined duration ex ante.38 Leaders
perceive a need for retrenchment during periods of misalignment marked by rising
international threats, especially shifts in relative power, and declining domestic resources
resulting from economic downturns, dysfunctional politics, or declining public support
for existing foreign policies. These antecedent conditions eventually lead to a decision
point regarding retrenchment where leaders consider the strategic circumstances and
decide how to reduce security costs. Realignment begins once leaders start to implement
and synchronize retrenchment activities. An outcome eventually emerges based on how
the costs and benefits of retrenchment facilitate strategic reorientation. Retrenchment
succeeds when it results in strategic reorientation and fails otherwise (figure 1).

International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995), 379-414; and Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War
(London: Macmillan, 1973), 246.
38
Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International
Organization 41, no. 3 (1987), 335-370; and Walter Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem in
Foreign Policy Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1992), 245-270.
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Figure 1. Four-stage strategic reorientation model.39
Retrenchment is the core stage of strategic reorientation during which leaders mediate
between existing security goals and the need to adapt to a changing security environment.
Leaders retrench during periods of overcommitment and acute relative decline because
the competitive and anarchic realm of great power politics incentivizes them to remain
strategically solvent.40 Overcommitted great powers attempt to avoid insolvency by
retrenching to regroup and slow, if not reverse, their decline. Over the long-term, the
international system punishes states that fail to balance their foreign policy objectives
with available resources.41 States that fail to retrench will eventually succumb to
aggression as rivals exploit inflexible foreign policies and military overextension.
The goal of retrenchment is to realign resources by reducing security-related costs in
one region to provide additional resources for addressing a neglected security challenge
in another region. There are two types of retrenchment – strategic and operational –
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differentiated by the types of policies implemented and whether retrenchment lowers the
associated risk or price of security.42 Strategic retrenchment entails a variety of external
policies such as redeploying military forces, removing or mitigating flashpoints, reducing
security burdens by redistributing them to an ally, or altogether abandoning an interest. 43
This type of retrenchment reduces the risks associated with a state’s foreign policy by
minimizing extraneous or overly costly commitments, and makes resources available for
improving deterrence and defenses in more important areas. Operational retrenchment
involves internal policies aimed at lowering the price of security. States free resources for
investment elsewhere by slowing or reducing military expenditures and cutting foreign
aid. Options include reducing military spending, revising military force structures, and
reforming underperforming or outmoded security institutions.44
Why This Matters
Academic claims about retrenchment’s dangers shape our theoretical understanding
of the causes of war and influence policymakers’ assessments of the risks of reducing
American engagement abroad. These claims also fuel concerns over how the rise of new
powers will undermine the existing international order. Graham Allison reflects the
widespread view that “based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and
China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely…When a rising
power is threatening to displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be
contained…can initiate a cascade of reactions.”45 However, in the past, declining powers
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that successfully retrenched managed power shifts more peacefully and managed to limit
their rate of decline and prolong their influence on the international order. Therefore,
understanding the factors that influence retrenchment outcomes is deeply important for
identifying strategies for success.
Most theories about retrenchment have limited empirical support to justify their bleak
assertions about the policy and its potential outcomes. Retrenchment is the most common
response to relative decline. States in decline are more likely to cut the costs and size of
their military or form alliances and abandon interests. Moreover, rather than leading to
exploitation by adversaries, declining states perform comparatively well in military
disputes that occur following retrenchment.46 Despite these clear benefits, scholars and
policymakers continue to believe in the importance of prestige, the need for credibility,
and the dangers of appeasement. From this perspective, even the mere perception of
decline or hint of retrenchment might lead to trouble.47 This flawed logic has buttressed
policies of geopolitical overstretch and resulted in failed geostrategic adjustment.48
Recent arguments for continued American engagement abroad rest upon this logic which
holds that any decline in American engagement would destabilize the international
order.49 Within the policymaking arena, the mantra about the indispensability of the
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United States’ global leadership short-circuits rational policy considerations. Rather than
critically evaluating the wisdom of retrenchment, leaders hold that America must
maintain all its commitments regardless of the cost.50
The United States now faces a dilemma as its leaders struggle to prolong the benefits
of hegemony. Political and military developments in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East
threaten important national interests, but the effects of military overcommitment and an
eroding domestic resource base have resulted in America’s strategic insolvency. Despite
having the largest economy in the world, almost two decades of sustained combat
operations have left the United States poorly postured and struggling to outpace
modernizing rivals like China and Russia.51 Elite polarization also diminishes the
political capacity for purposeful action. The American public supports current defense
spending levels and an active role in foreign affairs.52 Therefore, the crux of the current
debate is whether and how leaders can reorient American foreign policy and realign the
resources necessary for continuing global leadership.
Research Design
In subsequent chapters, I assess the claims of retrenchment critics and advocates
against the empirical record. Rather than examine when retrenchment is most likely to
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occur, I identify what explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes to determine the
necessary conditions for it to succeed. I conceptualize retrenchment within a process of
strategic reorientation shaped by international and domestic constraints. Towards this
end, I used primary and secondary sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis and
structured, focused comparison of two cases of United States retrenchment – from
Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, and the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. One
broad question motivated my effort: what explains the observed variation in the outcomes
of attempted retrenchment? My findings illuminate that ally availability, the outcome of
rapprochement with rivals, and the ability of leaders to abandon a foreign interest provide
a coherent explanation for observed outcomes. Moreover, I find that retrenchment is
more likely to succeed than fail. These findings contribute to the literature by situating
retrenchment within a larger foreign policy process and identifying the necessary
conditions for retrenchment to succeed. More importantly, my findings deliver policyrelevant knowledge to decisionmakers by providing an analytic framework for assessing
the utility of retrenchment.
Methods
This study used primary and secondary sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis
that applied structured, focused comparison of United States retrenchment from
Southeast Asia from 1969 until 1975, and the Middle East beginning in 2009 until
2015.53 Investigation focused on published or available public document collections that
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gathered the most important records pertaining to policy decision-making. It also
included the memoirs of key actors which provided first-hand accounts of relevant
considerations and reasoning despite their potential bias. Extensive secondary literature
for each case rounded out considered explanations. Although secondary sources might
lack historical consensus, the rich historiography for each case enabled assessing the
overall weight of academic opinion regarding historical contexts and outcomes.54
The limited number of historical retrenchment attempts and inherent difficulty in
quantifying key variables reduced the utility of quantitative analysis and situated the
phenomenon within a research niche well-suited for a comparative approach. This
method enabled developing contingent generalizations about the conditions necessary for
retrenchment to succeed. Despite the difficulty of measuring the weight of causal effects,
my approach facilitated considering specific contexts through in-depth exploration of the
variables affecting retrenchment outcomes.55 It may have been possible to identify
additional cases from the full range of history, but this would have required an unrealistic
amount of case research given the scope of this project. These trade-offs were not
sufficiently compelling to forego exploring an understudied phenomenon.
Defining and Measuring the Variables
The proposed model of strategic reorientation posits misalignment between a great
power’s commitments and resources due to relative decline stemming from international
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or domestic factors. This project established the strategic context for each case using
secondary sources to identify the presence and nature of emerging threats, shifting
locations of geopolitical competition, military overcommitment, and domestic political
divisions. I also examined the political decisions and debates surrounding retrenchment.
Unit of Analysis. The unit of analysis is a retrenchment attempt where indicators
show leaders sought to reduce the near-term costs of providing a state’s security.
Indicators included a speech by a leader directly expressing plans to retrench, a postconflict reduction of military forces to below pre-conflict levels, substituting economic or
diplomatic engagement for military involvement, diplomatic efforts to form alliances or
enhance ally capacity, rapprochement with rivals, or abandoning goals that might
undermine a regional security order.
Independent Variables. The independent variables are ally availability,
rapprochement outcome, and interest abandonment. Ally availability is the presence of a
potential successor state with compatible strategic preferences and the military capacity –
or potential capacity – to maintain a regional security order. Whether an ally is available
was coded as either yes or no. Rapprochement outcome is the result of a determined and
sustained attempt by the retrenching power to negotiate with its primary regional rival to
reduce potential flashpoints and limit the risk for predatory behavior. The outcome of
these negotiations was either success or failure, where a rival in the former circumstance
agrees to limit aggression and does not consent in the latter case. Finally, interest
abandonment is whether a great power’s leaders abandoned their security interest in an
area after retrenchment occurred. Interest abandonment was coded as either yes or no
depending on whether the great power re-intervened or not following withdrawal.
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Dependent Variable. The dependent variable is a retrenchment outcome. The intent
of retrenchment is to reduce near-term security costs to increase long-term strategic
solvency. Evaluating the outcome of a retrenchment attempt required multi-dimensional
criterion for success. Determining the degree of success required qualitatively evaluating
its effectiveness, costs, and benefits as they related to the level of reduced commitment,
rather than other goals which might have changed over time or been prevented by
evolving circumstances.56
Retrenchment is goal-oriented, so effectiveness is a necessary – but not sufficient –
condition for success.57 Effectiveness is the degree to which retrenchment succeeds in
realigning resources to address a more critical challenge. As a continuous variable, the
degree of effectiveness depends on the level of reduced commitment as the result of
burden sharing, rapprochement, or interest abandonment. Moreover, effectiveness may
have a positive (i.e., effective) or negative (i.e., ineffective) value. Retrenchment can
reduce the level of commitment to effectively zero, partially reduce commitments, or
ineffectively reduce commitments in a meaningful way.
Determining success also requires considering incurred costs. Costs are the effort,
loss, or sacrifice necessary to achieve a leader’s desired retrenchment goals. They may be
material or non-material, and the most significant costs inhere directly to the retrenching
state as the result of trade-offs among various interests or goals. Relevant costs also result
from the effects of retrenchment on allies or regional interests. Costs may be high,
moderate, or low based on the extent to which the net value of goals achieved exceeds
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related costs. States facing an existential crisis might incur high costs to retrench and still
succeed, while a state that achieves a modest goal at high cost gains a Pyrrhic victory and
fails.
Lastly, benefits that accrue to the retrenching state also influence outcome
assessments. Benefits are the advantages or improvements gained through retrenchment.
Relevant benefits relate to those gained by the retrenching state, because leaders opt to
withdraw to protect their state’s national interests, not those of other states. Any benefits
that accrue to other states as the result of retrenchment are incidental. Since retrenchment
occurs in part because of military overcommitment, dysfunctional domestic politics, or
economic decline, improvements to a state’s strategic solvency represent the most
important benefits for assessing outcomes. In other words, for retrenchment to succeed it
must close the resource gap and facilitate strategic reorientation.
Success occurs when leaders reduce foreign commitments in a less important region
and realign resources to address a more critical threat. Failure results when leaders fail to
reduce commitments and cannot reorient their state’s power projection. Threat levels do
not need to decline in any outcome, since threats are exogenous to the retrenchment
process; however, successful outcomes require improving a state’s capacity for
responding to emerging threats. Similarly, the overall number of foreign commitments do
not need to decline in any outcome, though successful outcomes should provide evidence
that commitments declined in one region before increasing elsewhere.
Case Selection
The theoretical and empirical requirements for this project entailed examining
historical periods when great powers maintained peripheral commitments, faced rising
19

international competition, and experienced declining domestic political or economic
capacity. Under these conditions, leaders considered retrenchment as a viable policy
option that they subsequently decided to attempt. I examined cases of retrenchment
during periods of both international and domestic relative decline. To maintain
consistency and isolate relevant variables, I focused on states with similar domestic
institutions at comparable periods of technological development. Finally, the
retrenchment attempts considered within this study emphasized reducing costs by
changing a state’s strategic ends and the means with which it pursued security. I excluded
minor adjustments to military budgets, cancellation of weapons acquisition programs,
mandated base closures, or routine treaty negotiations. With these criteria I identified
sixteen cases of attempted retrenchment since 1870, the period in which the modern great
power system and industrialized militaries arose: seven by Great Britain, two by France,
one by the Soviet Union, and six by the United States. Table 1 lists the universe of cases
and provides an initial outcome coding.
Table 1. Considered universe of cases.
CASE
CODING
CASE
CODING
1. Great Britain - 1895 Success 9. France - 1954
Success
2. Great Britain - 1908 Success 10. Great Britain - 1956
Success
3. United States - 1920
Failure
11. France - 1962
Success
4. Great Britain - 1930
Failure
12. Great Britain - 1968
Success
5. Great Britain - 1935
Failure
13. United States - 1969 Success
6. Great Britain - 1946 Success 14. Soviet Union - 1991
Failure
7. United States - 1946
Failure
15. United States - 1992
Failure
8. United States - 1953 Success 16. United States - 2009
Failure
I selected for analysis two episodes of attempted retrenchment by the United States in
the post-World War II era: Southeast Asia in 1969 and the Middle East in 2009. Selecting
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cases from an assortment of countries would likely be illuminating; however, the United
States is inherently interesting and important given its current standing and ongoing
debates about the future of American hegemony. Moreover, the United States maintained
foreign commitments in one or more peripheral regions, emerged as a global hegemon
during a period of intense competition, and experienced intermittent periods of relative
decline resulting from international or domestic factors. During this period, the United
States’ Cold War with the Soviet Union and subsequent unipolar dominance placed a
premium on signaling resolve, lest competitors assess weakness and decide to challenge
American hegemony. These conditions suggest that retrenchment should not only have
been rare, any attempts were risky and likely to fail because an adversary stood ready to
take advantage of American withdrawal. Thus, the United States is a hard case for the
arguments proposed by retrenchment critics.
Case Summaries
As mentioned above, I examined two cases of United States retrenchment. The cases
include different strategic environments as defined by ally availability, regional
adversaries, rising competitors, and domestic circumstances influencing the ability to
abandon an interest. These cases illustrate how my proposed variables affect
retrenchment outcomes and validates my hypotheses regarding when retrenchment will
succeed or fail. The first case, a success, occurred in Southeast Asia between 1969 and
1975. The second one, a failure, occurred in the Middle East from 2009 to 2015.
Case 1: Retrenchment from Southeast Asia, 1969-1975. The Nixon administration
assumed responsibility for American foreign policy during a period of international and
domestic change that necessitated developing a new strategic approach. American
21

diplomacy and military force had become overcommitted during America’s conflict in
Vietnam. The level of political and diplomatic effort expended in Vietnam resulted in the
strategic neglect of other critical areas of Cold War competition. In the Middle East, the
Soviet Union took advantage of American preoccupation with Vietnam to increase the
Soviet’s presence and influence in the region. President Nixon believed that this, along
with ongoing international changes, reduced the United States’ relative power and had to
be addressed.58
President Nixon and his security advisor, Henry Kissinger, recognized that ongoing
American involvement in Vietnam and the evolving international system needed to be
addressed to alleviate their foreign policy dilemma. Changes in the international system
included the emergence of nascent political and economic multipolarity as the strength of
the Western European and Japanese economies increased their international clout. The
Soviet Union’s attainment of strategic parity and emergence as a global power was
another key change that developed while the United States was distracted in Vietnam.
The Nixon administration had to reconcile the conflicting demands emerging from
political and economic multipolarity and revitalized military bipolarity, though the
administration focused more on the latter given the inherent risks involved in ongoing
Cold War competition along the periphery.
President Nixon opted for a policy of retrenchment from Vietnam and Southeast Asia
to facilitate strategically reorienting towards more important regions of geopolitical
competition. He managed to retrench successfully by adhering to a policy of gradual and
orderly withdrawal supported by burden sharing with an ally, South Vietnam, and
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rapprochement with rivals, China and the Soviet Union. By 1975, despite the changed
dynamics of the executive and legislative branches that emerged after the withdrawal
from Vietnam and Watergate scandal, Congress continued to support engagement abroad
even if it forced President Ford to abandon any American interest in South Vietnam.
Overall, President Nixon successfully retrenched and reoriented American foreign policy.
Withdrawal from Southeast Asia neither discouraged key allies nor encouraged adversary
aggression. Moreover, retrenchment facilitated reorienting towards the Middle East to
counter increasing Soviet involvement in a region critical for the economic security of the
United States and its allies. Figure 2 illustrates the pertinent facets of this case.

Figure 2. Successful American retrenchment from Southeast Asia, 1969-1975.
Case 2: Retrenchment from the Middle East, 2009-2015. Forty years after President
Nixon, President Barack Obama faced similar security challenges in the Middle East.
President Obama rose to office on a wave of public discontent with the country’s foreign
policy and questions about the role of American power and ideas.59 The security context
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he faced was arguably more complicated than that of his processors, partly because the
consensus regarding the American-led liberal order was shaken following the 2003
invasion of Iraq and the 2008 financial crisis.60 The Obama administration faced a tough
reality characterized by rising regional powers, America’s relative military and economic
decline, and power diffusion throughout a changing international order. President Obama
believed that his foreign policy task was to redefine the United States’ role in the world.
He sought to restore weakened relations with allies, extricate the United States from Iraq
and Afghanistan, and to avoid further entanglements in the Middle East. In other words,
President Obama aimed to retrench.
President Obama intended to improve the United States’ strategic solvency by
eliminating peripheral commitments in the Middle East and reorienting to address more
critical interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Before entering office, he concluded that the
ideological struggles in the Middle East were too complex for external powers to resolve,
particularly through either regime change or large-scale ground combat operations
typified by those in Iraq from 2003 onward.61 However, President Obama failed to hand
off responsibility to regional allies like Saudi Arabia and failed at rapprochement with
Russia and Iran. Subsequent security challenges in the Middle East following American
disengagement demonstrated that the United States could not afford to limit its role in the
region.
The United States reluctantly participated in coalition efforts to depose the Libyan
dictator Muammar Gaddafi, and its unwillingness to lead post-intervention security
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efforts contributed to Libya becoming a failed state and host to Islamist extremist groups.
Moreover, in the absence of American diplomacy backed by the threat of military force,
Russian military intervention into the Syrian Civil War on behalf of the Syrian
government resulted in a mass exodus of refugees that destabilized Syria’s neighbors and
disrupted European politics. Retrenchment also meant that the United States was unable
to counter Iranian influence spreading throughout the region in direct opposition to
America’s regional security interests. Finally, American political dysfunction prevented
abandonment of the United States’ interests in the greater Middle East. As a result, the
attempted retrenchment failed and an American strategic reorientation to Asia was
unsuccessful. Figure 3 illustrates the pertinent facets of this case.

Figure 3. Failed American retrenchment from the Middle East, 2009-2015.
Chapter Outline
In the remaining four chapters I explain my theory of retrenchment outcomes and
present hypotheses regarding when particular outcomes will occur. Then I test these
hypotheses against two historical cases of attempted American retrenchment. Finally, I
present my conclusion in which I summarize my findings and discusses their relevance to
25

scholarship and policy-making by examining the ongoing American retrenchment from
Syria. Below, I provide a summary of each chapter.
Chapter 2. This chapter presents my theoretical framework for explaining the
variation in retrenchment outcomes. I argue that a policy of retrenchment can facilitate
overcoming the challenges of overcommitment by redistributing resources from
peripheral to core security interests to improve a state’s strategic solvency. In broad
terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off
responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by
abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none
of these three options are possible. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, I argue that
retrenchment will generally succeed unless 1) there is no ally willing and able to accept
responsibility for maintaining regional security, and 2) a great power fails at
rapprochement, and 3) the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest.
Chapter 3. This chapter applies my theoretical framework and tests hypotheses on the
case of American retrenchment from Southeast Asia from 1969 to 1975. In this case,
President Richard Nixon overcame the challenges of overcommitment and constrained
power projection by implementing a policy of retrenchment. He redistributed resources
from peripheral to core security interests and improved the United States’ strategic
solvency. President Nixon attempted to hand off responsibility to the South Vietnamese,
but ultimately failed because of their political dysfunction. However, effective
rapprochement by the United States with China and the Soviet Union, combined with the
abandonment of American interests in South Vietnam, ultimately led to retrenchment
success.
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Chapter 4. This chapter applies my theoretical framework and examines why the
United States failed to retrench from the Middle East between 2009 and 2015. President
Obama intended to retrench from the Middle East – especially Iraq and Afghanistan – to
reorient American power towards East Asia. However, he could not identify a suitable
successor to counter rising Iranian influence or contain regional crises, nor did he succeed
at rapprochement with Iran to minimize its potential for taking advantage of American
withdrawal. Subsequent Middle East crises sparked intense debate about the wisdom of
withdrawal. A combination of American political partisanship and allied pressure left
President Obama unable to abandon American interests in the region. As a result,
retrenchment failed.
Chapter 5. In this concluding chapter I summarize my key findings and discuss their
implications for academic scholarship and policymaking. I also apply my theory to
predict the likely outcome of President Donald Trump’s recent announcement to
withdraw all American forces from Syria.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
“For what settles practical controversy is the knowledge that ends and means have to be
balanced: an agreement has eventually to be reached when men admit that they must pay
for what they want and that they must want only what they are willing to pay for. If they
do not have to come to such an agreement, they will never except by accident agree. For
they will lack a yardstick by which to measure their interests, or their ways and means of
promoting and protecting them.”62
Core Theoretical Argument
How does a great power realign its strategic priorities when overcommitment abroad
constrains its military power projection and limits diplomatic flexibility? A policy of
retrenchment may facilitate overcoming these challenges by redistributing resources from
peripheral to core security interests to improve the state’s strategic solvency. States that
successfully retrench end up with more sustainable foreign policies and perform
comparatively well in subsequent military disputes.63 However, not all retrenchment
attempts succeed. Therefore, what explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes? I
argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from a
commitment to free resources for addressing more critical challenges.
In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing
off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by
abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none
of these options are possible. In other words, and contrary to prevailing wisdom,
retrenchment will generally succeed unless 1) there is no ally willing and able to accept
responsibility, and 2) a great power fails at rapprochement, and 3) the great power is
politically unable to abandon an interest. The discussion below explains key assumptions,
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presents a model of retrenchment and strategic reorientation, then discusses plausible
hypotheses for explaining variation in retrenchment outcomes.
Key Assumptions
The following theory of retrenchment outcomes makes three key assumptions about
states that retrench, leader behaviors, and international threats. First, any state may
conceivably retrench, but the most important cases of retrenchment involve great powers.
These states possess the largest share of international military, economic, and diplomatic
power and they have interests distributed across geographic regions.64 I do not assume
that material factors have the most substantial impact on national power. Instead, I give
them equal footing with non-material factors that influence a state’s ability to react to and
shape the international environment.65 Those powers that seek to maintain their status
encounter more complex realignment decisions than the simpler guns versus butter
calculations made by smaller states. Mid- and small-sized states do worry about the
global distribution of power, but their limited stature and resources constrain their
capacity to influence anything beyond local issues.
Second, I assume great power leaders focus on long-term trends rather than shortterm power fluctuations when assessing national power. Furthermore, because great
powers exist within a self-help system where they must maintain security against external
threats, I assume leaders focus on assessments of relative rather than absolute power.66 I
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also assume leaders are generally prudent and rational actors capable of assessing relative
power.67 Though leaders are undoubtedly subject to motivated biases and cognitive
errors,68 the hazards associated with decline incentivize disregarding biases and opting
for pragmatic policies.69
Third, while the goal of retrenchment is to lower security costs to free up resources, I
do not assume that threat levels necessarily decline, since this is a structural condition
independent of a state. Moreover, reorienting will likely result in threat substitution and
may even result in a net increase, because threats remain in the area from which the state
retrenched. Similarly, the overall level of foreign commitments does not need to decline
for retrenchment to succeed, because the state will establish commitments that align with
its new strategic orientation.
Retrenchment
Retrenchment is the core stage of strategic reorientation during which leaders mediate
between existing security goals and the need to adapt to a changing security environment.
States retrench during periods of overcommitment and acute relative decline, because the
competitive and anarchic realm of great power politics incentivizes them to remain
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strategically solvent.70 Overcommitted great powers attempt to avoid insolvency by
retrenching to regroup and slow, if not reverse, their decline. Over the long-term, the
international system punishes states that fail to balance their foreign policy objectives
with available resources.71 States that fail to retrench will eventually succumb to
aggression as rivals exploit inflexible foreign policies and military overextension.
The goal of retrenchment is to realign resources by reducing security-related costs in
one region to provide additional resources for addressing a neglected security challenge
in another region. There are two types of retrenchment – strategic and operational–
differentiated by the types of policies implemented and whether retrenchment lowers
security’s risk or price.72 Strategic retrenchment entails a variety of external policies
including the redeployment of military forces, removal or mitigation of flashpoints,
reduction of security burdens by redistributing them to an ally, or abandonment of an
interest.73 This type of retrenchment reduces the risks of a state’s foreign policy by
minimizing extraneous or overly costly commitments, which makes resources available
for improving deterrence and defense in more important areas.74 Operational
retrenchment involves internal policies aimed at lowering the price of security. States
free resources for investment elsewhere by slowing or reducing military expenditures and
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cutting foreign aid. Options include reducing military spending, revising military force
structures, and reforming underperforming or outmoded security institutions.75
Explaining Variation in Retrenchment Outcomes
Great powers can recover from decline if they adjust their policies regarding foreign
commitments, yet this takes time, resources, and leader attention. Consequently, states
require “breathing room” in which leaders can focus on making necessary adjustments.76
Retrenchment provides this “breathing room” and allows states to realign security-related
resources and reorient foreign policy by shifting burdens onto allies, avoiding conflicts,
and reducing expenditures.77 It is not, however, a simple or one-size-fits-all activity;
instead, retrenchment is a multifaceted policy that leaders can tailor to fit their strategic
circumstances.
Retrenchment success hinges on a great power’s ability to reduce overcommitment by
extricating itself from existing commitments in a region to free resources for countering
more pressing threats.78 When realigning resources and commitments, a great power can
retrench in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through
rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the
consequences. How allies or rivals react to withdrawal and the influence of domestic
political divisions on foreign policy also affect retrenchment outcomes.
Burden Sharing. Retrenching states will generally be risk averse when withdrawing
from a region because of the potential consequences of the collapse of the status quo. A
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great power’s expectation for post-retrenchment stability will often depend on the
availability of a suitable “successor state.” These states ostensibly have the ability and
willingness to accept responsibility for preserving a favorable balance of power.79 The
availability of such a partner facilitates withdrawal by providing deterrent benefits and
maintaining local dynamics beneficial to the retrenching state’s interests.80 While
offering distinct benefits, relying on a successor creates a dilemma.
Entrusting security to a successor means the retrenching state must trust another state
to truthfully represent its capabilities and ambitions.81 Successor states may misrepresent
their will or capability to maintain regional order or they may have revisionist
intentions.82 Despite these risks, a retrenching state can use its existing resources, as well
as resources gained through retrenchment, to strengthen, recruit, and reward faithful allies
or punish betrayal.83 In general, a retrenching state will seek to improve the capacity of a
successor state by providing bilateral economic and military aid explicitly intended to
enhance the successor’s military capabilities and power projection.84 Though identifying
a suitable successor or improving their military capabilities does not guarantee that the
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status quo will be maintained, retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can
identify a suitable successor to uphold an existing security order.
Britain’s support of Japan during the former’s withdrawal from East Asia in the early
1900s illustrates how identifying a successor can enable retrenchment success. Russian
expansion in Asia and its threat to the “Open Door” policy prompted Britain to form an
alliance with Japan in 1902.85 The pact was intended as a means by which Britain could
maintain the status quo in the Far East by sharing the burden with another power.86
Between 1902 and 1904, Britain sought to improve Japan’s military capacity relative to
the Russians and French. Britain built the bulk of the Japanese Navy and provided it with
better ships than Japan could have constructed on its own. British banks also financed
Japan’s war efforts against Russia during the 1905 Russo-Japanese War.87 After Japan
decisively defeated the Russian navy at the Battle of Tsushima, effectively ending the
Russian threat in East Asia, Britain could afford to withdraw the bulk of its naval forces
and rely on its ally to defend British interests in the region.88
Rapprochement. Besides identifying a successor state, a retrenching great power can
attempt to remove potential flashpoints through rapprochement with regional rivals.89
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Rapprochement occurs when a state makes policy concessions or engages in sustained
efforts to settle disputes with another state.90 The great power can either negotiate a
settlement on divisive issues, or tacitly accept limited spheres of influence to prevent
friction and reduce the risk of aggression during retrenchment. Rapprochement operates
by resolving grievances and diffusing secondary threats.
Resolving grievances involves the hope by the retrenching power that significant,
even asymmetrical, concessions will resolve an issue to prevent aggression or war in the
future. Retrenching great powers might attempt to diffuse secondary threats when they
face multiple security challenges and possess limited resources. Diffusing secondary
threats requires the retrenching state to make extensive concessions to a less threatening
rival to free resources to deter or defend against a more threatening adversary. By settling
disputes and making limited concessions on outstanding disagreements, the retrenching
state appears less threatening to the rival’s interests. The intent is to avoid conflict with
the less threatening rival to better position the retrenching power for potential conflict
with another rival.91 Though resolving grievances and diffusing secondary threats with a
rival through rapprochement does not guarantee a rival will not renege on an agreement,
strategic retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at
rapprochement with adversaries.
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British retrenchment from the Western Hemisphere between 1904 and 1906 illustrates the
concessions to a rival, such as Britain’s activity towards Germany in the 1930s. See Rock, Appeasement
in International Politics , 10-12.
90
Charles Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2010); and Stephen Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in
Historical Perspective (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).
91
Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British
Appeasement in the 1930s,” International Security 33, no. 2 (2008), 154-155.

35

potential value of rapprochement to retrenchment success. Throughout the 19th century,
Britain viewed the United States as the primary threat to British interests in the Western
Hemisphere; however, budgetary constraints and the rising threat of Germany compelled
British leaders to begin rapprochement with the United States. They resolved grievances
by acceding to arbitration to settle the 1895 Venezuelan Crisis, signed the Hay–
Pauncefote Treaty granting the United States the right to build and control the Panama
Canal, and settled an ongoing Alaskan boundary dispute. Moreover, by tacitly accepting
the Monroe Doctrine, Britain diffused secondary threats to Canada and the West Indies,
thereby allowing it to focus its resources on more salient European threats.92
Abandonment. Abandoning a security interest is an option when a great power
cannot find a suitable ally for burden-sharing and regional adversaries remain implacable.
Abandonment rapidly frees resources for use in more critical areas. Abandoning an
interest presents significant challenges, because it involves overcoming risk aversion to
altering the status quo. Regardless, when a suitable ally is unavailable, and an adversary’s
grievances remain non-negotiable, retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a
great power is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. However,
retrenchment is a Fabian strategy that seeks to trade space for time to realign a state’s
foreign policy.93 The inherent political opposition to this type of strategy suggests that the
likelihood of abandonment occurring will depend upon the influence of domestic politics.
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Domestic political divisions not only affect the decision to retrench,94 they can
influence retrenchment outcomes. Divisions result from party factions, bureaucratic
interests, and regional or sectoral interests, or war weariness. They center on the level of
polarization in perceptions about the nature and extent of security threats, similarity of
policy preferences, agreement about the domestic political risks associated with
retrenchment, and the amount of military versus civilian spending.95 Moreover, the
defection or failure of an ally or sudden aggression by an adversary during withdrawal
may strengthen political opposition to abandonment. Political opponents have an
incentive to advocate for alternative policies, so they may resist abandonment or attempt
to exploit its consequences for domestic political gain. This diminishes a leader’s
political autonomy and may result in half-measures or contradictory policies. Therefore,
retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic political divisions have
on accepting the logical implications of regional withdrawal.
Britain’s decision to withdraw “East of Suez” reflects the dynamics of abandonment
in retrenchment success. Following World War II, Britain retained a chain of overseas
military bases stretching from the Suez Canal to Singapore. These bases were historically
viewed as vital for Britain’s security and economic strength. Nevertheless, the post-war
strategic landscape, effects of the 1956 Suez Crisis, and severe financial crisis and
economic decline ultimately resulted in British leaders deciding in 1968 to abandon these
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bases. Though economic factors motivated the desire to abandon Britain’s foreign bases,
the decision was ultimately a political choice. Faced with on-going economic crises,
lacking an ally with whom Britain could share their security burden, and with no
opportunity for rapprochement, British leaders overcame domestic political opposition
and opted to abandon their bases, so they could focus on strengthening Britain’s domestic
economic circumstances.96
Outcomes. Regional overcommitment and periodic relative decline by a great power
whose economy temporarily underperforms or who faces the rise of new rival are not
uncommon. In fact, “strategic and geographic overextension may…be the natural state of
affairs of great powers actively engaged in the world.”97 Therefore, the need for
retrenchment will recur over time when a great power must realign by cutting
commitments in one region to free resources to address a neglected challenge, whether
domestic or international. In these circumstances, a great power might extricate itself
from existing commitments by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, negotiate
a deal with a regional rival, or abandon an interest and accept the consequences. If none
of these options are a possibility, then retrenchment and realignment will fail. However,
this implies that retrenchment will generally succeed unless 1) there is no ally willing and
able to assume responsibility for a regional security order, and 2) the great power fails at
rapprochement, and 3) domestic political divisions keep the great power from accepting
the consequences of abandonment. Therefore, given that all three conditions must obtain
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for failure to occur, the probability of which is less than any single condition occurring,
retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail.
Table 2 summarizes the five proposed hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes.
Table 2. Hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes.
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 5

Retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a
suitable successor to uphold an existing security order.
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at
rapprochement with adversaries.
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a great power is
to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal.
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic
political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of
regional withdrawal.
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail.

Alternative Explanations
One consequence of the underdeveloped state of the retrenchment literature is that
little scholarship directly examines the topic of retrenchment outcomes. The hypotheses
above are theoretically plausible; however, the alternative explanations below propose
other independent variables to develop testable competing hypotheses.
Source of Relative Decline. The source of relative decline may be either domestic or
international – perhaps both in circumstances of terminal decline.98 The nature of relative
decline hinges on the fact that, at any given time, power within the international system is
finite. When the power of other states increases, the relative power of any single state
decreases. These periods are particularly salient to policymakers.99 However, power
98

Relative decline often results from a mix of domestic and international circumstances. For example,
when Britain withdrew some of its naval assets from the Pacific in the early 20 th century it was
experiencing a declining domestic economy along with the rise of new regional powers. The main reason
it opted for operational retrenchment from Asia was to address domestic economic concerns.
99
John Matthews, “Current Gains and Future Outcome: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter,”
International Security 21, no. 1 (1996), 112-146.

39

indicators continuously fluctuate and shift over short periods of time, thereby making
accurate assessments difficult. Beyond the inherent difficulties in assessing relative
power, leaders face the challenge of identifying the primary factors contributing to
decline. Correctly identifying whether the source of relative decline is domestic or
international is important, because each has distinct associated risks and optimal policy
responses.
If decline stems from international conditions, such as the emergence of a new
geopolitical rival or when regional overcommitment allows a rival in another region to
rise uncontested, then the best course of action may be to decrease peripheral
commitments. Though more difficult to implement, because it may require the reciprocity
of allies or effective mollification of adversaries, this course of action facilitates
reorienting resources to improve the security of core interests. Domestically-driven
conditions, whether as the result of economic downturns, an underperforming military, or
political disfunction suggest that the best solution may be to attempt internal reforms.
These are easier to implement and rely on self-help rather than the reciprocity of allies.
Therefore, retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align the type
of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of relative decline.
Retrenchment Type. States existing in anarchy generally have a strong incentive to
prefer self-help.100 Moreover, the ability to project power abroad depends on what leaders
can extract domestically,101 so they typically attempt to choose policies that do not
undermine domestic support.102 As a result, retrenching states will have a strong
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preference for attempting operational retrenchment to achieve their goals, because all the
benefits accrue solely to the state. Conversely, strategic retrenchment will be less
preferred, since it requires a state to rely on another to honor commitments and because
the state surrenders something it values.103
Operational retrenchment focuses on lowering the price associated with a foreign
policy without reducing the level of risk. Moreover, reducing security-related
expenditures and bureaucratic reforms are not guaranteed to reverse decline or
overcommitment. In fact, they may exacerbate it as excessive cuts might make the state
“incompetent to every exigency.”104 A similar risk inheres during attempts to revise force
structures. By altering the types and number of forces available for crises, a state may
find itself without the necessary tools to confront a foreign policy challenge. Lastly
institutional reform during a period of decline and fiscal austerity may be especially
challenging when bureaucracies must perform numerous complex tasks.105 As a result,
operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic retrenchment.
Retrenchment Speed. The speed of retrenchment lies along a continuum between
deliberate and hasty. Deliberate retrenchment is inherently slower as leaders implement
withdrawal tied to on-the-ground conditions where reductions will occur. As events
unfold during retrenchment, reductions must be calibrated to minimize disruption and
ensure continued deterrence. Hasty retrenchment is faster, even potentially precipitous, as
leaders implement rapid withdrawal regardless of existing security conditions or in
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reaction to changing political circumstances. Because of the increased rate of reductions,
a state risks being unable to respond to aggression or unforeseen events or rapid
withdrawal may create a power vacuum. Adversaries may be emboldened to act
aggressively to fill the vacuum created by the retrenching state, or allies may doubt that
state’s commitment to defend shared interests. Slower policies of retrenchment, however,
provide time for regional dynamics to adjust and limit the uncertainty created by more
rapid reductions. They signal that the retrenching state seeks to reduce tensions while
gauging a rival’s intentions and remaining able to oppose revisionist ambitions.106
Domestically, slower retrenchment ensures adequate forces remain available to respond
to unexpected crises or provocation. It also provides time for leaders to develop a new
foreign policy consensus or attempt to correct the political dysfunction that often attends
overcommitment. Therefore, slower rates of retrenchment are more likely to succeed
than more rapid withdrawal or reductions.
Table 3 summarizes alternative hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes:
Table 3. Alternative hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes.
Alternative
Hypothesis 1
Alternative
Hypothesis 2
Alternative
Hypothesis 3

Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align
the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of
relative decline.
Operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic
retrenchment.
Slower rates of retrenchment are more likely to succeed than more
rapid withdrawal or reductions.
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In subsequent chapters, I test the primary and alternative hypotheses explained above
using two cases of post-World War II retrenchment by the United States. These cases
included different strategic environments as they relate to ally availability, regional
adversaries, rising competitors, and domestic circumstances influencing the ability to
abandon an interest. The cases illustrate how my proposed variables affect retrenchment
outcomes and validate my hypotheses regarding when retrenchment will succeed or fail.
The first, a success, occurred in Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975. The second, a
failure, occurred in the Middle East from 2009 to 2015.
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CHAPTER 3: RETRENCHMENT FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1969-1975
“The war in Viet Nam has for so long dominated our field of vision…. A small country
on the rim of [Asia] has filled the screen of our minds; but it does not fill our map.”107
“We…have mortgaged our whole foreign policy to the defense of one country.”108
How does a great power realign its strategic priorities when overcommitment abroad
constrains its military power projection and limits diplomatic flexibility? In the case of
the United States’ withdrawal from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, President
Richard Nixon overcame these challenges by implementing a policy of retrenchment.
Though he sought to redistribute resources from peripheral to core security interests and
improve the United States’ strategic solvency, success was never assured. In broad terms,
a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to
a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment
regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are
possible. The United States attempted to hand off responsibility to its South Vietnamese
ally, but eventually failed because of dysfunctional South Vietnamese politics. However,
effective rapprochement by the United States with China and the Soviet Union, and the
abandonment of American interests in South Vietnam ultimately led to success.
President Nixon inherited a stalemated war when he assumed office in 1969. By the
time he became president, the Vietnam War had cost the United States hundreds of
millions of dollars and tens of thousands of American servicemembers’ lives. President
Nixon contended that the war distracted previous administrations and prevented them
from grappling with fundamental changes in the international system. The tenor of
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European politics was changing with West German chancellor Willie Brandt’s Ostpolitik,
Middle Eastern conflicts were boiling over, and the Soviet Union was actively expanding
its influence and cementing its superpower status. Meanwhile, the United States was
mired in the rice paddies of South Vietnam. President Nixon sought to rectify this and lay
the foundation for a proactive, long-range foreign policy that first required retrenching
from Southeast Asia.109
The Nixon administration opted to address the United States’ international relative
decline by implementing a policy of retrenchment from Southeast Asia. President Nixon
first began the Vietnamization of the conflict, whereby the South Vietnamese accepted
increasing levels of responsibility for their defense augmented by capacity building by
the United States. His intent was to improve the material capability of South Vietnam so
that it could prosecute the war as the United States withdrew its forces and reoriented its
power projection to more critical regions. Concurrently with these efforts, President
Nixon attempted, and ultimately succeeded, at rapprochement with the United States’ two
main geopolitical rivals, China and the Soviet Union. Finally, the failure by South
Vietnamese leaders to implement meaningful governmental reforms and politicization of
their senior military leaders resulted in the collapse of South Vietnam. Faced with the
prospect of re-intervening to honor its commitments, President Gerald Ford, Nixon’s
successor, opted instead to abandon all interests in South Vietnam. A political consensus
regarding the undesirability of providing further support to sustain South Vietnamese
independence made this decision easier (figure 4).
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Figure 4. Variables Affecting American Retrenchment from Southeast Asia
I discuss this example of successful retrenchment by highlighting the relevant
variables within the context of the posited model of strategic reorientation. First, I
demonstrate the international relative decline and strategic misalignment of the United
States resulting from its overcommitment in Southeast Asia between 1954 and 1968. I
then discuss the linked policies of détente and the Nixon Doctrine, both of which
provided the policy framework for retrenchment from Southeast Asia between 1969 and
1973. Next, I examine the period of political and military realignment following
withdrawal from Vietnam and geostrategic reorientation from 1973 to 1975. Finally, I
conclude by providing an empirical assessment of the outcome of this successful
retrenchment attempt.
International Relative Decline and Strategic Misalignment
The Road to Overcommitment, 1954-1968. America’s involvement in Vietnam
stemmed from a broad spectrum of political, military, economic, and psychological
concerns. Between 1946 and 1954, the United States steadily increased its financial and
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military assistance to French efforts to restore their colonial control over Indochina.110
President Dwight Eisenhower viewed a French defeat by Indochinese communist forces
as an unacceptable outcome; however, he and others within his administration debated
what to do. The saliency of the conflict increased in March 1954 when the Vietminh lay
siege to the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. The Eisenhower administration’s primary
concern as the siege continued was the erosion of French resolve and strengthening of the
Vietminh’s negotiating position at the ongoing Geneva peace talks.111 Given the
perceived global consequences of a French defeat by the communist North Vietnamese,
Eisenhower exclaimed “My God, we must not lose Asia…” since it would diminish
American credibility.112 Moreover, “It was important that we not show weakness at this
critical time and that we not let the Russians think that we might not resist…in Indochina
and elsewhere.”113
President Eisenhower justified the need to demonstrate resolve against the
communists in Indochina by describing the “falling domino principle” at a 7 April 1954
press conference. He explained, “You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the
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first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very
quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most
profound influences.”114 Eisenhower’s views reflected the continuation of security beliefs
first espoused by the Truman administration. Both administrations believed that
“Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously
endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States
security interests.”115 Although lying on the geopolitical periphery of American interests,
Southeast Asia bordered critical strategic sea and air lines of communication and
contained important military bases and economic resources.116 These considerations,
within a context of global turmoil, perceived threats, and ongoing ideological struggle,
raised the importance of the French struggle in Indochina for United States policymakers.
The symbolic nature of the French conflict and ambiguous value of maintaining
credibility resulted in a cautious, almost ad hoc, approach to the United States’
involvement in an area that was deemed important, if not worth taking too many risks. In
1954, the French and Vietminh signed the Geneva Agreement. According to the terms of
the armistice, Vietnam was temporarily partitioned along the 17th Parallel, the French
evacuated all forces from the North, there was a ban on increasing any military aid in
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either part of the country, an international control commission would monitor the parties,
and there would be elections to reunify the country before 20 July 1956. Though the
United States was not a signatory to the 1954 Geneva Agreement, Undersecretary of
State Walter Bedell Smith issued a pledge on behalf of the United States to refrain from
interfering in the execution of the armistice terms.117 However, almost immediately after
the French and Vietminh signed the Geneva Agreement, the United States began lending
its support to South Vietnam. In less than two years, the South Vietnamese military
increased to approximately 280,000 personnel with United States training and support.
American military aid rose between 1956 and 1962, by which time the aid necessary to
sustain South Vietnam’s military totaled around $300 million, and the American military
mission increased from a handful of men to more than 4,000.118
When President John F. Kennedy assumed office in 1961, he and his advisors,
particularly Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,
stressed the need to commit American ground forces because
the deteriorating situation in South Viet-Nam requires attention to the
nature and scope of United States national interests in that country. The
loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would involve the transfer of a
nation of 20 million people from the free world to the Communist bloc.
The loss of South Viet-Nam would make pointless…any further
discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia…[and] would
undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere. Further,
loss of South Viet-Nam would stimulate bitter domestic controversies in
the United States and would be seized upon by extreme elements to divide
the country and harass the Administration.
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Secretaries Rusk and McNamara ultimately recommended sending military forces to
prevent the fall of South Vietnam to the Communists, a task they estimated would take no
more than six United States divisions, about 205,000 soldiers.119
By the end of 1963, there were more than 16,000 United States military personnel in
South Vietnam, Air Force sorties increased from 2,334 to 6,929, economic assistance
rose to $186 million, and military aid increased from $65 million in 1961 to $185
million.120 Furthermore, the Kennedy administration’s tacit support of the 1 November
1963 coup that overthrew and killed South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem,
deepened American involvement in South Vietnam. According to General Maxwell D.
Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Kennedy’s principle military
advisor, “In the post-Diem period when the political turbulence in South Vietnam offered
the United States an excuse to withdraw from its involvement, the realization of our role
in creating the Vietnamese predicament was a strong deterrent to anyone inclined to
make such a proposal.”121
Shortly after becoming president in the wake of President Kennedy’s assassination,
President Lyndon Johnson vowed “I am not going to lose Vietnam,” and “I am not going
to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went.”122 Two political
beliefs framed how Johnson interpreted Vietnam: the New Deal of the 1930s and it’s
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benefits on rural development, and European appeasement of Hitler at the Munich
Conference in 1938. Johnson believed New Deal type programs could work everywhere,
but appeasement could not be tolerated anywhere.123 In early 1964, Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara explained that the situation in South Vietnam “has unquestionably
been growing worse…since September [1963],” and was continuing to deteriorate
rapidly.124 By late 1964, President Johnson actively considered escalating the United
States’ involvement in South Vietnam but refrained for fear of possible Chinese
intervention.125 Finally, in early 1965, President Johnson ordered bombing raids
ostensibly in retaliation for Communist attacks against United States forces at Pleiku,
South Vietnam.126 By mid-1965, he began the massive military build-up that immersed
the United States in another land war in Asia.
Between 1963 and 1966, United States ground forces increased from 16,000 to
267,000. During that same time, National Liberation Front (i.e., Vietcong) forces rose
from 25,000 to 101,000 with another 170,000 irregulars in reserve. More ominously,
North Vietnamese regular forces in South Vietnam went from zero to 30,000, and
President Johnson’s bombing campaign accelerated the infiltration of communist forces
into South Vietnam.127 However, in 1966 the United States and China reached a tacit
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agreement about Vietnam. China signaled that it would refrain from intervening in the
Vietnam conflict below the 17th Parallel if the United States did not attack China, invade
North Vietnam, or bomb the Red River dike system. The United States in turn signaled
that it would adhere to these caveats. The stand-off agreement between the United States
and China fundamentally transformed the American rationale for its involvement in
Indochina.128 Regardless, the Johnson administration continued to pursue its policies in
South Vietnam despite a growing awareness that the United States could not achieve its
political objectives militarily.
North Vietnam’s Tet Offensive in early 1968 underscored the inability of the United
States to militarily achieve its political goals in South Vietnam. During the offensive,
North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces gained control of parts of Saigon, several
provincial capitals, and the ancient capital city of Hue. It took intense American bombing
of the captured cities and fierce battles by American and South Vietnamese forces to
dislodge the enemy.129 Despite this military victory by the United States, the
psychological shock of the Tet Offensive on the American public was decisive in turning
opinion against the war.130
Declining public support for the Vietnam War did not result in a reevaluation of
American objectives, but two events finally led President Johnson to realize the
hopelessness of the Vietnam conflict.131 First, in February 1968, General William
Westmoreland, commander of American forces in South Vietnam, secretly requested
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206,000 additional troops following the Tet Offensive. Recognizing that North Vietnam
would continue to fight, Johnson’s advisors debated whether accomplishing the United
States’ objects might require 500,000 to one million additional soldiers. Secretary of
Defense McNamara conceded that those numbers might represent the potential cost. He
also noted that General Westmoreland’s request was not enough to achieve American
objectives.132
Second, Johnson’s changing attitudes were shaped by other administration officials.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earl Wheeler, admitted that winning the
Tet Offensive was “a very near thing” and that the war would likely become more
challenging and costly because of North Vietnam’s freedom of maneuver.133 In light of
ongoing inflation, growing antiwar protests, and race riots, Secretary of Defense
McNamara cautioned that sending additional troops to Westmoreland was risky since
some had to be available in the United States “to meet the possibility of widespread civil
disorder…in the months ahead.”134 Newly appointed Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford,
who replaced McNamara, also reported to the president that the military chiefs did not
have a plan to win the war. He argued that the Pentagon had no tenable solutions for
achieving victory short of destroying most of South Vietnam trying to eject communist
forces.135 Secretary Clifford also knew first-hand how the war was harming the American
economy and straining alliances with Western Europe and Japan.136
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In March 1968, President Johnson appointed Secretary of Defense Clifford to chair a
task force created to evaluate Westmoreland’s request and its possible domestic
consequences. Secretary Clifford convened a panel of senior presidential advisors –
dubbed the “Wise Men” – to examine the post-Tet situation. On 26 March 1968, the
panel reported its consensus opinion to the president that the United States should reduce
its involvement in South Vietnam and have the South Vietnamese assume more of the
military burden. According to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a member of the
group, “we can no longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left and we must
begin to take steps to disengage.” The panel also expressed its belief that further
escalation of the Vietnam conflict was unsupported by Congress, the business
community, and the public.137 These conclusions convinced President Johnson of the
futility of further escalation and continuing involvement in Vietnam. On 31 March 1968,
Johnson delivered a televised speech to the American public in which he announced a
partial halt to the United States’ bombing of North Vietnam. He also declared that he
would not seek a second term in office.
By late 1968, the interplay between time, economics, domestic politics, and
international events led to a turning point in American involvement in South Vietnam.
President Johnson secretly raised troop levels from 486,000 to 535,000, but the Tet
Offensive had exposed the insufficiency of American military power. Despite their losses
during the offensive, Communist forces controlled, or influenced, over 80% of South
Vietnamese hamlets and 65% of the total population. Ongoing negotiations with the
North Vietnamese stalemated by late 1968, and the unpopular and undemocratic South
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Vietnamese regime relied upon United States support for its continuing existence.
Domestically, there was a looming federal budget crisis, along with a marked upturn in
the level of antiwar opposition.138
Military Overcommitment. By the end of 1968, the United States was militarily
overcommitted in Southeast Asia. With a total active duty military force of over 3.4
million service members, approximately 1.2 million – over one-third of available active
forces – served overseas.139 Of those serving overseas, more than 536,000, just under
46%, were in Vietnam.140 There were more than double the number of service members
serving in South Vietnam than there were in West Germany, the primary area of potential
military confrontation with the Soviet Union. The expanding cost of the conflict in
Vietnam siphoned economic and human resources from Germany, where facilities
deteriorated, equipment fell into disrepair, and experienced military members were
replaced by poorly trained conscripts.141 From an economic standpoint, war related
expenditures totaled over $26.2 billion in 1968, almost 37% of the total military
expenditures that year.142 Discussing the issue in 1969, President Richard Nixon
declared:
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While the United States is tied down in Viet Nam, the Soviets are loose in
the World – free to challenge us in the Mediterranean, free to move into
the vacuum left by retreating colonial powers in the Middle East and along
the vast rimland of the Indian Ocean….The war bitterly divides the people
of the United States, and separates us from our allies….143
Psychological and physical factors also contributed to America’s military
overcommitment. Policymakers and the publics’ frustration and impatience with the lack
of military progress, questions and confusion about the purpose of military operations,
uncertainty about the conflict’s outcome, and the rising imbalance between the costs of
military operations and their exacerbation of declining economic and social conditions all
influenced the growing perception of geostrategic overcommitment.144
The physical realities of prosecuting a war abroad also contributed to American
overcommitment. United States leaders underestimated the obstacles to victory in modern
war, the specific conditions unique to Vietnam, and the enemy’s fighting abilities.
Policymakers and military leaders misunderstood how to fight in South Vietnam’s terrain
and climate, the logistical challenges created by Vietnam’s geographic distance from the
United States, South Vietnam’s contiguity to North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as
well as its proximity to China, the underdeveloped economies of North and South
Vietnam, South Vietnam’s politics, North Vietnam’s alliance with the Soviet Union and
China, and the deeply-rooted sense of nationalism within the Vietnamese people who had
a long history of resisting foreign invaders.145 By the end of 1968, the North Vietnamese,
using better tactics and armed with supplies from the Soviet Union and China, had
stalemated the powerful United States military and forced policymakers to make difficult

Quoted in Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 51.
Ibid., 46.
145
Ibid., 47.
143
144

56

decisions. In the post-Tet period, policymakers and military leaders realized that
American power could destroy Vietnam, but no amount of power could achieve the
United States’ political objectives.146
In November 1968, Richard Nixon defeated Hubert Humphry with 43% of the
popular vote, a mere. 0.7% more than his opponent. Nixon was only the second
Republican elected President since 1933 and the first new president since Zachary Taylor
to face opposition control in both houses of Congress. He inherited an unpopular and
stalemated war which State department officials estimated might take as many as thirteen
years to win, as the war was costing 200 American dead each week and over $30 billion a
year.147 According to Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor:
The new Nixon Administration was the first of the post [World War II]
generation that had to conduct foreign policy without the national
consensus that had sustained its predecessors largely since 1947. And our
task was if anything more complex. We faced not only the dislocations of
a war but the need to articulate a new foreign policy for a new era.148
Nixon’s pessimism grew as he reviewed the facts and searched for policy options after
becoming President in early 1969, and he finally came “to the conclusion that there’s no
way to win….”149
Declining Domestic Capacity. The global activism of the preceding two decades
strained American diplomacy and, by 1968, left it immobile and adrift.150 Besides its
effects on public opinion, the Tet Offensive precipitated a recognition that the conflict
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was militarily unwinnable given existing constraints and led to a major shift in strategy
towards de-escalation.151 Tet did not result in a re-evaluation of the purposes or
objectives of American involvement in South Vietnam, but it did call into question the
instrumentalities of American power and where they were focused. Several structural
changes in the international system challenged American power projection given its
overcommitment in Vietnam: the decline in the utility of military power, the advent
Soviet strategic parity, the emergence of political and economic multipolarity, and the
demise of the seemingly monolithic Communist world.
The costs and frustrations of the conflict in Vietnam influenced changes in public and
elite opinion that resulted in declining domestic willingness to achieve policy objectives
in South Vietnam. Increasing American casualties, a declining economy, social discord,
and a sense of the conflict’s futility all played a role in turning the public and political
elites against the war. In contrast to the Korean War, where the number of American
casualties was greatest during the first year of the conflict, the number of casualties in
Vietnam increased each year and the cumulative total exceeded that of the entire Korean
War by 1968. The increasing costs of sustaining the war also resulted in inflation, new
taxes, and policymakers having to choose between waging the war and supporting
domestic programs. Social divisions became more pronounced as racial strife engulfed
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American cities, a growing counterculture challenged mainstream values, and blue and
white-collar workers became alienated from their respective party’s positions regarding
the war. Finally, in the aftermath of Tet the war appeared to the public and policymakers
alike as irretrievably stalemated with no end in sight.152
Politicians were conscious of antiwar sentiments and divisions within the American
pubic regarding the war, and they recognized that these divisions reduced America’s
ability to continue the conflict.153 Public support for the United States’ involvement in
Vietnam began declining as early as 1966. In October 1967, for the first time during the
conflict, surveys asking whether America’s involvement was a mistake and whether it
should have stayed out revealed that opposition to the war surpassed support – 46 to 44%.
The downward trend in support continued, and by March 1968 polls revealed 49% of the
public opposed the war.154 During the first half of 1969, Gallup polled public preferences
regarding the Vietnam War, and a majority favored the gradual withdrawal of American
forces and establishing a fixed end date for involvement. A January 1969 poll showed
54% of the public favored a monthly troop reduction, with support rising to 56% by May
1969.155 When Nixon announced the first troop reductions in June 1969, 41% of survey
respondents favored a faster rate of withdrawal.156 Finally, an October 1969 poll revealed
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53% of the public supported completing troop withdrawals by the end of 1970; however,
only 20% of those polled favored a hypothetical plan for immediate withdrawal.157
Polling clearly showed that a significant portion of the American public was unhappy
with the Vietnam war and growing increasingly weary of the United States’ involvement.
Beginning in late 1967, a majority of American’s supported a cessation of bombing in
North Vietnam, gradual withdrawal of military forces, and turning over more
responsibility for the conflict to South Vietnam. These opinions influenced policymakers
and politicians, and political elites also considered the perspectives of friends, family
members, the press, business leaders, and informed members of the uniformed military.
In general, support for the conflict among Democratic policymakers was waning, and
even Republicans were moving away from a policy position advocating all-out support
for the war.158
Deciding to Withdrawal. The policy debate over whether to withdraw United States
forces from Vietnam began in 1968 during the Johnson administration. President Johnson
asked Secretary of Defense Clifford to establish a working group to examine whether the
United States should continue its current strategy in Vietnam. Members of this group
were unable to form a consensus on recommended changes or likely policy outcomes.159
Johnson’s advisors continued to debate the merits of troop increases or withdrawals
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throughout 1968.160 These debates carried on publicly during the 1968 presidential
campaigns of Vice President Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon. Although the
Vietnam War was the most significant issue during the campaign, neither candidate
offered clear or distinct plans for ending the conflict. Humphrey, as Vice President, could
not repudiate Johnson’s policies, and Nixon, though privately approving of Johnson’s
efforts,161 publicly critiqued Johnson’s handling of the war. Both candidates agreed on
the need to withdraw from Vietnam, and both rejected the idea of unilateral
withdrawal.162 In other words, a bipartisan consensus existed in favor of ending the war,
but how to accomplish that goal remained in debate.
Once elected, despite pledging to “end the war and win the peace in the Pacific,”
Nixon lacked a specific plan to end the conflict,163 though he did have a general
framework for solving the Vietnam dilemma.164 The fact that his new administration
lacked accurate information about the conflict further complicated matters. On his first
day in office Nixon issued National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 1, “In an
effort to develop an agreed evaluation of the situation in Vietnam as a basis for making
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policy decisions….”165 Though President Nixon “did not believe in changing policy for
change sake,” he did think it was important to “rethink all of our policy tracks” with
respect to Vietnam.166 NSSM 1 directed key national security-related departments and
agencies to answer 28 primary and 50 subsidiary questions regarding the North and South
Vietnamese military capabilities, progress of countryside security in South Vietnam, the
political situation in South Vietnam, United States military strategy and operations, and
political factors that might affect peace negotiations.167
The responses to NSSM 1 “made clear that there was no consensus as to facts, much
less as to policy.”168 Agency answers revealed that the United States’ national security
bureaucracy was divided over the prospects of progress and victory in South Vietnam.
Agency assessments generally fell into two camps, one which was optimistic about
American prospects in Vietnam and one that was pessimistic. Optimists included the
Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
commander of military forces in Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams, and the
commander of all forces in the Pacific, Admiral John McCain. This group believed that
military operations in Vietnam were gaining ground and influencing North Vietnam who
they believed was willing to negotiate because of the North’s military weakness.
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Pessimists included civilians in the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the State department. This group believed that the situation in South
Vietnam was stalemated and that any gains were either inflated or tenuous, and that
North Vietnam was negotiating from a position of strength so was unlikely to make major
concessions. Overall, both groups agreed on some basic positions regarding North
Vietnam’s objective, but there were significant disagreements over basic facts such as the
size and deployment of enemy forces.
President Nixon faced a situation in Vietnam that closely resembled the predicament
faced by French leaders in 1953. At that time, the seven-year French conflict in Indochina
was at risk of defeat due to military and political failures in Vietnam, the threat of
increasing Chinese support of the Vietminh, and a war-weary French public. This led
French leaders to consider a negotiated settlement that would allow them to withdraw. To
achieve this diplomatic solution French leaders believed they needed to stabilize or
improve their military position on the ground in Vietnam. Subsequent military decisions,
ultimately leading to the debacle at Dien Bien Phu, aimed to achieve the goal of an
honorable French withdrawal.169 As it was with the French in the early 1950s, so it was
with Nixon in 1969.
The dilemma was not whether to withdraw from South Vietnam, but how to extricate
the United States from the conflict without undermining American credibility and the
survival of an independent South Vietnam. Nixon’s plan amounted to a policy of
retrenchment that included the gradual withdrawal of American forces (i.e., deAmericanization), the strengthening of South Vietnam’s government and military forces
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(i.e., Vietnamization), antiguerrilla pacification operations, détente with the Soviet
Union, and diplomatic negotiation with the Vietnamese communists. De-Americanization
entailed the withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam and was politically
necessary to appease the public’s desire to end the war. President Nixon and his National
Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, hoped that ongoing troop withdrawals would bolster
public support for the president’s policy, thereby strengthening the president’s ability to
negotiate with North Vietnam and pursue diplomatic initiatives elsewhere. The primary
purpose of Vietnamization, the training and equipping of South Vietnam’s military forces
and political reform of its government, was to compensate for American troop withdraws
by strengthening South Vietnam’s ability to assume responsibility for defending itself.170
Though distinct policy goals, the Nixon administration referred to de-Americanization
and Vietnamization as “Vietnamization”, a term suggested by Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird to highlight the positive aspects of improving South Vietnam’s
governmental and military capabilities – the “right issues.”171
Framework for Retrenchment, 1969-1972
The idea of Vietnamization, the simultaneous withdrawal of American forces and of
strengthening South Vietnam’s political and military capacity, emerged after the Tet
Offensive in 1968 during the Johnson administration. By the time Nixon assumed office
“the goal of victory had been abandoned and a commitment had been made…to seek a
negotiated compromise solution [to the war].”172 The Nixon administration, however,
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debated the pace at which Vietnamization should occur. On one side, Secretary of State
William Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird argued for military de-escalation
and an accelerated withdrawal of American forces. On the other side, Kissinger
advocated for decelerated withdraw and military escalation. Although President Nixon
generally sided with Kissinger, his policy decisions often alternated between both
approaches.173 Some of Nixon’s decisions to expand the conflict into Cambodia in 1970
and Laos in 1971 appeared to contradict a policy of United States withdrawal from
Indochina. However, the purpose of these operations was to support the overall policy of
Vietnamization, a policy of retrenchment based on building South Vietnam’s capacity for
security burden sharing.
The stalemate in Vietnam prompted a reevaluation of the relationship between the
military means and political ends. Throughout the conflict, the United States applied
disproportionate military power against a militarily inferior opponent for a limited
political goal. Regardless of the level of force applied, a United States “victory” remained
elusive because America could not supply the political conditions necessary for success.
By 1969, policymakers were aware of this paradox. On one hand, America retained the
preponderance of military power throughout the world. On the other hand, it was
increasingly experiencing a relative decline in its global political influence.174 In other
words, though America was not experiencing the erosion of its power resources relative
to other countries, it did suffer relative decline in its ability to shape international
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outcomes.175 The challenge was how to negotiate the transition from preponderance to a
position of primus inter pares. Between 1969 and 1973, retrenchment from Vietnam
would be the linchpin of this transition.
Lowering Costs. President Nixon assumed responsibility for foreign policy during
America’s deepest crisis since World War II. His goal in Vietnam focused on “ending the
war and winning the peace” rather than achieving victory “over any other people.”176 To
win the peace, President Nixon not only had to end the fighting in Vietnam while
avoiding defeat, he had to ensure a noncommunist South Vietnamese government
remained in power. Therefore, achieving peace required a military and political victory
over communist forces in South Vietnam and a diplomatic victory over North Vietnam.
At the start of President Nixon’s term in 1969, most policymakers prioritized achieving
victory over the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.
Victory took precedence because of the widely held perception that the political status
of South Vietnam had strategic implications. Policymakers believed that defeat would
undermine the United States’ credibility to defend allies and to contain the expanding
influence of the Soviet Union and China. In other words, defeat in Vietnam would
ultimately endanger the United States’ preferred global order. These beliefs generally
reflected the views of successive post-World War II presidential administrations that
holistically conceived the United States’ policy goals as an interrelated system of military
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balances of power, geostrategic positions, political stability, ideological compatibility,
and national prestige.177 By the time Nixon ascended to the presidency, he
was eager to negotiate an honorable extraction [of American forces],
which he defined as almost anything except turning over to the North
Vietnamese Communists the millions of [South Vietnamese] people who
had been led by his predecessors to rely on America. He took credibility
and honor seriously because they defined America’s capacity to shape a
peaceful international order.178
Within the legislative branch, reaction to public opinion focused not only on the
implementation of American commitments, but also on the continuing utility and
desirability of widespread security obligations. Less than two weeks after Nixon’s
inauguration, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee announced an investigation into
executive power and the military’s role in influencing foreign policy.179 The committee
also ignored State Department objections and passed a National Commitments resolution
that called upon the Executive to refrain from entering into new security obligations
without Congressional consent.180 These actions reflected the firm belief among
influential members of the committee, especially its chairman, J. William Fulbright, that
if the United States were entering a new era of diplomacy – as the Nixon administration
claimed – then is should reassess its existing network of security commitments.181
Retrenchment from Southeast Asia in general, and Vietnam specifically, would
facilitate the United States establishing new terms for a continuing and active role in the

177

Kimball, The Vietnam War Files, 8-10.
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994), 675.
179
John W. Finney, “Senators to Sift Foreign Policies; Symington Panel to Review Influence of Military,”
New York Times, 4 February 1969, accessed 16 October 2018 at https://www.nytimes.com/1969/02/04/
archives/senators-to-sift-foreign-policies-symington-panel-to-review.html.
180
John W. Finney, “Senate Panel Asks US Commitments Be Put to Congress; Senators Bid Executive
Consult on Foreign Pledges,” New York Times, 13 March 1969, accessed 16 October 2018 at https://
www.nytimes.com /1969/03/13/archives/senate-panel-asks-us-commitments-be-put-to-congress-senatorsbid.html.
181
Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 120.
178

67

international system. The immediate foreign policy problem was managing the removal
of United States combat forces. This challenge was part of the larger one of the
overextension of America’s foreign commitments. Within this context, retrenchment not
only focused on the way to mitigate the consequences of withdrawal from Vietnam, but
also the nature and scope of the United States’ political and military retrenchment along
the periphery. The Nixon administration acknowledged the immobility of American
diplomacy resulting from the impasse in Vietnam and accepted the logic of
disengagement. However, the administration consistently argued that the way
disengagement occurred was important to America’s international reputation and to
prevent the erosion of its domestic support for continuing global engagement.182
President Nixon summarized this sentiment during a meeting at which he said
A pull-out of the American forces precipitously would be disastrous for
Asia, including countries like Japan and India. Europe would be affected.
But, the most serious effect would be in the United States. When a great
power fails, it deeply affects the will of the people. While the public
would welcome peace initially, they would soon be asking why we pulled
out and this would in turn lead an attack on the leadership and
establishment and the US role in the war. Isolation could easily be the
consequence.183
President Nixon believed he could end the Vietnam War quickly – within a year he
hoped. His initial instincts were to attempt a knock-out blow against North Vietnam, and
he ordered the military to plan for such an attack, code-named “Duck Hook.” In support
of Nixon’s military moves, he hoped the Soviets would put diplomatic pressure on the
North Vietnamese government. His strategy for gaining Soviet support was “linkage,”
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whereby Nixon would refrain from negotiating arms control or trade agreements unless
the Soviets complied. Domestically, Nixon sought to discredit his opponents by
questioning their loyalty and patriotism. For instance, at a speech he delivered at the
United States Air Force Academy he declared, “Military programs are ridiculed as
needless if not deliberate waste. The military profession is derided in some of the socalled best circles of America. Patriotism is considered by some to be a backward fetish
of the uneducated and the unsophisticated.”184
Despite Nixon’s pointed rhetoric towards his opponents and attempts to pressure the
Soviets, he sought to avoid the confrontations and controversies likely to result from
carrying out his ideas.185 He quickly moved away from “Duck Hook” for fear that it
would raise congressional opposition or split his cabinet – “I just wasn’t ready for that”
Nixon later admitted. Furthermore, instead of escalation, Nixon opted to announce the
first withdrawal of 25,000 American soldiers from South Vietnam, and implementation
of “Vietnamization” to train the South Vietnamese military and government to assume
the burden of self-defense. By the end of the summer of 1969, Nixon announced another
planned withdrawal of 35,000 troops.186 A desire to avoid controversy also led President
Nixon to abandon linking Soviet pressure on North Vietnam with diplomatic progress in
other areas. He was unwilling to sacrifice the political benefits of détente with the Soviets
and agreed to open talks on limiting strategic nuclear weapons without any meaningful
action by the Soviets towards Hanoi. In fact, Henry Kissinger believed that the Soviets
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made use of “reverse linkage” by exploiting Nixon’s need for foreign policy progress to
sustain domestic support.187
The Nixon administration explicitly portrayed retrenchment under the guise of the
Nixon Doctrine as a transitional policy that would facilitate maintaining regional stability
by substituting local forces for direct American involvement.188 The main thrust of the
doctrine was on Indochina, with emphasis on the nature and scope of American military
assistance to the region after the withdrawal of American forces. However, the
administration regarded the doctrine as having wider applications, thereby linking
retrenchment to the continuing role of the United States in the international system. As
Kissinger explained
[T]he relationship of the United States to other countries depends…on the
legal relationships but more fundamentally on the conception the United
States has of its role in the world and on the intrinsic significance of the
country’s relationship to overall security and progress.189
This new approach, coupled with the Nixon Doctrine’s emphasis to only “help where
it makes a real difference and is considered in [America’s] interest,”190 implied two
political prerequisites. First, the United States would have to change its perception of the
nature and level of threat within the international system and reduce its military
accordingly. Between 1969 and 1971, the Nixon administration reduced defense spending
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to its lowest level since 1951. As a percentage of the gross national product, defense
spending in 1971 was 7%, down from a high of 9.5% in 1968. Secretary of Defense Laird
justified these reductions in terms of countering domestic inflation and because of the
reduced level of threat American forces might plausibly encounter given the
administration’s posture of strategic sufficiency. Regarding the later, the Department of
Defense also argued for reconfiguring America’s military forces from a 2 ½ to a 1 ½
warfighting capability.191 By 1974, the United States’ conventional ground forces were
reduced to 16 active Army and Marine divisions, more than six fewer than in 1968 and
more than three fewer than in 1964.192 Second, the administration would have to revise its
perspective on the forces available to participate in the defense of allies. Towards this
end, the Nixon administration’s “National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence”
applied a total force concept whereby the size and effectiveness of allied military
capabilities were integrated into American defense planning.193
The Nixon administration implemented its policy of retrenchment across a range of
military, diplomatic, and economic activities. Between 1969 and 1972, the total number
of United States military personnel declined from 3.4 million to 2.3 million, a more than
32% reduction, bringing the military forces to their lowest level since before the Korean
War. More than 500,000 military personnel were withdrawn from South Vietnam, the
number of troops in Japan and South Korea were reduced by one-third, and those in the
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Philippines were cut by one-half.194 Nixon justified these reductions by pointing to his
articulated doctrine and noting United States allies would assume a larger burden for their
own defense. In other words, the United States’ relations with its allies would change
from “predominance” to “partnership.”195 In the realm of nuclear strategy, the United
States scaled back its goals from superiority to sufficiency.196 Economically, the Nixon
administration decreased most areas of the defense budget and devalued the dollar
twice.197 Although dedicated to pursuing a cost-conscious foreign policy, President Nixon
was concerned that the United States was going “down the drain as a great power” and
vowed he would not “fall into [the] dry rot of just managing the chaos better.”198
Managing Withdrawal. A central feature of the Nixon Doctrine was its ambiguity.
President Nixon and his administration believed that maintaining ambiguity would
facilitate regaining diplomatic initiative and flexibility. By providing the conceptual
ability to discriminate between cases of potential intervention, the doctrine freed Nixon
from the confines of a more specific declaratory policy. Moreover, the perceived interests
at stake were also subject to change since
the Doctrine…is given full meaning through a process that involves other
countries…. To attempt to define the new diplomacy completely by
ourselves would repeat the now presumptuous instinct of the previous era
and violate the very spirit of our new approach.199
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Critics generally argued that it was a flawed policy that failed to provide a coherent
framework for American foreign policy.200 Some noted the apparent contradiction
between reducing capabilities while maintaining commitments.201 They argued that the
Nixon doctrine was merely substituting forces rather than “adjusting [American]
commitments, restricting [American] objectives or modifying [the American] conception
of the interests of the United States.”202 According to Nixon and Kissinger’s worldview,
the first set of critical arguments were disputable. The Nixon administration reconciled
the apparent contradiction between the continuance of commitments despite a reduction
in forces through a policy of superpower détente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement
with China, and the development of mid-range regional powers.
Nixon explicitly aimed to develop “a new approach to foreign policy to match a new
era of international relations.” Guiding his approach was the idea that “[American]
enmities are not immutable, and we must be prepared realistically to recognize and deal
with their cause.” Doing so required “mutual self-restraint and a willingness to
accommodate conflicting national interests through negotiation rather than
confrontation.”203 The first step was to attempt to achieve a global modus vivendi with the
Soviet Union through a policy of détente. Though commonly perceived as an attempt by
the Nixon administration to bring about more peaceful relations with the Soviets, détente
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was an instrumentalist strategy designed to achieve the administration’s goals in Vietnam
and globally.204 Nixon and Kissinger viewed détente as “a strategy to contain and harness
Soviet use of its increasing power” by creating a “web of relationships” that the United
States would weave.205
The intent for détente, tantamount to rapprochement, was to stabilize the nuclear arms
race, prevent or mitigate the consequences of crises, and to narrow the ongoing rivalry.
Détente was also a means for encouraging or coercing Soviet behavior in relation to the
existing world order and in accordance with American preferences. The main instrument
for achieving these aims was linkage, a stratagem of carrots and sticks that served as a
“governing device for applying incentives and penalties that [the United States] placed at
the center of their concept of diplomatic strategy.”206 Positive incentives included offers
of deals on divisive issues like Berlin, the Arab-Israeli conflict, nuclear weapons, and
economic aid in exchange for support of America’s attempt to withdraw from Vietnam.
Disincentives included diplomatic maneuvers like rapprochement with China, denial of
economic aid, and military threats. Ultimately, détente was pursued to resolve grievances
and diffuse secondary threats. This was so the United States could preserve its central
role in maintaining the international order at a time when the Soviet Union reached
strategic nuclear parity and acted as an obstacle to America’s foreign policy goals. 207
America’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China was intended by
President Nixon to complement détente and facilitate retrenchment from Southeast Asia.
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By improving relations with China Nixon hoped to produce stable regional conditions to
facilitate American withdrawal.208The main objective of American rapprochement was to
establish a Sino-American relationship to counter-balance the Soviet Union. Regionally,
the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine was meant to signal that the American threat to
China would decline post-Vietnam.209 The American opening to China was intended to
elicit diplomatic pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war. Consequently,
rapprochement led to triangular diplomacy between the United States, China, and the
Soviet Union.210 Much like détente with the Soviet Union, Nixon viewed rapprochement
with China as a type of modus vivendi developed at a regional, rather than global, level.
The consensus among the national security agencies at the beginning of Nixon’s
presidency was that China opposed negotiations between the United States and North
Vietnam, and the Soviets were believed to support a negotiated settlement on terms
favoring North Vietnam.211 Despite these views, Nixon opted to explore options for
altering the United States’ relationship with China. He issued National Security Study
Memorandum 14 in which he directed the security agencies to explore the status of
American relations with China, the nature of the Chinese communist threat in Asia, the
interaction between American policy and other relevant countries towards China, and the
costs and risks of alternative approaches.212 The results of this interagency study revealed
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that the national security agencies were focused on China’s ideology and alleged military
goals. Kissinger, however, criticized this focus because he believed it failed to regard the
implications of increasing Sino-Soviet tensions and opportunities for a triangular
relationship.213
Though the motives behind Nixon’s triangular strategy were somewhat ambiguous,214
as the process of rapprochement progressed they evolved into a means for pressuring the
Soviets and hastening the end of the Vietnam War.215 The notion of playing the “China
card” against the Soviets preceded any concrete steps toward rapprochement, though it
served as a motivation to achieve that goal. The timing for playing the card was
influenced by a period of increasing Sino-Soviet tensions in the middle of 1969,216 as
well as by Nixon’s plan to withdraw from South Vietnam. The triangular relationship
between the United States, Soviet Union, and China resulting from rapprochement was
supposed to assist extricating the United States from Vietnam. When combined with the
carrots of détente mentioned earlier, the China card was intended to encourage the Soviet
Union to pressure North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war. Moreover, Nixon hoped
that rapprochement with China would also intimidate the North Vietnamese and serve as
an added incentive to negotiate a settlement.217
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Developing a new approach required changing American attitudes towards its
alliances which were “no longer addressed primarily to the containment of the Soviet
Union and China behind the American shield.”218 Moving forward, the United States
would adopt a new role of “accepting and encouraging initiative and leadership from our
allies.”219 The Nixon administration also attempted to develop locally preponderant states
into regional powers capable of burden sharing and to further stabilize the new
relationship with the Soviet Union and China. These powers would become the recipients
of the devolution of America’s regional security responsibilities, along with the military
aid necessary to maintain and promote regional stability. The Nixon administration’s
policies of détente and rapprochement ushered a period of global diplomacy. Though
attempts to develop regional powers essentially fragmented the international system, they
fit within the administration’s belief in an emerging multipolarity.220
Rather than being an adjunct to the modus vivendi the United States achieved with the
Soviet Union and China, the Nixon Administration’s development of regional powers
aimed to stabilize superpower relations by expanding the web of relations that could
influence or mitigate Soviet actions. Nixon hoped that these regional relationships would
facilitate his strategy of linkage politics and mitigate the apparent contradiction between
the reduction in United States capabilities and maintenance of commitments. However,
the Nixon administration essentially conducted relations with its preferred regional
clients – Brazil, Indonesia, Iran, and Zaire – in an uncoordinated and ad hoc manner that
hinted at their secondary importance. Another flaw in the administration’s approach was
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the optimistic assumption that the United States would be able to maintain long-term
consonance of interests with its regional partners. This error was magnified by a failure to
differentiate between contending views on security within region, where there might not
be a common perception of threats, and between regions, where security criteria might
vary.221
Realignment and Reorientation, 1973-1975
Diminishing Importance of Vietnam. After winning re-election in 1972, President
Nixon was determined to end American involvement in Vietnam to facilitate refocusing
on other global issues.222 Of primary concern was stabilizing superpower relations to
complement retrenchment from peripheral regions. First, the United States had to
terminate its involvement in Vietnam. The successful negotiation of the Paris agreement
between the United States and North Vietnam in January 1973 finalized the
disengagement of American forces from Southeast Asia. Under the terms of the
agreement, the United States agreed to stop all military activity against North Vietnam
and remove all remaining American troops from South Vietnam within 60 days.223 The
last American troops departed on 29 March 1973, and the only residual American
presence consisted of embassy guards and members of the Defense Attaché Office tasked
to monitor South Vietnamese military activities and provide technical assistance.224
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Over the next two years, the importance of the survival of South Vietnam, the
resolution of other conflicts in Southeast Asia, and the political struggles stemming from
the Nixon administration’s desire to continue providing support decreased. Between 1973
and 1975, the United States sent South Vietnam approximately $1.5 billion in military
aid, $640 million in economic aid, and $535 million worth of food. Despite the Nixon
administration’s doubts about the efficacy of Vietnamization during this period, they
believed that the settlement agreement and level of aid gave South Vietnam “every
opportunity to demonstrate their inherent strength.”225 This belief rested on an
assumption that each year that passed improved the South Vietnamese regime’s prospects
for survival. This assumption depended on the Soviet Union decreasing its arms transfers
to North Vietnam as well as a domestic political consensus regarding the re-introduction
of American airpower should South Vietnam’s collapse be imminent. Neither of these
prerequisites occurred, however, as Soviet arms sales continued unabated and American
political consensus overwhelmingly favored terminating any American involvement in
Vietnam.226
Abandoning American Interests in Vietnam
In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act which limited the President’s ability to
use American military forces oversees without consultation. That same year Congress
also passed a resolution forbidding the use of funds to pay for any military activities in
Vietnam. Following the Watergate scandal, the Democrats gained 43 seats in the House
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and three in the Senate during the 1974 mid-term elections. The enhanced Democratic
majority intended to use their power to “correct imbalances in the CongressionalPresidential relationship.”227 During the early stages of the Nixon administration, the
Democrats favored and end to the war but were often hesitant to challenge the
president;228 however, by 1975, Congress was unified in its opposition to any
involvement in Vietnam and unconcerned about the consequences of abandoning the
president’s policy goal.229
During the final months of 1974, the situation in South Vietnam increasingly
deteriorated as the North Vietnamese violated the Paris agreement and began a
widespread offensive. President Ford was unable to directly address the violations
because of the limitations passed by Congress. Instead, he attempted to negotiate to
secure additional military assistance for Cambodia and South Vietnam.230 During the
negotiations, President Ford argued that continuing to provide military aid to Southeast
Asian nations was important to maintain American credibility and the validity of the
Nixon Doctrine. In a letter to Speaker of the House Carl Albert, Ford argued
It has been a basic policy of the Government to give material support to
friends and allies who are willing and able to carry the burden of their own
self-defense.
This is a moral question that must be faced squarely. Are we to
deliberately abandon a small country in the midst of its life and death
struggle? Is the United States, which so far has consistently stood by its
friends through the most difficult times, now to condemn, in effect, a
small Asian nation totally dependent on us? Our national security and the
integrity of our alliance depend upon our reputation as a reliable partner.
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Countries around the world who depend on us for support – as well as
their foes – will judge our performance.231
Congress answered yes to both of President Ford’s questions and refused further
assistance to Cambodia or South Vietnam. North Vietnam noted these developments and
took advantage of them by devising a two-year plan for a general uprising to complete
taking over the South.232 Instead of two years, the North defeated South Vietnam by the
end of April 1975. Shortly before the collapse, on 23 April 1975, President Ford
announced that the war was finished as far as America was concerned.233
While the legislated termination of the United States’ involvement in Southeast Asia
sparked new debates over foreign policy, the Nixon administration sought to preserve
American credibility and revitalize the domestic political consensus necessary for
sustaining global engagement. Until the middle of 1973, the United States’ concentration
on the situation in Vietnam came at the expense of other important issues. Kissinger
noted this clearly when he observed “We…have mortgaged our whole foreign policy to
the defense of one country.”234 President Nixon wrote “Now that the Vietnam war had
ended, we could turn our attention to the other areas of the world where war was always
imminent and where the danger of a great-power nuclear confrontation was far greater
than in Southeast Asia.”235 Between 1973 and 1975, Vietnam continued to set the
emotional tone of foreign policy discussions; however, the centrality of the United States
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and Soviet Union relationship re-emerged as the primary thrust of American foreign
policy, particularly as it related to the Middle East. As Chinese Premier Chou Enlai
noted, “When the [United States] got stuck in Vietnam, the Soviet revisionists embraced
the opportunity to extend vigorously their sphere of influence in…the Middle East.”236
Arab-Israeli Conflict and its Aftermath. The 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict (i.e., the
Yom Kippur War) led to a reassessment of Soviet intentions in the Middle East. In each
of the successive Middle East conflicts that occurred while the United States was mired
in Vietnam – 1967, 1970, and 1973 – the Soviet Union increased its involvement and
power projection into the region. Increased Soviet involvement was attributed, in part, to
its attainment of strategic nuclear and military parity while the United States and its
military was distracted in Vietnam.237 The political ramifications of Soviet involvement
in the 1973 war extended across a range of foreign policy issues, most notably the
undermining of détente diplomacy. The Soviet Union’s failure to abide by its accords
with the United States regarding involvement in the conflict called into question the
perceptions of Soviet intentions in the periphery. This erosion of trust then undermined
confidence in strategic arms negotiations.238
The deteriorating relationship between the United States and Soviet Union following
the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict reaffirmed the centrality of the bipolar superpower
relationship despite an emerging political and economic multipolarity. Following the
conflict, the United States’ foreign policy shifted back to a more explicit policy of Soviet
containment. From this perspective, the political and military retrenchment from
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Southeast Asia and détente with the Soviet Union were clearly temporary conditions.
Rather than reflecting a foreign policy failure, the unstable international context during
retrenchment underscored the inherent political and technological instability of the
ongoing Cold War between the Americans and Soviets. Politically, the period of postcolonialization and proliferation of conflicts challenging existing state structures
coincided with the rising ability of both superpowers to project power globally. Because
of this development and the ongoing ideological competition of the Cold War, domestic
conflicts in the periphery became international conflicts in which the United States and
Soviet Union competed – the internationalization of domestic conflict. Technological
advancements in nuclear technologies and the implications of Soviet parity also renewed
the challenge of integrating nuclear weapons and foreign policy.239
Free from the constraints of Vietnam, the United States’ response to the 1973 Yom
Kippur War, the first international test following America’s withdraw from Southeast
Asia, showed the benefits of retrenchment. The conflict severely tested Soviet-American
relations politically divided the United States from its main European allies, and
increased tensions between the United States and several Arab states in the Middle East.
In meeting these challenges American diplomacy was active, innovative, and determined
throughout the crisis.240 To achieve these results, the Nixon administration temporarily
abandoned the cooperative assumptions of détente and sought to gain geopolitical
advantage over the Soviets in the Middle East. The United States continuously sought
advantages during and after the conflict while repeatedly assuring the Soviet Union that
America remained committed to collaborative problem solving. During the conflict, the
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United States deterred possible Soviet military intervention by issuing an unprecedented
alert of American nuclear forces. This act was meant to minimize conjecture that the
United States may have “provoked [Soviet intervention] by being soft” and to issue a
warning “in a manner that shocked the Soviets into abandoning” notions of intervening
on behalf of their Egyptian clients.241 Following the conflict, the Soviet Union had little
more than a ceremonial role in the diplomacy between the Middle Eastern powers
involved in the conflict. In fact, the Soviet’s client states, Egypt and Syria, sought
American diplomatic assistance believing that the United States was the only power that
could deliver meaningful results.242
Because of the United States’ support of Israel during the Yom Kippur war, Arab oil
producers used their oil monopoly power in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) to embargo oil exports to the United States and its European and
Japanese allies. The embargo raised oil prices fourfold and severely impacted the
economies of the targeted countries. The economic shock of the oil embargo
overshadowed fears of Soviet military threats and raised the strategic importance of the
Middle East to the American and European economic security.243 However, when the
United States attempted to unify opposition to the embargo, its European allies balked
because of their dependence on Arab oil and Japan wanted to pursue other options.244 In
response, Nixon declared to American allies that they could not “have it both ways. They
cannot have the United States’ participation and cooperation on the security front and
then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political
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front.”245 The United States also implemented a unilateral strategy that threatened
countermeasures against OPEC states, including the implied threat of military force.246
The United States’ ultimate unilateral success resulted from effective diplomacy in which
Kissinger applied the principle of linkage to elicit Arab concessions. In conducting his
“shuttle diplomacy”, Kissinger successfully demanded that if Egypt and Syria wanted
him to serve as a mediator between them and Israel, then they would have to mediate
between the United States and OPEC states to eliminate the embargo.247
Outcome of Strategic Reorientation
Level of Reduced Commitment. Nixon and Kissinger noted the relative decline of
American power resulting from overcommitment in Vietnam and believed that changing
international circumstances required the United States to realign and reorient its foreign
policy. Besides the inherent challenges of devising a sustainable foreign policy, domestic
constraints further exacerbated developing an appropriate response. The Nixon
administration understood that a large segment of the American public wished for a
return to isolationism after more than 20 years of global engagement and bipolar
competition.248 Therefore, the administration had the dual challenge of reorienting
American foreign policy in line with new structural circumstances while simultaneously
maintaining domestic political support.
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The first step in meeting these challenges was retrenchment from Vietnam and
Southeast Asia. Nixon consistently held that the maintenance of American credibility as
an international partner relied upon providing South Vietnam a reasonable chance to
determine its future. In his first speech on Vietnam after becoming president, President
Nixon explicitly rejected attempting to achieve a “purely military solution on the
battlefield” in South Vietnam, as well as “a one-side withdrawal from Vietnam or the
acceptance of [peace terms] that would amount to disguised defeat.”249 While the former
would require a level of support Nixon knew he could not attain,250 the latter might
undermine American prestige, encourage adversaries, and threaten allies’ security.251
Nixon contended that the nature of the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam would
influence both international and domestic perceptions. He also realized that to maintain
domestic support for his foreign policy he would not be able to halt troop withdrawals
once begun.
Between Nixon’s first announcement of troop reductions on Midway Island on 8 June
1969 and November 1972, the United States reduced its troop levels from over 549,000
to less than 27,000. By 1975, the Defense Attaché Office in South Vietnam had only 50
American servicemembers and 1,200 civilians. Vietnam was no longer America’s
primary concern. Regarding funding for the South Vietnamese government and military,
the budget for fiscal year 1973 included $3.2 billion in aid, and this was reduced to $1.1
billion in fiscal year 1974. By fiscal year 1975, Congress only allocated $700 million.
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Effects on Allies and Adversaries. Contrary to President Nixon’s assertions regarding
the consequences of withdrawal and the loss of South Vietnam, United States allies
continued to remain committed. In an assessment of ally sentiment following the collapse
of South Vietnam, officials noted a “reverse domino” effect. They found that
Most nations in Asia apparently believe that revolutionary warfare of the
Vietnamese model, like a car accident, is something that happens to other
people…. On the other hand, they are worried about North Vietnamese
expansionism, which they quite accurately regard as having been the
principal determinant of events in Indochina. They are also worried about
the danger of increased Russian and Chinese activity, though they still
regard these in rather amorphous terms.252
Even though international partners were concerned about the level of American
commitment, they continued to depend on the United States because they lacked other
options. A review of those countries most affected by events in Southeast Asia – South
Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines – showed little willingness to forsake partnership
with the United States. South Korea had no other option in the face of continuing
animosity with the communist North Korean regime supported by the Soviet Union and
China. Virtually surrounded by new communist regimes in Laos and Cambodia, Thailand
vacillated between conflicting desires to expel United States forces from its territory or to
adopt neutrality that would imply some level of continued American support. In the
Philippines, domestic issues prompted its leader to desire a stronger commitment from
the United States while reducing its overt presence, yet the Philippines’ objectives were
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not hostile to American interests. Lastly, other countries like Malaysia, Australia, and
Singapore attempted to move even closer to the United States.253
Not only did allies remain committed to partnership with the United States,
adversaries refrained from further aggression against American interests. At the time of
the Paris peace accords ending the Vietnam War, American interest in South Vietnam
remained an independent country with “the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people
to determine their own future without outside interference.”254 North Vietnam did invade
and subsequently conquer South Vietnam in 1975; however, at the signing of the Paris
peace accords the Nixon administration knew this would likely happen and hoped to
forestall collapse by providing copious military aid. At the time of the North’s final
offensive, South Vietnam possessed a numerically and technologically superior force
relative to their rival. When the invasion and pending collapse occurred, the United States
deliberately abandoned its goals and interests in the region. Laos and Cambodia fell to
internal communist insurgents. Beyond inhibiting the general spread of communism, the
United States never maintain a committed interest in maintaining the survival of either
country. In 1975, Cambodian Khmer communists seized the American container ship SS
Mayaguez, but this was deemed an act of piracy related to an ongoing territorial dispute
between Cambodia and Vietnam.255 Regardless, the United States opted to take a strong
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stand against the Cambodians to send a signal to the North Koreans and Chinese that the
United States was willing to defend its interests and would not tolerate similar actions.256
Outcome.
How does a great power realign its strategic priorities when overcommitment abroad
constrains its military power projection and limits diplomatic flexibility? Second, what
explains the variation in outcomes when states opt to attempt retrenchment. I argue that
great powers correct the dilemma of overcommitment by going through a process of
strategic reorientation, of which retrenchment is the critical mechanism. Retrenchment is
the stage in strategic reorientation when leaders attempt to mediate between existing
security goals and the need to adapt to an evolving security environment. Retrenching
states are more likely to succeed when they can share a security burden with a likeminded
ally, settle grievances or diffuse secondary threats with a rival through rapprochement, or,
failing either of these, abandon an interest regardless of the consequences. When none of
these options are available, retrenchment will fail, because a great power will be unable
to extricate itself from existing commitments and free resources to address more critical
challenges. In this case, President Richard Nixon sought to lay the foundation for a
proactive, long-range foreign policy. He began by implementing a policy of retrenchment
that redistributed resources from peripheral concerns in Southeast Asia to core security
interests in other regions. He was successful and ultimately improved the United States’
strategic solvency.
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Much as my theory of retrenchment outcomes predicted, Nixon’s success stemmed
from a combination of ally burden sharing, rapprochement with geopolitical rivals, and
abandoning American interests in Southeast Asia. I argue that retrenchment is more
likely to succeed when a state can identify a suitable successor to uphold an existing
security order. In this case, President Nixon focused on Vietnamization to improve South
Vietnam’s ability to assume responsibility for its own defense and relieve the United
States of its security burden. He committed substantial financial and material resources to
strengthen South Vietnam’s ability to defend itself. By the time United States military
forces withdrew in 1973, South Vietnam had a numerically and qualitatively superior
military that gave the South a fighting chance. The failure by South Vietnamese leaders
to implement meaningful governmental reforms and politicization of their senior military
leaders resulted in the collapse of South Vietnam; however, this was the South’s failure
and did not impede American retrenchment.
My theory of retrenchment outcomes also holds that retrenchment is more likely to
succeed the more a state succeeds at rapprochement with adversaries. President Nixon
successfully implemented a policy of détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement
with China. He held the idea that competing interests with rivals were not immutable and
could be realistically managed through negotiation. Nixon’s policy of détente with the
Soviet Union was an instrumentalist strategy for achieving the administration’s goals in
Vietnam. President Nixon intended to complement détente and facilitate retrenchment
from Southeast Asia through rapprochement with China. By improving relations with
China, Nixon hoped to produce stable regional conditions to facilitate United States
withdrawal. The announcement of the Nixon Doctrine was meant to signal that the
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American threat to China would decline post-Vietnam. The American opening to China
was intended to elicit diplomatic pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the
war. Rapprochement led to triangular diplomacy between the United States, China, and
the Soviet Union and facilitated American retrenchment between 1969 and 1973.
Absent an ally willing and able to assume responsibility for burden sharing, and when
rapprochement fails, I predict that retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a
great power is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. During the
United States’ retrenchment from South Vietnam, President Nixon committed extensive
political, economic, and military resources to improve South Vietnam’s security capacity.
Given the consequences of failure, South Vietnamese leaders were ostensibly willing to
provide their own security, and American military aid gave them the material ability to
do so. However, South Vietnamese political dysfunction hindered their effectiveness and
ultimately led to collapse. Faced with the prospect of re-intervening to honor its
commitments, United States leaders opted instead to abandon all interests in South
Vietnam, a decision supported by the public and political elites.
Regarding my last two hypotheses – retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less
influence domestic political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of
regional withdrawal, and retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail – I find
evidence to support both claims. The American public and political elites favored
withdrawal, and Congress went so far as to limit the president’s war powers, cut funding
for South Vietnam, and preclude using American military forces in in that country.
President Ford did try to secure additional military aid for South Vietnam, but faced with
a political consensus about remaining uninvolved, Ford acquiesced and declared that the
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Vietnam War was over before the South finally collapsed. Finally, retrenchment in this
case succeeded because the United States was able to find an ally for burden sharing,
successfully settle disputes with its rivals, and, when South Vietnam’s demise seemed
imminent, domestic political circumstances in favor of nonintervention resulted in
abandonment of American interest in South Vietnam specifically, and Southeast Asia in
general.
Table 4 summarizes my findings regarding the five main hypotheses.
Table 4. Hypotheses and Summary of Successful Retrenchment

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 5

Retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a
suitable successor to uphold an existing security order. Nixon
focused on improving South Vietnam’s ability to assume
responsibility for its own defense and relieve the United States of its
security burden. Nixon committed substantial financial and material
resources to strengthen the South’s ability to defend itself; however,
political dysfunction in that country made it an ineffective proxy.
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at
rapprochement with adversaries. President Nixon successfully
implemented a policy of détente with the Soviet Union and
rapprochement with China.
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a great power
is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. The
United States abandoned its interest in South Vietnam and declined to
commit American airpower to stave off defeat by the North.
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic
political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of
regional withdrawal. The American public and political elites favored
withdrawal. Nixon managed to avert the risk of isolationism and
maintained a political consensus on the need for engagement abroad.
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. Attempts to bolster
South Vietnam’s ability to secure itself ultimately failed, but the
United States successfully settled issues with its main rivals which
prevented aggression. When faced the prospect of re-intervening to
prevent the collapse of South Vietnam, American leaders opted
instead to abandon their interests in that country.
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Alternatives
How about the alternative hypotheses for retrenchment outcomes? This case provides
limited to no support for any of the three identified alternatives. What support does
appear falls well short of the robust evidence supporting my main claims. First,
retrenchment may be more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align the type of
cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of relative decline. President
Nixon did opt for strategic retrenchment when faced with international relative decline;
however, this did not necessarily contribute to the United States’ success. His ability to
enhance South Vietnam’s capability for providing for its own defense and triangular
diplomacy made possible because of rapprochement facilitated America’s deliberate
withdraw. Had either of these factors not manifested, retrenchment likely would have
failed due to the consequences of a precipitous withdraw and rapid collapse of the South
at a time when the American public still supported honoring their country’s commitment
to a free and democratic South Vietnam. Therefore, while President Nixon did correctly
link the type of cost reductions with the nature of American relative decline, this alone
was not enough to bring about success.
Second, another possible explanation is that operational retrenchment is less likely to
succeed than strategic retrenchment. Here too, the evidence of the case does not fully
bear this out, though it does suggest the need for further investigation. President Nixon
implemented a mixture of operational and strategic retrenchment policy responses, yet
the main thrust of cost savings involved reducing the level of foreign commitments – the
level of risk in foreign policy. He also provided cover for force reductions and reduced
warfighting capacity by engaging in active diplomacy with Soviet and Chinese rivals.
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This reassured allies, particularly in the Middle East, who up to that point were slowly
being pulled into the Soviet orbit. Middle Eastern countries quickly abandoned the
Soviets when the United States asserted itself diplomatically. Had President Nixon opted
to solely cut costs through reducing the price of security or refrained from substituting
diplomacy for force, it seems likely retrenchment would have failed. Counterfactually, by
withdrawing from South Vietnam, abandoning its interests in Southeast Asia, and
significantly cutting its forces, American rivals might have opted to act more
aggressively to take advantage of the apparent United States’ retreat, aggression to which
it might not have been able to respond given recently reduced force structures. Therefore,
the hypothesis that operational retrenchment is more likely to fail than strategic
retrenchment has some support and warrants further investigation, even if it was not an
operative factor in this case.
Finally, slower rates of retrenchment may be more likely to succeed than rapid
withdrawal or reductions. Here again, the evidence does not fully support this hypothesis.
Nixon began withdrawing large numbers of servicemembers within eight months of
assuming the presidency. After making the initial withdrawal announcement, he
proceeded to make other large reductions over the course of the next three years. While
the number of servicemembers in South Vietnam rapidly declined, President Nixon
attempted to calibrate withdraw to on-the-ground conditions and the South’s ability to
assume more responsibility for their security. In this respect, the size of reductions seems
less important that the managed pace at which they occurred. While providing some
support for the idea that the rate of withdrawal may matter, little evidence points to it
being a vital factor to success. In 1974, after it became clear to the North Vietnamese that
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the United States would no longer support the South, the North planned and initiated an
offensive to capture South Vietnam. Perhaps had Nixon opted for rapid and immediate
withdraw this might have precipitated a similar response from the North; however, the
factor determining success would have been the United States’ ability to abandon its
interests, not how quickly it withdrew its forces. There might have been an effect on
allies or other rivals, but this case provides little evidence. Therefore, there is limited
support for the rate of retrenchment influencing outcomes. Counterfactuals suggest,
however, the need for further research regarding not only whether the rate of reductions
matter, but how they might matter.
Table 5 summarizes my findings regarding the three alternative hypotheses.
Table 5. Alternative Hypotheses of Successful Retrenchment.

Alternative
Hypothesis 1

Alternative
Hypothesis 2

Alternative
Hypothesis 3

Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align
the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of
relative decline. President Nixon correctly matched cost reductions to
the nature of decline, but this played no role in the outcome.
(Unsupported)
Operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic
retrenchment. President Nixon mixed and matched types of cost
reductions, with the predominant being strategic retrenchment
policies. His success neither proves nor disproves this hypothesis. A
counterfactual where Nixon favored operational reduction might
plausibly have resulted in aggression by American rivals.
(Limited support)
Slower rates of retrenchment are more likely to succeed than rapid
withdrawal or reductions. President Nixon attempted to calibrate
withdraw to on-the-ground conditions and the South’s ability to
assume more responsibility for their security. The pace of reductions
may play a role, but little evidence from the case points to it being a
vital factor for success.
(Limited support)
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CHAPTER 4: RETRENCHMENT FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, 2009-2015
“Any thoughtful president would hesitate about making renewed commitment in the
exact same region of the world with some of the exact same dynamics and the same
probability of an unsatisfactory outcome.”257
This project aims to answer how a great power realigns its strategic priorities when
foreign overcommitment constrains its military power projection and diplomatic
flexibility. Retrenchment is one way to realign resources and priorities, but its outcome
varies. I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself
from existing commitments and, therefore, is unable to free resources to address more
vital challenges. Extrication occurs in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to
a partner, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandonment. Retrenchment fails
when none of these three options are available.
President Obama entered office in January 2009 with a desire to reverse what he
perceived as foreign policy overreach by his predecessor. He inherited two stalemated
wars – in Afghanistan and Iraq – and he believed that American foreign policy had
ossified over the previous eight years. President Obama and his advisors thought that the
George W. Bush administration overcommitted the United States in Iraq and neglected
more critical issues like institutional reform, nuclear proliferation, economic growth, and
collective responses to man-made and natural disasters. These crises were believed to be
symptoms of weakness in the existing international architecture.258
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Seeking to lay the foundation for a proactive, long-range foreign policy, President
Obama intended to retrench from the Middle East – especially Iraq and Afghanistan –
and reorient American power towards East Asia. In the final analysis, the Obama
administration failed. President Obama could not identify a suitable successor to counter
rising Iranian influence and contain regional crises, nor did he succeed at offsetting his
retrenchment policy with rapprochement to minimize the potential for rivals to take
advantage of American withdrawal.259 Subsequent turmoil resulting from the Arab
Spring, the Syrian Civil War, the emergence of the Islamic State, and Iran’s expanding
influence sparked intense post hoc debate about the wisdom of withdrawal. Despite
President Obama’s intent, political partisanship and allied pressure meant he could not
abandon American interests in the region (figure 5).

Figure 5. Variables Affecting American Retrenchment from the Middle East.
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In what follows, I discuss this example of unsuccessful retrenchment within the
context of the posited model of strategic reorientation. First, I demonstrate the
international relative decline and strategic misalignment of the United States resulting
from its overcommitment in the Middle East between 2004 and 2008. I then discuss the
linked policies of the nebulous Obama Doctrine and related pivot to Asia, both of which
provided the policy framework for political and military retrenchment from the Middle
East between 2009 and 2011. Next, I examine the period of political and military
realignment following and the attempted geostrategic reorientation towards the East Asia
from 2011 to 2014. I conclude by providing an empirical assessment of the outcome of
this unsuccessful retrenchment attempt.
International Decline and Strategic Misalignment
The Road to Overcommitment, 2001-2008. Attacks on 11 September 2001 made
terrorism the United States’ strategic priority in a worldwide geopolitical and ideological
struggle. Cast in a Manichean light, President George Bush asserted that “our
responsibility to history is clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.”260
Rather than leaving it to law enforcement and passive countermeasures, President Bush
began a military offensive based on the “need to fight overseas by bringing the war to the
bad guys,”261 while “making no distinction between the terrorists who committed [the
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9/11 attacks] and those who harbor them.”262 Assessing terrorism as a worldwide threat
led Bush to formulate a strategy for fighting a global “War on Terror.”263
Five assumptions guided the Bush administration’s “War on Terror” and military
action in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas around the world. First, American military
dominance provided an unprecedented ability to fight overseas. Second, previous
administrations failed to respond more expansively to terror provocations which
emboldened extremist groups like Al Qaeda. Vice President Dick Cheney argued that
weakness, vacillation, and the unwillingness of the United States to stand
with our friends – that is provocative. It encouraged people like Osama bin
Laden…to launch repeated strikes against the United States, our people
overseas and here at home, with the view that he could, in fact, do so with
impunity.264
Third, the United States had to act pre-emptively because the Cold War doctrines of
containment and deterrence would not work against terror groups that did not have to
defend territory.265 Fourth, since terrorists required state support, the War on Terror was
indistinguishable from efforts to combat rogue regimes like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea
who supported terror groups. Finally, alliances and multilateral organizations were not
essential to American efforts to fight terrorism.266
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Afghanistan became the first battle in the War on Terror because its Taliban
government harbored Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda and would not turn them over to
the United States following the 9/11 attacks. One day after the attacks, the United Nations
Security Council expressed its readiness “to take all necessary steps to respond to the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in
accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.”267 On the
same day, and for the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
invoked Article 5, obligating its members to come to the defense of another member.
Within a week of the attacks, Congress authorized President Bush “to use all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2011, or harbored such organizations or persons.”268 By October 2001, the United
States, joined by almost twenty other countries, attacked Afghanistan and succeeded in
routing the Taliban by December.
Most allies who joined the United States to fight the Taliban assumed the Bush
administration had an Afghanistan-only policy. In fact, President Bush was pursuing an
Afghanistan-first policy.269 Although Bush ultimately decided against invading Iraq as
the first offensive in the War on Terror, he and his advisors began debating whether to
invade immediately after the 9/11 attacks.270 Iraq and its dictator, Saddam Hussein,
embodied the potential for the convergence of terrorists operating within rogue states in
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possession of weapons of mass destruction. President Bush’s decision was not whether
but when to invade Iraq. Though Congress ultimately authorized President Bush to
launch a war against Iraq, the United Nations Security Council did not. Despite that setback, President Bush launched an attack against Iraq in March 2003 over objections by
many of the United States’ allies and much of the rest of the world.
The United States defeated Iraq in less than four weeks, but by the summer of 2003
the American military found itself embroiled in an insurgency. President Bush attributed
this to the “consequences of catastrophic success,”271 but the reality was misguided postwar planning that assumed the United States would hand over control to the Iraqis within
a few months. This did not happen. More than half-way through President Bush’s second
term, the United States was still mired in Iraq with well over 120,000 servicemembers
deployed there annually, and an additional 30,000 deployed each year to Afghanistan. In
2007, after costing over half a trillion dollars and tens of thousands of casualties,
President Bush deployed an additional 20,000 troops during “the Surge” to Iraq to try and
stop internecine ethnic violence and quell the insurgency.
Because of the Surge’s seeming success,272 and “recognizing the performance and
increasing capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces,”273 President Bush and Iraqi Prime
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Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed a comprehensive Status of Forces Agreement in
December 2008. The agreement established a framework for curtailing American military
presence in Iraq and making the Iraqi government responsible for its security. 274 The
agreement stipulated that all American combat forces be removed from Iraqi cities no
later than 30 June 2009, and that “[a]ll the United States Forces shall withdraw from all
Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.”275 Moreover, the United States
recognized Iraq’s right to request the withdrawal of American forces at any time.276
Administration officials believed that the agreement would ultimately be renegotiated to
allow a sizable residual force to remain in Iraq after 2011.277
Meanwhile, the Taliban regained the initiative in Afghanistan because of the Bush
administration’s diplomatic and military fixation on Iraq. Iran and North Korea also
advanced their nuclear programs, America ineffectively opposed China as it expanded its
influence throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and Russia brazenly demonstrated
revanchist behavior in its near-abroad. Though the United States demonstrated it could
topple regimes with unprecedented speed,278 it became mired in Iraq and struggled to
defeat the insurgency or build a functioning democratic government. Worse, the United
States was strategically misaligned and unable to address emerging challenges in Asia
because of its military overcommitment and declining capacity for action.
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Military Overcommitment. By December 2008, the United States military,
particularly the Army, was overcommitted in the Middle East. All military services
deployed forces in support of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the Army
bore the brunt of these sizable land operations. As a result, the Army most clearly
reflected the costs of strategic overreach. According to Defense Manpower Data Center
data, between March 2003 and December 2008, the Army deployed an average of
117,000 active duty Soldiers each year to Iraq and Afghanistan. This average increased to
128,000 between September 2005 and December 2008, by which point approximately
67% of active duty Soldiers had deployed, with many on their second or third
deployments. By December 2008, approximately 373,000 active Army soldiers had
served in Iraq or Afghanistan: 121,000 had deployed for their first year, 173,000 for their
second, and 79,000 for their third year. Over 9,000 of the latter group had deployed for
their fourth year.279
The high demand for forces led the Army to change its force generation model to
ensure it could maintain an adequate forward deployed force, provide rotational forces,
and ensure deploying units were properly trained and equipped. The new model
established a structured, event-based progression of increased unit readiness over time.
The intent was for active units to be available for deployment once every three years,
reserve units every five years, and National Guard units every six years. In practice,
however, it meant that the only trained and available units were those deployed or just
about to be deployed. Those just returning from a deployment or recently returned were
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untrained, undermanned and resourced, and unavailable. For every deployed unit there
were two others unavailable – one recently redeployed and one preparing for deployment.
In aggregate, the number of deployed and unavailable soldiers totaled approximately 70%
of the active Army. The remaining 30 % of forces were either new soldiers or military
academy cadets in training, forward-deployed soldiers at other locations, supporting
operations from the United States, or injured. Less than 6% of soldiers – approximately
31,000 – in the active Army did not fall into one of these categories.280
Operational demands forced the Army to exceed desired dwell times for soldiers – the
time soldiers spent at home station between deployments – to maintain required troop
levels. Rather than maintaining a dwell time ratio of one year deployed and two years at
home, the Army adhered to a roughly one to one ratio to generate enough replacement
forces for deployed units. In addition to more frequently occurring deployments, the
Army had to increase its end strength, remove deterrent units stationed in South Korea
and Europe for use in the deployment cycle, and decrease the size of its generating forces
to make more soldiers available for deployment. Even with these stopgap measures, the
active Army experienced an approximately 94% annual utilization rate, deployment
ratios stayed the same, and it retained almost no capacity to deploy more soldiers in
support of ongoing operations or in response to unexpected contingencies.281
Declining Domestic Capacity. Three main factors contributed to declining domestic
capacity: a war-weary American public, fiscal austerity resulting from the 2008 financial
crisis, and dysfunctional political partisanship. First, by early 2009, only 35% of
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Americans believed that the Iraq war was the main problem facing the United States,
57% thought that sending troops to Iraq was a mistake, and 65% believed that the costs of
the war outweighed it benefits.282 Over 49% of Americans felt that the United States
should “mind its own business internationally.”283 A majority of the public also felt that
the United States should only assist five out of fifty of its formal defense treaty allies –
Canada, Germany, Israel, Mexico, and the United Kingdom – if required, thereby
signaling serious doubt about America’s global leadership role and commitment to the
exiting American-led world order.284 The effects of the 2008 financial crises heightened
these concerns.
Widespread failures in financial regulation, corporate governance lapses, risky
lending and borrowing, and ethics violations caused the financial crisis beginning at the
end of 2007 and lasting through 2008.285 Massive bailouts of financial institutions
prevented economic collapse, but the United States entered “the Great Recession” and
there was a global economic downturn. Housing markets suffered in many parts of the
country, resulting in high levels of evictions, foreclosures, and prolonged unemployment.
The economic crisis also contributed to widespread business failures and trillions of
dollars of lost consumer wealth.286
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“The Great Recession” led to domestic economic concerns that presented President
Obama with his most pressing challenges when he entered office. The recession also
highlighted the spiraling budget deficits and increasing national debt that accrued
between 2001 and 2009. A large portion of the debt increase resulted from the Bush
administration’s decision to finance the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by borrowing
instead of raising taxes. It became increasingly clear that the United States would have to
reign-in federal spending or risk being unable to repay its debts or control inflation.287 In
2009, the Congressional Budget Office forecast that the United States would run
unsustainable $1 trillion budget deficits annually, and observed that even if recovery
from the recession occurred as expected, the United States would still have the highest
debt-to-gross national product ratio since 1945.288
Spiraling budget deficits and increasing national debt between 2001 and 2009 sparked
concerns about the material foundations of American power. The weakening of the
United States’ economic and financial underpinnings suggested that it would have to
either raise taxes and interest rates, consume less and save, or reduce its military
expenditures.289 Significantly reducing military spending would likely force the United
States to scale back its overseas commitments with two important consequences. First,
reducing defense spending would make it easier for rising great powers like China to
close the military power gap with the United States. Second, declining military capacity
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would make it more difficult for the United States to respond to crises and stabilize
important regions or secure the global commons.290 Left unchecked, both consequences
would hasten America’s relative decline. Regardless, the Obama administration proposed
an annual defense spending cut of $400 million over eleven years, totaling approximately
$40 billion over that period – a 10% cut in annual defense spending.
By the time of President Obama’s inauguration, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had
cost over $1.5 trillion with a human toll of over 6,000 dead and more than 40,000
wounded.291 These costs sapped the political will to sustain the conflicts and distorted
policy making by increasingly polarizing politicians forced to simultaneously contend
with terrorism, economic decline, and the steady rise of near-peer geopolitical rivals.
Whereas the decision to attack Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks received bipartisan
support, the war in Iraq produced some of the highest levels of polarization recorded in
the history of popular polling. A year after the United States invaded Iraq, the gap in
support for the war between Republicans and Democrats reached 63%. By comparison,
the gap in support for previous wars in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Vietnam, and Korea
averaged 5%.292 This ongoing public polarization coincided with equally divided political
elites. Regardless of party affiliation, members of Congress actively sought to frustrate or
complicate opposition party initiatives, whether domestically or internationally.
The partisan lens through which political elites and the public viewed the Iraq War
also influenced the lessons learned and conclusions about the efficacy of the war on
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American security.293 One study of Republicans and Democrats showed divergent
opinions about the effects of the war on the United States’ long-term security. The study
found that 66% of Republicans thought the war was the right decision, while only 31% of
Democrats and 38% of independents agreed. Similarly, 69% of Republicans believed the
war improved American security, while only 35% of Democrats and 40% of
independents agreed.294 These views also established the parameters for adjusting
national security policies. Political polarization undermined the United States’ foreign
policy where the lack of unity encouraged adversaries, disheartened allies, and sapped
American resolve for taking needed action.295 Moreover, the inability of the president to
get bipartisan support for foreign policy increased the political risk of subsequent military
action.296
Considering Withdrawal. President Obama believed that the war in Iraq rested on
flawed assumptions.297 He outlined his foreign policy views as a Senator in the 2007
article “Renewing American Leadership” in which he argued “for a new vision of
[American] leadership in the twenty-first century” that would not be “bound by outdated
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thinking.”298 Obama argued that contemporary security challenges, especially those in the
Middle East, could only be addressed by applying the full range of American power
rather than narrowly focusing on military power alone.299 Key to his approach was
rebalancing American engagement abroad from an overreliance on military power during
the Bush administration to the use of non-military, soft-power.
During his presidential campaign, Obama promised to remove all United States
combat units from Iraq within sixteen months of his inauguration. While noting that “we
must be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in,” he argued that the
United States could remove all combat forces by the summer of 2010. However, he
explained “we'll keep a residual force to perform specific missions in Iraq: targeting any
remnants of al-Qaida; protecting our service members and diplomats; and training and
supporting Iraq's Security Forces, so long as the Iraqis make political progress.”300 This
suggested that the United States retained critical security interests in the region. In two
early speeches as president, at Cairo in June 2009 and at the September 2009 address to
the United Nations General Assembly, Obama also appeared to question the capacity and
virtue of American efforts to spread democracy, advance human rights, and open free
markets around the world.301
President Obama’s approach ultimately responded to his perspectives on the limits of
American power and an inclination to leverage the influence provided by the previous
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period of American primacy.302 During his first term in office, this meant that his biggest
security challenges involved the extrication of the United States from the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and changing the way America prosecuted the War on Terror.303 Benjamin
Rhodes, one of Obama’s deputy national-security advisers, said, “The project of the first
two years has been to effectively deal with the legacy issues that we inherited,
particularly the Iraq war, the Afghan war, and the war against Al Qaeda, while
rebalancing our resources and our posture in the world.”304 “If you were to boil it all
down to a bumper sticker, it’s ‘Wind down these two wars, reestablish American
standing and leadership in the world, and focus on a broader set of priorities’….”305
The Obama administration was not only skeptical about the limits of American
power, especially military power, it focused on the constraints imposed by the rise of
other states like China and India. The 2008 global financial crisis also hinted at the limits
of the United States’ economic power, but the rise of regional competitors was the
primary driver of American relative decline. President Obama and his aides believed that
they were struggling to hold on to America’s dominant position for another few
decades.306 Benjamin Rhodes explained “[w]e’re not trying to preside over America’s
decline. What we’re trying to do is get America another 50 years as leader.”307
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The rise of regional powers meant that the United States’ desire to maintain primacy
faced opposition in areas like the Middle East and Asia where rising powers competed for
resources and influence. However, the Obama administration fundamentally sought to
preserve primacy. During her confirmation hearing, Secretary of State nominee Hillary
Clinton noted that “our overriding duty is to protect and advance America’s security,
interests, and values…to strengthen America’s position of global leadership so we remain
a positive force in the world.”308 Similarly, during his first inaugural address, President
Obama declared, “we are ready to lead once more.”309 Despite the administration’s intent
and efforts to preserve primacy and America’s leadership role, it experienced an abiding
tension between this desire and balancing domestic economic and political constraints
with international challenges to American leadership.
Framework for Retrenchment, 2009-2011
The Obama administration’s foreign policy rested on the notion that the United
States’ involvement in Iraq undermined its world standing and threatened America’s
fundamental economic and security interests. His initial goal was to end American
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan while encouraging Middle Eastern partners to
assume more responsibility for providing for their security and regional stability. Success
in both these areas would facilitate the United States’ disengagement from the region to
focus on strengthening America’s domestic circumstances and strategically reorienting to
address emerging economic and security challenges in Asia. The Obama administration
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envisioned leaving a small military force in the Persian Gulf region to counter the spread
of Iranian influence, while focusing efforts to expand American economic and security
interests in the Asia-Pacific region to prevent China from altering the status quo.310
President Obama opted for a mixture of policies and actions designed to calibrate
American commitments with its constrained capacity to maintain and maximize its ability
to provide global leadership.311
President Obama’s worldview of the international system rested on four pillars. He
believed he inherited a world that was hyper-connected, uncontrollable, and required
multi-partner action. Both the 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategies reflected these
views and redefined the United States’ relationship to the international system. Hyperconnectedness described the world in which American would act considering the
condition of uncontrollability, and the belief in partnerships reflected how the United
States would exercise it leadership.312
These four pillars provided the basis for President Obama’s attempts to restore
equilibrium to American foreign policy which he perceived had become misaligned
during the Bush administration. President Obama saw Bush’s reaction to the 9/11 terror
attack – an overreaction in Obama’s estimate – as the biggest danger to American
interests. Because the Bush administration overcommitted to the War on Terror in
general, and specifically the Iraq War, President Obama believed he needed to rebalance
foreign policy to regain American prestige and freedom of action. To succeed, Obama
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needed to achieve equilibrium in six interrelated areas: resetting the global War on
Terror, balancing America’s hard and soft power, pursing multilateralism in a “new era
of engagement,”313 finding a balance between foreign and domestic policy needs, finding
a new foreign policy consensus, and geostrategic equilibrium.314
Lowering Costs. President Obama entered office when the United States was
experiencing its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. His primary task was
to avoid economic collapse, and his priorities during his first year in office reflected an
emphasis on domestic and economic issues. Obama’s first National Security Strategy
mirrored this emphasis on domestic economic solvency and asserted “[t]he foundation of
American leadership must be a prosperous American economy.”315 President Obama’s
domestic focus comported with widely held opinions in which the public, Democrats and
Republicans alike, believed America should pay less attention to foreign policy issues
and focus on domestic problems.316 Accordingly, Obama made clear his determination to
reduce national security spending.
In February 2009, President Obama delivered a speech in which he revised the
original date of withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq from 30 June 2009 to 31 August
2010. Despite this extension, President Obama reaffirmed his commitment of complete
withdrawal of American forces from Iraq by 31 December 2011, in accordance with the
Bush administration’s agreement with the Iraq government. In the meantime, the United
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States would “retain a transitional force to carry out three distinct functions: training,
equipping, and advising Iraqi security forces as long as they remain nonsectarian;
conducting targeted counterterrorism missions; and protecting our ongoing civilian and
military efforts within Iraq. Initially, this force will likely be made up of 35,000 to 50,000
[American] troops.”317
As he did with Iraq, President Obama began pushing for a withdrawal of American
forces from Afghanistan within sixteen months of entering office.318 After initially
approving an increase of 17,000 troops in Afghanistan, the debate over withdrawal lasted
several months and appeared indecisive.319 However, by October 2009, Obama seemed to
make up his mind. At a National Security Council meeting discussing sending more
troops to Afghanistan he stated, “[w]e’ve recognized that we’re not going to completely
defeat the Taliban which we all agree on,” and after hearing recommendations declared
“[t]his is not what I’m looking for…I’m not doing ten years. I’m not spending a trillion
dollars. That’s not in the national interest.”320 Moreover, some on his national security
team believed that the Taliban could be accommodated like Hezbollah, so President
Obama decided to pursue a policy of withdrawal rather than trying to defeat the
enemy.321 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted “[for President Obama], it’s all about
getting out.”322 In November, President Obama decided to send 30,000 additional soldiers
to Afghanistan, far below the 60-80,000 his advisors recommended, but stressed that
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“there needs to be a plan about how we’re going to hand off and get out of
Afghanistan.”323
President Obama’s decision to increase troop levels in Afghanistan was a comprise
because he was reluctant to continue devoting resources to the conflict.324 Military
leaders requested what they thought were enough additional troops to win the campaign.
President Obama, however, did not want to deepen American commitment and settled on
a plan he believed to be politically viable. Critics on both ends of the political spectrum
panned President Obama’s decision.325 Regardless, when he announced the deployment
of additional troops he simultaneously announced that they would start being withdrawn
within eighteen months. Moreover, he reduced the United States’ objectives in
Afghanistan which he now “narrowly defined as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating
Al Qaeda and its extremist allies,” because he “[refused] to set goals that go beyond
[America’s] responsibility…means…and interests.” President Obama argued that the
United States could no longer ignore financial costs and declared that “our troop
commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended – because the nation that I’m most
interested in building is our own.”326 In other words, President Obama limited further
involvement in Afghanistan to conserve resources and focus on domestic priorities.
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President Obama remained “absolutely convinced that you cannot solve the problem
of Afghanistan, the Taliban, the spread of extremism in that region solely through
military means.”327 While announcing on 1 December 2009 that he would send additional
troops to Afghanistan, President Obama set July 2011 as the date to begin withdrawing
all troops from that country.328 On 22 June 2011, President Obama announced that 10,000
troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of the year, and an additional
23,000 would leave by the summer of 2012.329 The announced drawdown would leave
approximately 68,000 by the end of 2012. President Obama and Afghan president Hamid
Karzai signed a strategic partnership on 2 May 2012. The agreement stipulated that
Afghan Security forces would take the lead in combat operations by the end of 2013, and
almost all US troops would be completely withdrawn by the end of 2014.330 Finally, on
27 May 2014, President Obama announced that American combat operations in
Afghanistan would end in December 2014 and that troops levels would be reduced to
9,800 troops by this time. He noted it was “time to turn the page on a decade in which so
much of our foreign policy was focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.”331
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Besides the planned troop reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama
administration sought to lower the cost of the War on Terror by relying on drones and
special operation forces.332 It also attempted to reduce foreign commitments and share
burdens with allies. These dynamics indicated the Obama administration was concerned
with redefining “the circumstances under which the United States [would] use diplomacy,
coercion and force to shape the world around it” at as little cost as possible.333 As
President Obama explained
the world is a tough complicated, messy, mean place, and full of hardship
and tragedy. And in order to advance both our security interests and those
ideals and values that we care about, we’ve got to be hardheaded at the
same time as we’re bighearted, and pick and choose our spots, and
recognize that there are going to be times where the best that we can do is
to shine a spotlight on something that’s terrible, but not believe that we
can automatically solve it. There are going to be times where our security
interests conflict with our concerns about human rights. There are going to
be times where we can do something about innocent people being killed,
but there are going to be times where we can’t.334
President Obama’s response to the Libyan crisis exemplified this approach whereby
he sought to avoid additional military commitments in the Middle East unless necessary
to protect American security interests.335 The Obama administration believed that other
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regional powers like France and Britain, both American allies, had more direct interests
in resolving the crisis. Accordingly, President Obama persuaded these powers to act
while he implemented a “lead from behind” strategy by which the United States applied
its unique military capabilities to assist NATO allies who conducted the main operations
against Libya.336 Obama’s approach to the Libyan crisis and the War on Terror amounted
to a policy of “surrogate warfare” whereby he externalized the costs of conflict by using
human and technological surrogates when the administration determined vital national
interest were not at stake.337
Managing Withdrawal. President Obama was determined to limit the use of the
military in defense of vital interests within the context of globalization and forced
austerity resulting from two costly wars and the 2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, any
use of a leaner and more flexible military force would only be considered if it were
multilateral and in cooperation with allies.338 With the president’s attention focused on
domestic affairs, it appeared that his approach to foreign affairs, particularly security
policy, was non-interventionist. President Obama recognized the limits to the United
States’ resources and capacity,339 so his primary strategic approach relied upon the
principles of “multilateral retrenchment” designed to “curtail the United States’ overseas
commitments, restore its standing in the world, and shift burdens onto global partners.”340
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The 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategies echoed these themes. They stated
“[t]he threshold for military action is higher when [United States] interests are not
directly threatened. In such cases, we will seek to mobilize allies and partners to share the
burden and achieve lasting outcomes.”341 Ultimately, President Obama did not
necessarily change the objectives of American foreign policy so much as the means he
would use to achieve them.342 The intent for altering the means used to achieve security
objectives was to reduce military commitments in the Middle East and Europe to
facilitate sizable military force reductions and divert savings towards domestic programs.
President Obama demonstrated on several geopolitical issues that he preferred a
policy of retrenchment and restraint over continuing engagement in unproductive and
interminable conflicts. First, the Obama administration sought to minimize conflict with
major powers like China despite ample opportunities for confrontation. Second, the
administration’s dealings with middle powers like Iran demonstrated restraint despite
Iranian provocation. Finally, in regional flashpoints like North Africa and the Middle
East, President Obama’s actions showed the limits of American ambition and desire for
constrained military engagement.343
Some viewed the Obama administration’s implementation of these policies as an
abandonment of the United States’ “pivotal role as the world’s default power,”
particularly in a volatile and conflict-prone region like the Middle East.344 However,
Derek Chollet, a special adviser to President Obama and Assistant Secretary of Defense
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for International Security Affairs explained that the Obama administration was playing
the “long game.” He claimed that “the defining element of Obama’s grand strategy is that
it reflects the totality of American interests – foreign and domestic – to protect global
leadership in an era of seemingly infinite demands and finite resources.”345 Essentially,
President Obama’s approach was comprised of “a set of reactions, adapting itself to
reality rather than reshaping it.”346
Strategically, President Obama’s approach emphasized using collective action
through coalition warfare and international partner capacity-building.347 Operationally, it
prioritized covert operations and using technological platforms like drones to achieve
security objectives.348 Changing the means used to achieve the United States’ foreign
policy objectives resulted in three key actions taken by the Obama administration. First,
President Obama sought near-term withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, and he resisted
any new ground operations in the Middle East. Second, the administration sought
rapprochement and Iran. Third, the administration wanted to shift the United States’
strategic focus to Asia – the “pivot to Asia” – which further justified retrenchment from
the Middle East.
During his first term, President Obama conducted relations with Middle Eastern
countries within the larger context of the “pivot to Asia” and desire to reduce military
costs. He did not intend to reduce the importance of the Middle East, but he viewed Asia
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as the most strategically important area across all the dimensions of the United States’
national interest.349 Instead of redefining the United States’ primary objectives in the
Middle East, President Obama’s policy of retrenchment focused on achieving them at
lower cost.350 For President Obama, diplomacy would become the first line of defense
against becoming embroiled in the types of all-consuming commitments made by the
Bush administration. As he explained in an interview:
A president does not make decisions in a vacuum. He does not have a
blank slate. Any president who was thoughtful, I believe, would recognize
that after over a decade of war, with obligations that are still to this day
requiring great amounts of resources and attention in Afghanistan, with
the experience of Iraq, with that strains that it’s placed on our military –
any thoughtful president would hesitate about making renewed
commitment in the exact same region of the world with some of the exact
same dynamics and the same probability of an unsatisfactory outcome.351
President Obama declared a formal end to United States combat operations in Iraq in
August 2010. The United States military continued to provide a stabilizing presence after
this time;352 however, keeping forces in Iraq beyond the end of 2011 required
renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement between American and Iraq. President
Obama attempted to renegotiate an agreement and offered to leave behind 10,000 troops,
about one division’s worth, for training and counterterrorism. The future number,
mission, and legal status of American troops in Iraq emerged as sticking points. Iraq’s
prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, appeared unable or unwilling to provide assurances of
legal immunity for American troops and the talks finally broke down. President Obama
arguably could have come to an agreement. However, political concerns about the effect

Krieg, “Externalizing the Burden of War,” 105.
Manyin et al., “Pivot to the Pacific?” 4.
351
Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” 76.
352
Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael O’Hanlon, Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign
Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 75-80.
349
350

121

of extending the United States’ mission in Iraq before his upcoming 2012 reelection bid
led President Obama to abandon the attempt.353 Despite military concerns about a
complete withdrawal, all remaining American forces in Iraq quickly departed to make the
31 December 2011 withdrawal deadline. The last American troops departed Iraq on 18
December 2011.354
Withdrawal from Iraq presented several risks that had the potential to disrupt
American retrenchment from the region. The risks included: logistics, terror groups, the
main Iraqi groups, and neighboring countries. Logistically, withdrawing American troops
would be relatively straightforward unless insurgent or terror groups disrupted the
process. Terror groups had the potential to complicate withdrawal by attempting to
embarrass the United States by making its withdrawal appear to be a rout. More
significantly, these groups had the potential to stoke ethnic tensions that could lead Iraq
back into a civil war. This possibility suggested the largest risk to withdrawal would be
that associated with the ethnic disputes between the Sunnis and Shia, and between the
Arabs and Kurds. Regarding the former dispute, the main danger resulted from the
possibility that the Shia-led Iraqi government would refuse to fully integrate the Sunnis
into a truly unified government structure, especially if the government failed to integrate
Sunni militias into the Iraqi Security Forces. The Arab-Kurdish disputes over territories
in the oil-rich north of Iraq had the greatest potential risk for erupting into a civil war that
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would force the United States to choose between backing the government it helped form
or America’s Kurdish allies.355
The risk of Sunni-Shia and Arab-Kurdish disputes heightened the role of regional
actors and the roles they might play by interfering in Iraq. Iraq’s neighbors – especially
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey – had a vested interest in interfering because of the
domestic consequences of Iraq becoming a failed state. Moreover, most of these states
believed the United States’ invasion of Iraq was a bad decision that had negative
consequences for their countries.356 These neighbors stoked potential conflicts by backing
the ethnic factions most likely to advance their power and interest. Saudi Arabia and
Syria backed Iraqi Sunnis and manipulated Iraqi politics to ensure Sunni groups were
integrated into Iraqi government to prevent the spread of Iranian influence in the
region.357 These countries typically acted surreptitiously, unlike Turkey, who possessed
the main conventional military threat to Iraq and who had a history if attacking Iraqi
Kurds in response to Kurdish terrorism. Finally, Iran had the most potential for
destabilizing Iraq and a motive for embarrassing the United States. Destabilizing Iraq,
whose government was predominantly Shia, might not be in Iran’s interests, but the
possibility provided it leverage over the United States as a tool for managing AmericanIranian relations.358
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In all, the greatest potential risk affecting the prospects of American retrenchment
from the Middle East was the longstanding conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
These two regional powers, the former the dominant Sunni state and the latter the
dominant Shia state, often engaged in zero-sum conflict between their ethnic blocks.
While these two powers had for many years maintained a modus vivendi in the region,
their mutual interest in the Iraqi state might bring them into conflict. As a result, the
United States’ withdrawal from Iraq left that country open to becoming the frontlines in
Sunni-Shia competition fought by Saudi and Iranian proxies.359 Complicating matters
was the fact that Saudi Arabia was a traditional regional ally, while Iran remained a
seemingly implacable foe with an active nuclear development program. Any attempt by
President Obama to diffuse the risks associated with American retrenchment would
require building up the Saudi’s capacity – both is ability and willingness – to assume a
larger regional security burden, as well as rapprochement with Iran.
The United States long relied on Saudi Arabia to play a vital role in maintaining
Middle Eastern security because of the country’s economic, political, and cultural
importance, as well as its strategic location. Since the beginning on the War on Terror,
the United States relied on Saudi Arabia to counter Islamist extremism and support
counterterrorism efforts to promote regional stability. The Saudis had long been the
United States’ largest foreign military customer, receiving equipment, training, and
support.360 However, after President Obama announced his intention to withdraw
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American troops from Iraq and pivot to Asia, American foreign military sales increased
from $244 million in 2009 to $358 million in 2010. Sales generally increased in
subsequent years, with large increases occurring after 2013 when the Syrian civil war
began, and again in 2014 when ISIS began to emerge as a regional threat. In all,
American foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia increased from $244 million in 2009 to
almost $3.5 billion by 2017, an over 1300% increase.361 These sales clearly illustrated an
attempt to improve Saudi Arabia’s capacity to maintain regional security and its
importance to the United States’ policy of regional retrenchment. However, defusing
Iranian hostility towards American interests that might destabilize regional security
meant President Obama would have to attempt rapprochement.
The Obama administration’s relationship with Iran, once designated as a member of
the “axis of evil,”362 demonstrated a clear preference for diplomacy over saber rattling.
President Obama explicitly campaigned with the intent to de-escalate ongoing tensions
with Iran to stem its pursuit of nuclear weapons.363 He argued that Iran was “acting
irresponsibly” by pursuing nuclear weapons and supporting Shiite militant groups in Iraq
and throughout the Middle East. However, Obama blamed the Bush administration and
its regional policies for Iran’s behavior.364 Iran seemed to sense an opportunity and its
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, called two days after President Obama’s election to
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congratulate him, the first such call made to an American president since 1979. During
President Obama’s first inauguration speech he seemed to be replying to this overture
when he declared
To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual
interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to
sow conflict or blame their society's ills on the West: Know that your
people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To
those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing
of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will
extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.365
When mass protests erupted in Iran following its disputed 2009 presidential election,
President Obama resisted pressure to advocate for regime change. Instead, he adopted a
wait-and-see approach and refused to meddle by refraining from offering any direct
American support to protesters.366 Even after more than two years of failed negotiations,
regional Iranian aggression, and the apparent unwillingness of Iran to engage in
rapprochement with the United States, the Obama administration continued to refrain
from threatening or using military action against Iran. President Obama even declined to
explicitly, even if only rhetorically, support regime change in Iran, the sworn enemy of
the United States, leading state-sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East, and repeated
threats to destroy Israel, a key regional American ally.367 Despite this forbearance, Iran
continued to confront the United States in the region by capturing and shooting at
American unmanned aerial vehicles whose technology they threated to share with Russia
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and China,368 and by making repeated threats to close the Straits of Hormuz, thereby
cutting off oil from the Persian Gulf.369
Though consideration of great power conflict faded following the 9/11 terror attacks
against the United States.370 Over time, realities revealed that great power competition
continued apace while the United States was fixated on lesser threats. One of those
“threats” was China’s rise and burgeoning regional aspirations. China increasingly
displayed assertiveness during the Obama administration’s first year. It interfered with
American naval vessels, objected against combined United States-South Korea military
exercises, and limited military-to-military cooperation in protest over ongoing arms sales
by the United States to Taiwan.371 China’s assertiveness increasingly became a theme in
official reports,372 yet the Obama administration consistently sought to avoid conflict by
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accepting China’s growing power.373 While resisting the temptation for confrontation,
President Obama revealed his willingness to bear the burden of reassuring China
regarding American intentions and willingness to manage – as opposed to stymie –
China’s rise.374
President Obama believed that the Bush administration was so preoccupied with the
War on Terror in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, that it neglected the
Asia-Pacific region and China’s rise. This view was not entirely accurate. In fact, the
Bush administration maintained forward-deployed air and naval forces at Guam and
Japan, began cooperation with Singapore to build an aircraft carrier facility at Changi
Naval Base, assigned an additional aircraft carrier battle group to the Pacific theater, and
declared it would station 60% of American submarines in Asia.375 Furthermore, the Bush
administration prioritized revitalizing the relations with Japan and other Asian allies and
adeptly managed relations with China.376 However, despite these positive steps, the Bush
administration’s Asian policies were largely reactive and arguably secondary to its
primary fixation on the War on Terror and Middle East conflicts. Forward-positioned air
and naval forces, the assignment of an additional aircraft carrier, and overweighting of
submarine forces in the Pacific were largely stopgap measures intended to offset the
reduction of American ground combat forces in the region that were removed to meet
operational needs in the Middle East. Moreover, even though the Bush administration
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maintained generally positive relations with China, it never fully settled the question of
whether China was a strategic competitor or cooperative partner.377
The Obama administration viewed Asia as an arena where they could achieve foreign
policy success, unlike the interminable Middle East quagmires. President Obama aimed
to use the “pivot” to Asia as a means for shifting American attention away from Middle
Eastern hot spots like Iraq and Afghanistan and towards a more economically and
strategically important region. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted
Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to [Iraq and
Afghanistan]. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic
about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the
best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance
our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over
the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased
investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the AsiaPacific region.378
To achieve these tasks, Secretary Clinton stated that the Obama administration would
focus on six lines of effort aimed at
strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working
relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with
regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging
a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human
rights.379
The Obama administration recognized that an increasingly assertive China might
cause conflicts that could undermine the Asia-Pacific region’s growing economies and
emerging nations. Moreover, through geographically separated from Asia, as a Pacific
power the United States would directly benefit from increased engagement with the
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region.380 The strategic narrative accompanying the announcement of America’s turn to
Asia unsettled allies in the Middle East who feared abandonment,381 as well as AsianPacific partners who questioned the determination of the United States to exert its power
in that region.382 Moreover, though the administration intended to strengthen ties with
long-standing regional allies and bring new energy to managing the United States’
relationship with China, it had the opposite effect. President Obama’s emphasis on
strengthening security ties with its allies – Australia, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines,
South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam – created the impression in China that the United
States was implementing a containment strategy intended to counter China’s rising power
status.383
Failing to Realign and Reorient, 2012-2015
Ally Failure to Uphold the Regional Security Order. President Obama could not
keep Iran from exploiting growing regional instability, because he lacked an effective
Middle Eastern ally to uphold the United States’ preferred regional security order. Iran
was relatively free to exert its influence after the United States first removed Iran’s
primary threat on its east, the Taliban in Afghanistan, then removed Iran’s main western
threat by toppling Saddam Hussein. Once the United States withdrew most of its forces
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from the Middle East, Iran had virtually unconstrained freedom of maneuver. Iran
effectively became the main force shaping Middle Eastern politics because America’s
regional allies seemed unwilling to assist in containment. Since the effects of any
confrontation would affect neighboring states, the unwillingness to assume that risk made
many of America’s Middle Eastern partners ineffective.384 Saudi Arabia remained an
exception. However, it pursued its own security goals, only tangentially compatible with
American interests, as it increasingly engaged in proxy conflict with Iran.
Saudi Arabia and the United States share a common interest in limiting Iran’s Middle
Eastern sphere of influence. However, as the regional power in direct confrontation with
Iran, Saudi Arabia has a deeper interest that prompts it to pursue its own regional security
goal. When Saudi actions benefit the United States, this is the consequence of, rather than
the motivation for, Saudi Arabia’s behavior.385 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the
dominant Sunni power in the region, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the dominant Shia
power, historically engaged in proxy conflicts throughout the Middle East, and extending
into the Caucasus, South and Central Asia, and across Northern Africa.386 Rather than
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engage in direct military competition, the two states participate in a “Cold War” in which
their influence is brought to bear on the domestic politics of weak states throughout the
region. The Saudi-Iranian Cold Was is more a struggle over domestic politics, where the
political and military strength of supported parties in civil conflicts is more important that
the balance of military power of the Saudis and Iranians.387
The decades old Saudi-Iranian Cold War flared up in 2011 as a result of the Arab
Spring.388 Previous episodes, such as the one lasting from 1952 to 1970, or the one from
1979 to around 1997, reflected distinct regional dynamics. However, they existed within,
and were manipulated by, the larger great power conflict between the United States and
the Soviet Union.389 After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Saudi Arabia and Iran formed
competing blocs, the Saudis and their allies struggled to maintain the status quo while
Iran and its allies formed a revolutionary bloc.390 The United States supported the Saudi
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bloc, and the Russians and Chinese supported the Iranian bloc. When the Arab Spring
sparked civil uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa, it presented challenges
and opportunities to both blocs. Traditional patrons – the United States, Russia, and
China – favored regional stability, but they had to choose how much to support their bloc
in the new circumstances.391 Russia and China decided to support their Middle East
allies, but President Obama opted to remain uninvolved, which left Saudi Arabia free to
pursue its interests.
The Saudis and Iranians traditionally preferred to compete through proxies, and in the
aftermath of the Arab Spring – the Arab Winter – they did so again.392 The Arab Spring
and subsequent Arab Winter heightened Saudi Arabia’s concerns about its internal
stability and Iranian actions. Consequently, Saudi leaders acted to maintain the regional
status quo in what some described as a 21st century Brezhnev Doctrine – the Saudis could
intervene in any state to protect their interests.393 Iran sough to take advantage of regional
instability to expand the Shia Crescent by using Shia militias to create a land corridor
running from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, and into Lebanon.394 The two blocs created or
exacerbated instability as they fought using proxies in countries throughout the Middle
East. For its part, Saudi Arabia’s proxy fights and contribution to instability ran at odds
with American interests.
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Not only did Saudi Arabia fail to uphold the regional security order, its self-interested
actions in places like Syria created circumstances to which President Obama had to
respond. Because of his disinclination and preferred policy of Middle East retrenchment,
President Obama often responded too slowly and reactively. Moreover, when Obama did
decide to respond, in siding with Saudi Arabia and other status quo regimes affiliated
with political oppression and human rights violations, his decision put the United States
at odds with the rising wave of democratic, anti-authoritarian movements sweeping the
region. This further benefited Iran, who remained hostile to American interests despite
President Obama’s attempted rapprochement.395
Failed Rapprochement with Iran. President Obama spent the first two years of his
first term trying to achieve rapprochement with Iran. His attempts spanned a range from
the mundane, such as insisting on saying the full name of Iran in a video greeting to
initially refusing to speak out in support of pro-democracy protests being brutally
attacked by the ruling regime.396 President Obama’s attempt to reduce Iran’s nuclear
threat was in line with his earlier diplomatic efforts to lead global nuclear reduction
efforts;397 however, this put the administration in the morally dubious position of
accepting anti-democratic efforts by an adversary. The Obama administration was trying
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to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program and drive for regional
hegemony. He believed that engagement and rapprochement offered the best option,
though his policy used the threat of economic sanctions to further motivate Iran.398
Unlike some of his predecessors, President Obama did not view engagement and
sanctions as mutually exclusive. He was personally in favor of working with Iran, but he
also saw the value in putting pressure on the regime through sanctions.399 From the start,
the purpose of the administration’s policy was to help generate international support for
tougher sanctions if engagement failed. When early engagement attempts ultimately
failed, President Obama was able to gain more European and international support than
previous administrations.400 This was crucial because of the regional threat and risk of
nuclear proliferation posed by Iran. President Obama’s engagement with Iran culminated
in October 2009 when representatives from Britain, China, France, Germany, Iran,
Russia, and the United States met in Geneva to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. During
this meeting, representatives from the United States and Iran met separately in the
highest-level bilateral meeting between the two countries since the 1979 Iranian
Revolution.401
The Geneva conference achieved a deal for Iran to give up its enriched uranium, but
the deal fell apart two weeks later when Iran refused to comply. By early 2010, the
Obama administration shifted its efforts from engagement to implementation of economic
sanctions intended to coerce Iran into abandoning its nuclear ambitions. These sanctions
appeared affect Iran by raising factional strife and political dissent and intensifying Iran’s
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domestic economic problems. However, three critical weaknesses hindered the extent to
which sanctions could alter Iran’s behavior. First, evidence revealed that key states like
Austria, China, and Switzerland were not fully complying with the sanctioning agreement
and Iran was actively trying to circumvent the sanctions.402 Second, despite clear effects
on the Iranian economy, there was little evidence suggesting they were affecting the
regime’s cost-benefit calculations about the value of its nuclear program. Moreover, the
sanctions required strategic patience and political costs,403 something President Obama
lack because of the danger nuclear weapons held for regional dynamics.404 Finally,
Iranian leaders believed they held the stronger position,405 even as President Obama
sought to implement a policy of containment.406
President Obama opted for a policy of containment after rapprochement failed and
sanctions appeared to be diminishing in effectiveness. Proponents of the policy argued
that containment would allow the United States to mitigate the consequences of Iran’s
“nuclear defiance.” To do so, the Obama administration would have to be willing to
establish “redlines” defining acceptable Iranian behavior and be willing to use military
force if necessary. Moreover, it would have to reassure regional allies that the United
States remained committed to preserving the regional balance of power.407 Regardless,
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Iran’s continuing shadow wars with the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq led Iran to
believe that even if it could not militarily defeat the United States it could wear America
down through exhaustion.408 President Obama’s retrenchment from the Middle East and
reluctance to intervene during the Arab Spring served to fuel this perception. Iran’s
strategy relied on Middle Eastern volatility which the Arab Spring provided in
abundance. However, by 2011, President Obama had abandoned any hopes of
rapprochement as Iran remained recalcitrant and took advantage of the turmoil from the
Arab Spring to advance its interests.
Inability to Abandon Middle East Interests. President Obama entered office
intending to cut military spending, reduce military forces, and downplay the importance
of military power in foreign relations. However, less than half way through his first term,
he increasingly found himself bogged down in geopolitical rivalries that forced
reengagement in the Middle East.409 The domestic-level “mismatch between the
complexity of the global system and the simplicity of [American] foreign policy rhetoric”
was another critical challenge President Obama faced in implementing his security
policies.410 Political tensions between the Republican party’s antipathy towards
multilateralism and the Democrat’s aversion to military power projection made it difficult
for the Obama administration to implement his policies without having to confront
challenges from multiple directions.411 The Obama administration’s response to the Arab
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Spring demonstrated a clear preference for restraint and limiting the use of American
power. However, the administration’s response to the uprisings in Libya and Syria
demonstrated the costs of President Obama’s policy of Middle East retrenchment and the
inability of the United States to abandon its security interests in the region.
The Obama administration based its response to events in Libya during the Arab
Spring as the unfolded rather than based on a clear-cut plan. President Obama
consistently demonstrated reluctance to intervene, an attitude some critics described as
dithering.412 He only decided to intervene with airpower when it became clear that antiGadhafi rebels faced imminent defeat and slaughter in Benghazi. Obama stressed that
“America’s role would be limited; that we would not put ground troops into Libya; that
we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and that we
would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners.”413 These declarations suggested
that President Obama would use American military power in support of the United
Nations Security Council resolution 1973 to intervene under the Responsibility to Protect
(R2P) principle to protect Benghazi – something that would preserve the United States’
interest in averting mass slaughter.414 However, shortly after beginning military
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operations Obama accepted the urgings of those who sought to expand the mission
beyond the mandate for R2P to a mission for regime change.415
After the first wave of bombing, President Obama explained that the United States
would transfer responsibility and assume “a supporting role” to ensure that “the risk and
cost of this operation – to our military and to American taxpayers – will be reduced
significantly.” He stressed that “to be blunt, we went down that road in Iraq…That is not
something we can afford to repeat in Libya.” Instead, he would “[create] the conditions
and coalitions for others to step up…to work with allies and partners so that they bear
their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs.”416 Allied burden sharing aside,
post-Gadhafi Libya became marked by lawlessness,417 extralegal imprisonments,418
weapons proliferation,419 infiltration of Islamist terror groups,420 and spillover in the
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neighboring states.421 President Obama still refused to step in even as Libya descended
into chaos and lay on the brink of becoming a failed state. According to one State
Department official,
“Obama remained intent upon leaving the Middle East, and he was not
going to let himself be distanced from that mission by sudden eruptions of
pro-democracy protests, teetering dictators, and looming civil wars. He did
not know whether the Arab Spring would lead to ubiquitous democracy or
a prolonged period of instability, but regardless, he was determined that
America would not try to influence the outcome – not if it meant reversing
course to get involved in the region.…”422
This intent was in line with a retrenchment policy, but the aftereffects of the Libya
intervention unsettled the trans-Sahel region and expanded the influence of Islamist terror
groups. These factors forced the Obama administration to escalate its level of military
engagement throughout North Africa over the remainder of Obama’s term.423
Similar events occurred during the Syrian Civil War in 2011. In March of that year,
antigovernment protests erupted over the Assad family’s four-decade rule. As protests
spread, the level of violence committed by Syrian government forces and rebel groups
escalated and numerous political and armed opposition groups emerged. President
Obama openly called on Syrian president Bashar al Assad to step down and was ignored.
The increasing level of violence, death toll, and use of chemical weapons by the Assad
government put pressure on the Obama administration to support the resistance despite

Nick Amies, “Growing Threat of al Qaeda in North Africa Prompts EU Action,” Deutsche Welle, 17
November 2011, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://www.dw.com/en/growing-threat-of-al-qaeda-in-northafrica-prompts-eu-action/a-15573516.
422
Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (New York: Doubleday, 2013),
164.
423
John Reed, “Mapped: The US Military’s Presence in Africa,” Foreign Policy, 1 May 2013, accessed 1
March 2019, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/01/mapped-the-u-s-militarys-presence-in-africa/; and
Kathryn Watson, “Where Does the US Have Troops in Africa, and Why?” CBS News, 23 October 2017,
accessed 1 March 2019, at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/where-does-the-u-s-have-troops-in-africaand-why/.
421

140

his desire to remain uninvolved in the conflict. In 2013, Congress debated whether to
provide lethal and nonlethal assistance to suitable Syrian opposition groups, ultimately
authorizing nonlethal aid. Moreover, Congress refrained from authorizing President
Obama to use force in response to an August 2013 chemical weapons attack.424
In 2014, the Obama administration requested that Congress grant authority and
funding for providing lethal support to selected Syrian opposition groups. The
administration’s original request aimed to support defending Syrian people against Assad
regime attacks: however, the subsequent rise and expansion of ISIS across Syria and
portions of Iraq forced the administration to refocus on counterterrorism efforts in the
region. Congress authorized the Department of Defense to lead a train and equip program
for Syrian groups fighting terror groups. In September 2014, the United States began air
strikes in Syria aimed at preventing ISIS from using Syria as a base of operations for its
efforts in Iraq. A month later, the Department of Defense established Combined Joint
Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve to “formalize ongoing military actions against the
rising threat posed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria.” American military personnel on the ground
in Syria increased from 50 in late 2015 to over 2,000 by 2017.425
The Obama administration also deployed several thousand more American
servicemembers in June 2014 to fight ISIS in Iraq. The deployment was made at the
invitation of the Iraqi government in response to successful offensives conducted by ISIS
that defeated Iraqi Security Forces and seized large portions of territory in western Iraq.
The United States now had several thousand servicemembers committed in Iraq less than
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three years after they were withdrawn under President Obama’s policy of retrenchment.
He justified his actions by saying
…the world is confronted by many challenges. And while America has
never been able to right every wrong, America has made the world a more
secure and prosperous place. And our leadership is necessary to
underwrite the global security and prosperity that our children and our
grandchildren will depend upon. We do so by adhering to a set of core
principles. We do whatever is necessary to protect our people. We support
our allies when they’re in danger. We lead coalitions of countries to
uphold international norms. And we strive to stay true to the fundamental
values – the desire to live with basic freedom and dignity – that is
common to human beings wherever they are. That’s why people all over
the world look to the United States of America to lead. And that’s why we
do it.426
This justification for intervention directly contradicted the one he provided to justify
non-intervention in Libya despite the similarities between the two situations. President
Obama’s decision also ran counter to his express intent to extricate the United States
from the Middle East. Instead, the recommitment of thousands of troops to Iraq and Syria
once again embroiled the United States in a conflict that pitted America and its regional
allies – Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates – against Russia, Iran, and
the Iranian-backed terror group Hezbollah. Moreover, as the spillover from the Syrian
Civil War affected neighboring states, the Saudis and Iranians pursued their own security
interests and fought proxy conflicts that further destabilized the region against American
interests.427 In the end, the United States could not abandon its security interest in the
Middle East.
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Outcome of Strategic Reorientation
Level of Reduced Commitment. President Obama successfully withdrew all
American forces out of Iraq and significantly reduced the number of soldiers in
Afghanistan; however, major cost savings resulted from decreasing the defense budget.
There were multiple rounds of military cuts beginning in 2009, and defense spending
declined significantly as domestic spending increased.428 As a proportion of the United
States’ gross domestic product, the military budget was 5% in 2010 and approximately
3% by 2016. The national defense budget declined from $722 billion in 2010 to $580
billion by 2015. Rather than directly engaging in key regions, the 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance sought to develop low-cost, small-footprint approaches to achieving security
objectives. These included heavy reliance upon exercises, rotational units to maintain a
military presence, and advising partner militaries.429 More importantly, the Obama
administration decided that the military would no longer be required to be prepared to
fight two wars simultaneously; instead, the military would only be sized to fight one
large-scale operation in one region, while denying an adversary’s objectives in a second
region (i.e., fighting one and a half instead of two wars).430 The Obama administration
also de-prioritized large-scale counterinsurgency and ground campaigns in favor of
“innovative, low-cost and small-footprint approaches to achieve…security objectives.”431
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Finally, the administration decreased spending on military research and development,
procurement, and modernization.432
The Obama administration’s cost reductions saved money but entailed another,
intangible, cost. Reducing the size of the military increased the level of risk in America’s
strategic engagements and commitments. Primary strategic documents, like the 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance, did not address the trade-offs between costs and risks.
Instead, the guidance tacitly assumed that the resulting risk increase would be
manageable.433 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta did concede “Because [the United
States military] will be somewhat smaller…risks will be measured in time and
capacity.”434 One way the administration sought to minimize these risks was through
“reversibility,” maintaining the ability to reconstitute personnel, the defense industrial
base, and science and technology capabilities the administration cut. This, however,
ignored how requiring longer time to rebuild capacity might affect a future operation’s
cost, whether financial or human, and the likelihood of success. It also did not address
how the military would be able to overcome the loss of leadership and trained personnel
cut during retrenchment. Finally, guidance did not address how long key portions of the
defense industrial base could remain operating under the policy of reversibility.435
These issues assumed added significance once sequestration became a fiscal reality.
Sequestration was an austerity fiscal policy that required automatic spending cuts to
federal government spending under the 2011 Budget Control Act. The cuts required by
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sequestration exacerbated those already enacted by the Obama administration, to the
point where American military capabilities were unaligned with even the administration’s
more modest commitments. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance assumed that the
Department of Defense would experience an approximately $500 billion budget reduction
over ten years; however, when sequestration occurred the department suddenly faced $1
trillion in cuts. This jeopardized what one analyst noted were the “irreducible
requirements in American defense policy – winding down current wars responsibly,
deterring Iran, hedging against a rising China, protecting global sea lanes vital for
commerce, attacking terrorists and checking state sponsors of terror, and ensuring a
strong all-volunteer military as well as a world-class defense scientific and industrial
base.”436 It was not just analysts and government observers who were concerned, but
senior military leaders as well. In a congressional hearing, three of the four assembled
Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that the military under sequestration would be incapable of
handling even a single major armed conflict.437 Critics might argue this should be
expected from chiefs seeking to increase their service’s budgets, but the unity of the
chiefs and consequences they described reflected far more than previous inter-service
budgetary rivalry or jockeying for defense dollars.
Outside of readiness issues, the Obama administration’s military reductions and the
effects of sequestration constrained the envisioned pivot to Asia. Obama’s policy looked
to counterbalance China’s military power and assertiveness in the Pacific. One key
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element of achieving this goal was increasing United States naval forces in the region;
however, force structure cuts and the consequences of sequestration effectively prevented
this. Because of force reductions, the United States military in East Asia remained about
as strong as it was ten years before. Over that same period China’s military expenditures
grew dramatically, a fact likely noticed by China and American allies.438 This resulted in
continuing American relative decline in the Pacific.
While the Obama administration managed to retrench from Iraq and Afghanistan, it
came at a significant cost. The United States forfeited the ability to influence the behavior
or shape preferable policies when President Obama withdrew completely from Iraq and
announced a timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan. Already hard-pressed to control
political events in these two countries when the United States maintained a sizable
contingent of forces in each, that lack of presence made it virtually impossible to do so.
This led to several problems. First, the United States was unable to assist the Iraqi
government fight resurgent Sunni jihadists in ISIS between 2012 and 2014. Second, a
lack of American influence resulted in Iran gaining sway over much of the Iraq
government, to the point where Iraqi prime minister Maliki allowed Iranian overflights to
deliver weapons to Assad during the Syrian Civil War. Finally, Maliki increasingly
became authoritarian and cracked down on political opposition and Iraq’s Sunni minority.
The latter became increasingly alienated and increased the level of sectarian violence and
support for ISIS.439 Increased tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia also ran the risk of
reigniting Iraq’s sectarian civil war as Saudi Arabia and Iran used proxies in Iraq to fight
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each other. Kurdish-Arab relations in Iraq remained strained as the result of territory
disputes, and ongoing sectarian and ethnic rivalries made governing Iraq more
challenging and contested.440 Finally, the sharp reduction in American ground personnel
in Afghanistan coincided with a resurgence of the Taliban and increased involvement by
Pakistan in Afghan affairs.
Effects on Allies and Adversaries. President Obama’s retrenchment from the Middle
East was intended to extricate the United States from its regional overcommitment and to
complement the “pivot” to Asia. The pivot, however, rested upon flawed assumptions.
First, was the assumption that the rising economic and political importance of Asia not
only required additional American engagement, but the assignment of additional military
forces to the region. The Obama administration placed Asia at the center of its security
strategy; however, this appeared to Chinese leaders as if the United States was adjusting
its defense policy to contain China.
The underlying premise of the pivot to Asia was that the region’s growing economic
importance made it more globally important relative to other regions like the Middle
East. This suggested an economic response – for instance, joining the Asia Infrastructure
Investment Bank at China’s invitation. However, not only did the administration decline
China’s invitation, it included a sizable military component to its rebalancing efforts. For
instance, the release of the United States’ Air-Sea Battle doctrine in 2010 outlined an
operational doctrine for military confrontation with China. Official proclamations by
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prominent administration officials like Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who discussed
the importance of countering China’s growing military capabilities further signaled to
China that the United States intended to contain China’s power in the region. As a result,
China began acting more assertively throughout East Asia in general, and the South
China Sea and Senkakus more specifically.
The Obama administration attempted to counter China’s assertive territorial claims
over the Scarborough Shoal, Paracel Islands, and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea
by conducting freedom of navigation operations and increasing military support to
American allies. It also made diplomatic overtures to India, Indonesia, Myanmar, and
Vietnam, and aimed to develop closer economic ties to the Asia-Pacific region by
increasing trade through the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Finally, the Obama administration
began developing new military doctrines to conducting potential combat in the Pacific
Theater. These goals all focused on three components of the military aspect of the pivot
to Asia: strengthening alliances and building new partnerships, adjusting force postures,
and strategic planning. First, the Obama administration reemphasized existing formal
alliances and began building new ones to expand its ally network in the Asia-Pacific
region. Second, the administration sought to maintain a visible military presence in the
region, promising not to cut military budgets for forces in Asia, despite being forced to
do so because of sequestration. Third, the Department of Defense updated its strategic
battle plans and devised the Air-Sea Battle concept to counter an adversary’s anti-access
and area denial capabilities.
The expanding network of American allies reached China’s border, the increased
presence of United States military forces throughout the Pacific brought them into more
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frequent contact with Chinese forces, often in contested areas, and the fact that China was
the likely rival against which Air-Sea battle would be used, all heighten China’s concerns
about being contained. The main reason the Obama administration increased the saliency
of the military component of the Asian pivot was ostensibly in reaction to growing
Chinese assertiveness; however, China had made no new claims and its “assertiveness”
was intended to strengthen its position in established claims or defend outstanding
claims. In most instances, the Chinese were reacting, or overreacting, to a rival’s
actions.441 The United States arguably already had enough air and naval assets in the
region to counter Chinese overreactions. However, the Obama administration misread
China’s leadership. As a result, subsequent policies to enhance American’s Pacific
presence compounded China’s insecurities, motivated Chinese assertiveness, and
undermined regional stability.442 This occurred at a time when Middle Eastern turmoil
was forcing the United States to refocus its attention back on that region.
The Syrian Civil War resulted in the rise of the Islamic State whose actions and
regional success at seizing territory forced the Obama administration to refocus on the
Middle East at the expense of its Asian efforts.443 This highlighted the second, and
perhaps most important, flawed assumption. The Obama administration wrongly assumed
that the United States could afford to withdraw from the Middle East despite ongoing
social, economic, and political challenges in a region critical to American and global
economic security. While generally ignoring the Arab Spring uprisings, President
Obama’s reluctance to act during the Syrian Civil War resulted in a conflict that
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displaced eleven million people and caused a refugee crisis that further destabilized
countries in the Middle East and Europe. American disengagement also allowed the
Islamic State to exploit the conflict and move into, and subsequently occupy portions of
Iraq
Intervening in Syria presented the Obama administration with few good options.
However, a counterfactual argument could be made that President Obama should have
worked harder to renegotiate a status of forces agreement. Had he kept some level of
forces in Iraq, the United States would likely have been better postured to combat ISIS
and counter Iran. Meanwhile, the spread of Iranian influence to fill the vacuum created by
withdrawing American power weakened American relationships with Gulf State partners
and allies. Therefore, the Obama administration’s approach not only increased tensions in
Asia, it allowed the Middle East to descend further into chaos due the United States’
relative neglect.
Outcome. Retrenchment occurs when leaders attempt to mediate between existing
security goals and the need to adapt to an evolving security environment. Retrenching
states are more likely to succeed when they can share a security burden with a likeminded
ally, settle grievances or diffuse secondary threats with a rival through rapprochement, or,
failing either of these, abandon an interest regardless of the consequences. When none of
these options are available, retrenchment will fail because a great power will be unable to
extricate itself from existing commitments and free resources to address more critical
challenges. In this case, President Barack Obama sought to lay the foundation for a
proactive, long-range foreign policy by implementing a policy of retrenchment from the
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Middle East and pivoting to Asia. He was unsuccessful and ultimately failed to improve
the United States’ strategic solvency.
As my theory of retrenchment outcomes predicts, Obama’s failure stemmed from
unsuccessful burden sharing by allies, failed rapprochement with rivals, and an inability
to abandon American interests in the Middle East. I argue that retrenchment is more
likely to succeed when a state can identify a suitable successor to uphold an existing
security order. In this case, President Obama committed substantial material resources to
strengthen Saudi Arabia’s ability to maintain regional security favorable to American
interests. However, instead of doing so, Saudi Arabia engaged in a new Cold War with
Iran which was attempting to expand its influence after the American withdrawal. This
competition led Saudi Arabia to engage in proxy conflicts throughout the Middle East.
Whether these conflicts contributed to or resulted from Saudi and Iranian intervention,
they served to destabilize the region. Therefore, while Saudi Arabia pursed its interests,
the results of its efforts undermined the United States preference for regional stability.
Moreover, events in the region forced President Obama to recommit diplomatic energy
and military forces to the Middle East at the expense of his Asian pivot.
My theory of retrenchment outcomes also holds that retrenchment is more likely to
fail when a state is unsuccessful at rapprochement with a rival. President Obama
attempted to engage with Iran, especially over its nuclear program. However, Iran
remained implacable and refused to abandon its nuclear program or its attempt to achieve
regional hegemony. By early 2010, the Obama administration shifted its efforts to the
implementation of economic sanctions intended to coerce Iran into altering its behavior
and engage in negotiations. The effects of the sanctions clearly affected Iran’s domestic
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economy, but they had an ambiguous effect of Iran’s leaders who continued to pursue
their strategic goals in defiance of the United States. By 2011, President Obama
abandoned attempts at rapprochement as Iran remained recalcitrant and stoked turmoil
during the Arab Spring to advance its interests. The turmoil of these conflicts,
particularly the Syrian Civil War and subsequent rise of ISIS as a regional threat, forced
President Obama to reengage in the Middle East.
Without an ally willing and able to assume responsibility for maintaining security,
and with rapprochement failure, the last option for retrenchment to succeed is for a great
power to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. In the end, President
Obama was unwilling or unable to abandon the United States’ interest in the Middle East.
The Arab Spring proved to be the undoing of the Obama administration’s retrenchment
attempt. Though initially refraining from intervention, President Obama half-heartedly
reversed course when he supported attacking Libya, first to prevent mass killings then to
effect regime change. During the initial stages of the Syrian Civil War, the Obama
administration debated how best to respond though there was a clear preference for a
hands-off approach. However, as ISIS emerged during the conflict then spread into Iraq
the administration finally settled on deploying military forces to directly confront the
threat. Once again, the United States was militarily engaged in the Middle East and
retrenchment had failed.
Regarding my last two hypotheses – retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less
influence domestic political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of
regional withdrawal, and retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail – I find little
evidence to support the either claim. The American public favored withdrawal from Iraq,
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political elites did as well, but they were concerned about the way withdraw occurred.
President Obama declared a deadline for withdrawal from Iraq, and the subsequent
collapse of talks to extend the Status of Forces Agreement provided the political cover
necessary to complete full withdrawal. Republicans and Democrats both supported
intervening during the Arab Spring – though for different reasons – so President Obama
likely could have gained support for intervention had he wanted to do so. Retrenchment
in this case failed because the United States was unable to find an ally for burden sharing,
failed to settle disputes with its rivals, and, when Middle East turmoil erupted during the
Arab Spring, could not abandon its interest in a region vital for global economic security.
Table 6 summarizes my findings regarding the five main hypotheses.
Table 6. Hypotheses and summary of failed retrenchment
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 5

Retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a
suitable successor to uphold an existing security order.
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at
rapprochement with adversaries. President Obama failed at
rapprochement with Iran after trying engagement then sanctions.
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a great power
is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. The
United States could not abandon its interest in an economically
important region.
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic
political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of
regional withdrawal. American public and political elites favored
withdrawal then reengagement. Obama squandered this support
because of his personal desire to avoid Middle East entanglements
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. President Obama
might have invested more political effort in strengthening Saudi
Arabia’s efforts to counter Iranian influence throughout the region.
Instead, he focused on pivoting to Asia. President Obama might also
have opted to abandon American interests in the region regardless of
the consequences, since the United States would not suffer from them
nearly as much as others. Either action would have likely resulted in
successful retrenchment.
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Alternatives. How about my alternative hypotheses? This case provides limited
support for any of the three identified alternatives. What support does appear falls well
short of the robust evidence supporting my main claims. First, retrenchment may be more
likely to succeed the more closely leaders align the type of cost reductions with the nature
of relative decline. There is limited support for this, though the case does offer avenues
for additional research along these lines. President Obama simultaneously enacted
strategic and operational retrenchment when he withdrew military forces from the Middle
East and subsequently reduced the size of the military, particularly the Army, and
significantly reduced the defense budget. While the Obama administration focused on the
domestic concerns related to the 2008 economic crises, it failed to adjust its policies to
ensure it could address the source of America’s international relative decline, namely
China. The reduced force structure and low readiness resulting from sequestration meant
President Obama lacked the means to simultaneously execute his pivot to Asia and
respond to the turmoil of the Arab spring. As a result, intervening in Iraq and Syria in
2014 came at the expense of the Asian pivot. This, however, was not the cause of
retrenchment failure, but a consequence.
Second, another possible explanation is that operational retrenchment is less likely to
succeed than strategic retrenchment. Here too, the evidence of the case does not fully
bear this out, though it does suggest the need for further investigation. By enacting
operational retrenchment, President Obama limited the means with which to purse the
military component of his Asia policy and reengage in the Middle East. The United
States already had enough air and naval assets in the Pacific theater to contain China.
However, America lacked the capacity to respond to rising Chinese assertiveness.
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China’s assertiveness was arguably a reaction to take advantage of the United States’
circumstances following the 2008 financial crisis and its inability to disengage from the
Middle East. The military and diplomatic components of President Obama’s strategy also
raised fears in China that America was trying to implement a policy of containment. Both
factors likely contributed to growing Chinese assertiveness to which the United States
had limited military capability to respond. American intervention after the Arab Spring
forced President Obama to choose between Asia and the Middle East. Having to make
this choice suggests that operational retrenchment was a poor decision, particularly since
the cost savings did little to address the domestic economic concerns. Therefore, the
hypothesis that operational retrenchment is more likely to fail than strategic retrenchment
has some support and warrants further investigation, even if it was not an operative factor
for failure in this case.
Finally, slower rates of retrenchment may be more likely to succeed than rapid
withdrawal or reductions. Here again, the evidence does not fully support this hypothesis.
There is little evidence to support the claim that the rate of retrenchment matters.
However, a counterfactual argument can be made that had President Obama kept some
level of forces in Iraq the United States may have been better postured to combat ISIS.
President Obama arguably could have offered to leave more troops in Iraq to demonstrate
American commitment, or he could have negotiated terms to a new Status of Forces
agreement that might have appeased domestic Iraqi political dynamics. However, his
desire to withdraw from Iraq and pivot to Asia likely weakened his resolve. When Iraqi
leaders would not concede to legal protections for remaining American servicemembers,
President Obama used it as a pretext for full withdrawal. President Obama left the United

155

States at a strategic disadvantage by removing all American forces and forfeiting the
United States’ ability to influence an Iraqi government increasingly coming under the
influence of Iran. As in the successful case of retrenchment from Southeast Asia,
counterfactuals in this case suggest the need for further research regarding not only
whether the rate of reductions matter, but how they might matter.
Table 7 summarizes my findings regarding the three alternative hypotheses.
Table 7. Alternative hypotheses of failed retrenchment

Alternative
Hypothesis 1

Alternative
Hypothesis 2

Alternative
Hypothesis 3

Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align
the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of
relative decline. President Obama faced international relative decline
because of China’s rise, and domestic relative decline resulting from
the 2008 financial crises. Of the two, while the latter drove pressing
domestic concerns, the former presented the biggest potential threat.
(Limited Support)
Operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic
retrenchment. By enacting operational retrenchment, President
Obama limited the means with which to purse the military component
of his Asia policy and reengage in the Middle East. As a result,
intervention forced a choice between Asia and the Middle East,
indicating operational retrenchment was a poor decision, particularly
since the cost savings did little to address the domestic economic
concerns driving the decision to reduce the price of defense.
(Limited support)
Slower rates of retrenchment are more likely to succeed than rapid
withdrawal or reductions. There is little evidence to support the claim
that the rate of retrenchment matters. However, a counterfactual
argument can be made arguing that had President Obama kept some
level of forces in Iraq the United States may have been better
postured to combat ISIS.
(Limited support)
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
“We must achieve both security and solvency.”444
Security and Solvency
At times is appears that security and solvency are antimonies. The costs of pursing
national security, whether through military expenditures or in defense of a national
interest, often leads to insolvency. Similarly, achieving solvency, economic or strategic,
often requires leaders to accept higher levels of security risk than they might otherwise
prefer. For example, the Eisenhower administration’s policy of retrenchment beginning in
1953 reflected the paradox of security and solvency. President Eisenhower sought to
reduce military expenditures to divert the savings towards domestic economic concerns.
His administration’s top foreign policy goal was to reduce the cost of the Cold War to
preserve America’s economic solvency.
President Eisenhower wanted to reduce the cost of the Cold War through a twofaceted policy of retrenchment. The first facet was a policy aimed at lowering the risk of
security by shifting burdens onto allies (i.e., strategic retrenchment).445 Eisenhower
wanted to conclude American involvement in the Korean war by reaching a negotiated
settlement with China and North Korea.446 This would facilitate the administration going
beyond a mere “spasmodic reaction to the stimulus of emergencies” and reorienting its
diplomatic efforts to address challenges in Europe and Latin America.447 Unfortunately,
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the United States lacked an ally to assume South Korea’s security burden, and
Eisenhower faced resistance from European allies to assume more responsibility for their
security interests.448 Moreover, he was politically unable to abandon American interests
on the Korean peninsula and Western Europe. Regardless, this facet of President
Eisenhower’s retrenchment policy succeeded because of his rapprochement with wartime
rivals.
The second facet of Eisenhower’s retrenchment policy was lowering the price of
security by cutting defense spending (i.e., operational retrenchment). Ending the Korean
War afforded the opportunity to realize a peace dividend to help restore America’s
economic solvency. President Eisenhower cut his predecessor’s last defense budget
proposal from $41.2 billion to $35.8 billion, a more than 13% reduction. In his first
budget proposal for fiscal year 1955, Eisenhower proposed only $30.9 billion, a
cumulative 25% reduction of the United States defense budget.449 Eisenhower thought his
predecessor’s goal of making the United States less reliant on nuclear weapons was too
expensive. In the age of nuclear weapons, deterrence would only be effective if the
United States focused on those things most likely to deter the Soviet Union. Accordingly,
President Eisenhower he cut American ground forces by a third between 1953 and 1955.
He off-set these cuts by considering the use of nuclear weapons more often and for a
wider range of security problems than any other president.450
Both facets of President Eisenhower’s retrenchment policy were successful at
reducing the costs associated with providing security. On the one hand, strategic
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retrenchment from Korea lowered the risks associated with preventing the spread of
international communism. On the other hand, it facilitated lowing the price of American
security by allowing Eisenhower to claim a peace dividend and cut military budgets and
force structure. However, this was not security and solvency; instead, what Eisenhower
managed to achieve was security with solvency. Perhaps this is the best any leader can
accomplish. After all, the risks to security are potentially limitless, while the domestic
resources available for defense are undeniably limited. Normatively, security with
solvency – the ability to defend national interests with enough power in reserve to
address emerging threats – is the goal to which great power leaders should aspire. The
question is how, particularly in circumstances characterized by relative decline. How can
a great power realign its strategic priorities when overcommitment abroad results in
diplomatic inflexibility and constrained power projection in the face of increasing foreign
policy challenges and decreasing domestic resources?
In this project I argued that a policy of retrenchment conducted within a larger
process of strategic reorientation allows leaders to redistribute resources from peripheral
to core security interests. Strategic reorientation occurs over time as a four-stage lifecycle with mutually-reinforcing, sequentially-linked stages. Leaders perceive a need for
retrenchment during periods of misalignment marked by rising international threats,
especially shifts in relative power, and declining domestic resources resulting from
economic downturns, dysfunctional politics, or declining public support for existing
foreign policies. These antecedent conditions eventually lead to a decision point
regarding retrenchment where leaders consider the strategic circumstances and decide
how to reduce security costs. Realignment begins once leaders start to implement and
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synchronize retrenchment policies. An outcome eventually emerges based on whether
retrenchment facilitates strategic reorientation. Retrenchment succeeds when it results in
strategic reorientation and fails otherwise (figure 6).
Retrenchment is the core stage of strategic reorientation during which leaders mediate
between existing security goals and the need to adapt to a changing security environment.
States retrench during periods of overcommitment and acute relative decline because the
nature of great power politics incentivizes them to remain strategically solvent.451
Overcommitted great powers attempt to avoid insolvency by retrenching to regroup and
slow, if not reverse, their decline by implementing more sustainable foreign policies. This
is important to the long-term strategic solvency of a great power. The international
system ultimately punishes states that fail to balance their foreign policy objectives with
available resources. States that fail to retrench will eventually succumb to aggression as
rivals exploit inflexible foreign policies and military overextension. Therefore, remaining
strategically insolvent will result in relative decline becoming absolute.
The goal of retrenchment is to realign resources by reducing security-related costs in
one region to provide additional resources for addressing a neglected security challenge
in another region. There are two types of retrenchment – strategic and operational –
differentiated by the types of policies implemented and whether retrenchment lowers the
price or associated risk of security.452 Strategic retrenchment reduces the risks associated
with a state’s foreign policy by minimizing extraneous or overly costly commitments and
makes resources available for improving deterrence and defenses in more important
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areas. Operational retrenchment lowers the price of security and increases the amount of
available resources. However, regardless of the type, not all retrenchment attempts
succeed. Therefore, I aimed to identify what explains the variation in retrenchment
outcomes.
Retrenchment arguably has the best potential for improving a great power’s strategic
solvency relative to the uncertain options of muddling along or launching costly
preventative wars. I argued that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to
extricate itself from existing commitments and is therefore unable to free resources to
address more critical challenges. In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in
one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through
rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the
consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are available.
Contrary to prevailing wisdom, I argued that retrenchment will generally succeed
unless there is no ally willing and able to accept responsibility, and a great power fails at
rapprochement, and the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest. Using
primary and secondary sources, I conducted in-depth historical analysis using structured,
focused comparison of two cases of post-World War II retrenchment attempts by the
United States. The first, a success, explored American retrenchment from Southeast Asia
between 1969 and 1975. The second, a failure, looked at an attempted retrenchment from
the Middle East between 2009 and 2015. Below, I discuss my findings and their
significance to scholarship and policymaking
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Findings
Case 1 (Success): Retrenchment from Southeast Asia, 1969-1975. The Nixon
administration assumed responsibility for American foreign policy during a period of
international and domestic change that necessitated developing a new strategic approach.
American diplomacy and military force had become overcommitted during the American
conflict in Vietnam where political objectives remained elusive. The level of political and
diplomatic effort expended in Vietnam resulted in the strategic neglect of other critical
areas of Cold War competition. In the Middle East, the Soviet Union took advantage of
American preoccupation with Vietnam to increase the Soviet presence and influence in
the region. President Nixon believed that ongoing international changes reduced the
United States’ relative power and had to be addressed.453
President Nixon and his security advisor, Henry Kissinger, recognized that ongoing
American involvement in Vietnam and the nature of the evolving international system
needed to be addressed to solve their foreign policy dilemma. Changes in the
international system included the emergence of nascent political and economic
multipolarity as the strength of the Western European and Japanese economies increased
their international clout. The Soviet Union’s attainment of strategic parity and emergence
as a global power was another key development during the United States’ distraction in
Vietnam. The Nixon administration had to reconcile the conflicting demands emerging
from political and economic multipolarity and revitalized military bipolarity, though the
administration focused more on the latter given the inherent risks involved in ongoing
Cold War competition along the periphery.
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President Nixon opted for a policy of retrenchment from Vietnam and Southeast Asia
to facilitate strategically reorienting towards more important regions of geopolitical
competition. He managed to retrench successfully by using a policy of gradual and
orderly withdrawal supported by burden sharing with an ally, South Vietnam, and
rapprochement with rivals, China and the Soviet Union. Differentiating between the ends
of foreign policy helped President Nixon develop a consensus regarding American
engagement with the world. By 1975, despite the changed dynamics of the executive and
legislative branches that emerged after the withdrawal from Vietnam and the Watergate
scandal, Congress continued to support engagement abroad even if though forced
President Ford to abandon American interests in South Vietnam. Overall, President
Nixon successfully retrenched and reoriented American foreign policy. American
withdrawal from Southeast Asia neither discouraged key allies nor encouraged adversary
aggression. Moreover, retrenchment facilitated reorientation towards the Middle East to
counter increasing Soviet involvement in a region critical to the economic security of the
United States and its allies. Figure 7 illustrates the pertinent facets of this case.
Nixon’s success stemmed from a combination of ally burden sharing, rapprochement
with geopolitical rivals, and abandoning American interests in Southeast Asia. I argued
that retrenchment will be more likely to succeed when a state can identify a suitable
successor to uphold an existing security order. In this case, President Nixon focused on
Vietnamization to improve South Vietnam’s ability to assume responsibility for its own
defense and relieve the United States of its security burden. Vietnamization also
facilitated the United States’ troop drawdown between 1969 and 1973. Nixon committed
substantial financial and material resources to strengthen South Vietnam’s ability to
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defend itself. By the time United States military forces withdrew in 1973, South Vietnam
had a numerically and qualitatively superior military that gave the South a fighting
chance. The failure by South Vietnamese leaders to implement meaningful governmental
reforms and politicization of their senior military leaders resulted in the collapse of South
Vietnam; however, this was the South’s failure and did not impede American
retrenchment.
I also argued that retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at
rapprochement with adversaries. President Nixon believed that competing interests with
rivals were not immutable and could be realistically managed through negotiation.
Therefore, he attempted, and ultimately succeeded at, implementing a policy of détente
with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. Nixon’s policy of détente with the
Soviet Union was an instrumentalist strategy for achieving the administration’s goals in
Vietnam. Similarly, President Nixon intended to complement détente and facilitate
retrenchment from Southeast Asia through rapprochement with China. By improving
relations with China, Nixon hoped to produce stable regional conditions to facilitate
American withdrawal. The American opening to China was intended to elicit diplomatic
pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war. Consequently, rapprochement
led to triangular diplomacy between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union
which facilitated American retrenchment.
Without an ally to assume more responsibility for burden sharing, and when
rapprochement fails, I predicted that retrenchment will be more likely to succeed the
more able a great power is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal.
During the United States’ retrenchment from South Vietnam, President Nixon committed

164

extensive political, economic, and military resources to improve South Vietnam’s
security capacity. Given the consequences of failure, South Vietnamese leaders were
ostensibly willing to provide their own security, and American military aid gave the
South the material ability to do so. However, South Vietnamese political dysfunction
hindered military effectiveness and ultimately led to collapse. Faced with the prospect of
re-intervening to honor its commitments, United States leaders opted instead to abandon
all interest in South Vietnam, a decision supported by the public and political elites.
In this case of successful retrenchment, I also found evidence to support the
predictions that retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic
political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of regional withdrawal, and
that retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail . The American public and political
elites favored withdrawal, and Congress went so far as to limit the president’s war
powers, cut funding for South Vietnam, and preclude using American military forces in
in that country. President Ford tried to secure additional military aid for South Vietnam,
but faced with a political consensus about disengagement he acquiesced and declared that
the Vietnam War was over shortly before the South finally collapsed.
Case 2 (Failure): Retrenchment from the Middle East, 2009-2015. President Barack
Obama attempted, and ultimately failed, to retrench from the Middle East between 2009
and 2015. President Obama rose to office on a wave of public discontent with the
country’s foreign policy and questions about the role of American power and ideas.454
The security context he faced was arguably more complicated than that of his processors,
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partly because the consensus regarding the American-led liberal order was shaken
following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2008 financial crisis.455 The Obama
administration faced a tough reality characterized by rising regional powers, America’s
relative military and economic decline, and power diffusion through a changing
international order. President Obama believed that his foreign policy task was to redefine
the United States’ role in the world. He sought to restore weakened relations with allies,
extricate the United States from Iraq and Afghanistan, and to avoid further entanglements
in the Middle East. In other words, President Obama aimed to retrench.
President Obama intended to improve the United States’ strategic solvency by
eliminating peripheral commitments in the Middle East and reorienting policy to address
more critical interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Before entering office, he concluded
that the ideological struggles in the Middle East were too complex for external powers to
resolve, particularly through either regime change or large-scale ground operations.456
However, President Obama failed to hand off responsibility to regional allies like Saudi
Arabia and failed at rapprochement with Russia and Iran. Subsequent security challenges
in the Middle East demonstrated that the United States could not afford to limit its role in
the region. Figure 8 illustrates the pertinent facets of this case.
President Obama’s failure stemmed from unsuccessful burden sharing by allies, failed
rapprochement with rivals, and an inability to abandon American interests in the Middle
East. I argued that retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a
suitable successor to uphold an existing security order. In this case, President Obama
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committed substantial material resources to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s ability to maintain
regional security favorable to American interests. However, instead of doing so, Saudi
Arabia engaged in a Cold War with Iran which was attempting to expand its influence
after the American withdrawal. This competition led Saudi Arabia to engage in proxy
conflicts throughout the Middle East. Whether these conflicts contributed to or resulted
from Saudi and Iranian intervention, they served to destabilize the region. While Saudi
Arabia pursed its interests, the results of its efforts undermined the United States
preference for regional stability. Moreover, events in the region forced President Obama
to recommit diplomatic energy and military forces to the Middle East at the expense of
his Asian pivot.
I also argued that retrenchment is more likely to fail when a state is unsuccessful at
rapprochement with a rival. President Obama attempted to engage with Iran, especially
regarding its nuclear program. However, Iran remained implacable and refused to
abandon its nuclear program or its attempts to achieve regional hegemony. By early
2010, the administration shifted its efforts to implementing economic sanctions intended
to coerce Iran into altering its behavior and engaging in negotiations. The sanctions
clearly affected Iran’s domestic economy, but they had an ambiguous effect on Iranian
leaders who continued to pursue their strategic goals in defiance of the United States. By
2011, President Obama abandoned attempts at rapprochement as Iran remained
recalcitrant and stoked turmoil during the Arab Spring to advance its interests. The
turmoil of these conflicts, particularly the Syrian Civil War and subsequent rise of ISIS as
a regional threat, forced President Obama to reengage in the Middle East.
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The last option for retrenchment to succeed is for a great power to abandon its
security interest in the region of withdrawal. In the end, President Obama was unable to
abandon the United States’ Middle East interests. The Arab Spring proved to be the
undoing of the Obama administration’s retrenchment attempt. Though initially refraining
from intervening in the popular uprisings, President Obama half-heartedly reversed
course when he supported attacking Libya, first to prevent mass killings then to effect
regime change. During the initial stages of the Syrian Civil War, the Obama
administration debated how best to respond, though there was a clear preference for a
hands-off approach. However, as ISIS arose during the conflict and spread into Iraq, the
administration finally settled on deploying military forces to directly confront the threat.
Once again, the United States was militarily engaged in the Middle East and
retrenchment had failed.
I found limited evidence to support the claim that retrenchment is more likely to
succeed the less influence domestic political divisions have on accepting the logical
implications of regional withdrawal. The American public favored withdrawal from Iraq,
political elites did as well, but they were concerned about the way withdraw occurred.
President Obama declared a deadline for withdrawal from Iraq, and the subsequent
collapse of talks to extend the Status of Force Agreement to let American forces remain
after the deadline provided the political cover necessary to complete full withdrawal.
During the debates over intervention during the Arab Spring, Republicans and Democrats
both supported it – though for different reasons – so President Obama likely could have
gained support to intervene had he wanted to do so.

168

This case provided evidence for my claim that retrenchment is more likely to succeed
than fail. Retrenchment in this case failed because the United States was unable to find an
ally for burden sharing, failed to settle disputes with its rivals, and, when Middle East
turmoil erupted during the Arab Spring, could not abandon its regional interests. If any of
these three things occurred, President Obama’s retrenchment attempt likely would have
succeeded. Had Saudi Arabia better protected American interests instead of pursuing its
own interests, President Obama may have been better able to remain disengaged.
Similarly, had President Obama’s rapprochement with Iran or Russia succeeded in
alleviating security concerns much of the great power rivalry that re-emerged in the wake
of the Arab Spring might have been less contentious. Alternatively, security challenges
may have been resolved before escalating to a point where President Obama could no
longer remain disengaged. Lastly, if President Obama could have withstood calls for
reintervention in the Middle East made by Congress and European allies, he would have
been able to follow through with his preference to withdraw from the Middle East and
focus on Asia. However, he was unable to do so, and intervened in the Middle East even
though the prospects for success were dim.
Alternatives
Both cases provided limited or no support for any of my three identified alternative
hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes. Even when the cases provided limited
support, it fell well short of the robust evidence supporting my main claims.
The first alternative was that retrenchment may be more likely to succeed the more
closely leaders align the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature
of relative decline. President Nixon did opt for strategic retrenchment when faced with
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international relative decline; however, this did not necessarily contribute to the United
States’ success. His ability to enhance South Vietnam’s capability for providing for its
own defense and triangular diplomacy made possible because of rapprochement
facilitated America’s deliberate withdraw. Had either of these factors not manifested,
retrenchment likely would have failed due to the consequences of a precipitous withdraw
and rapid collapse of the South at a time when the American public still supported
honoring their country’s commitment to a free and democratic South Vietnam. While
President Nixon did correctly link the type of cost reductions with the nature of American
relative decline, this alone was not enough to bring about success.
There is limited support for this alternative in the case of retrenchment from the
Middle East, though the case offers avenues for additional research along these lines.
President Obama simultaneously enacted strategic and operational retrenchment when he
withdrew military forces from the Middle East and subsequently reduced the size of the
military, particularly the Army, and significantly reduced the defense budget. The Obama
administration focused on domestic concerns related to the 2008 economic crises, but it
failed to adjust its policies to ensure it could address the source of America’s
international relative decline. Reduced force structure and low levels of readiness
resulting from sequestration meant President Obama lacked the means to simultaneously
execute his pivot to Asia and respond to Middle East turmoil. As a result, when President
Obama decided to intervene in Iraq and Syria in 2014, the intervention came at the
expense of the Asian pivot. This, however, was not the cause of retrenchment failure, but
a consequence.
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A second alternative was that operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than
strategic retrenchment. Here too, evidence does not fully bear this out, though it does
suggest the need for further investigation. President Nixon implemented a mixture of
operational and strategic retrenchment policies, yet the main thrust of cost savings
involved reducing the level of foreign commitments – the level of foreign policy risk. He
also off-set force reductions and reduced warfighting capacity by engaging in active
diplomacy with America’s rivals. This reassured allies, particularly in the Middle East,
who up to that point were slowly being pulled into the Soviet orbit. Middle Eastern
countries quickly abandoned the Soviets when the United States asserted itself
diplomatically. Had President Nixon opted to solely cut costs through reducing the price
of security or refrained from substituting diplomacy for force, it seems likely
retrenchment would have failed. Counterfactually, by withdrawing from South Vietnam,
abandoning its interests in Southeast Asia, and significantly cutting its forces, American
rivals might have opted to act more aggressively to take advantage of the apparent United
States’ retreat, aggression to which America might not have been able to respond with its
recently reduced force structures.
The evidence in President Obama’s retrenchment attempt also did not fully bear out
this alternative, though it suggests the need for further investigation. By enacting
operational retrenchment, President Obama limited the means with which to purse the
military component of his Asia policy and reengage in the Middle East. The United
States already had enough air and naval assets in the Pacific theater to contain China,
which remained focused on defending its current position and outstanding claims.
However, America lacked the capacity to respond to rising Chinese assertiveness.
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China’s assertiveness was arguably a reaction to take advantage of the United States’
circumstances following the 2008 financial crisis and its inability to disengage from the
Middle East. Moreover, the military and diplomatic components of President Obama’s
pivot strategy raised fears in China that America was trying to implement a policy of
containment. Both factors likely contributed to growing Chinese assertiveness to which
the United States had limited military capability to respond. American intervention after
the Arab Spring forced President Obama to choose between Asia and the Middle East.
Having to make this choice suggests that operational retrenchment was a poor decision,
particularly since the cost savings did little to address domestic economic concerns.
Therefore, the hypothesis that operational retrenchment is more likely to fail than
strategic retrenchment has some support in both cases and warrants further investigation
even though it was not an operative factor in either case.
Finally, the third alternative was that slower rates of retrenchment may be more likely
to succeed than rapid withdrawal or reductions. Here again, the evidence did not fully
support this hypothesis. Nixon began withdrawing large numbers of troops within eight
months of assuming the presidency. After making the initial withdrawal announcement,
he proceeded to make other large reductions over the course of the next three years.
While the number of servicemembers in South Vietnam rapidly declined, President
Nixon attempted to calibrate withdraw to on-the-ground conditions and the South’s
ability to assume more responsibility for their security. In this respect, the size of
reductions seems less important that the managed pace at which they occurred. While
providing some support for the idea that the rate of withdrawal may matter, little
evidence points to it being a vital factor to success. In 1974, after it became clear to the
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North Vietnamese that the United States would no longer support the South, the North
planned and initiated an offensive to takeover South Vietnam. Perhaps had Nixon opted
for rapid and immediate withdraw this might have precipitated a similar response from
the North; however, the factor determining success would have been the United States’
ability to abandon its interests, not how quickly it withdrew its forces. There might have
been an effect on allies or other rivals, but this case provides little evidence. Therefore,
there is limited support for the rate of retrenchment influencing outcomes.
The evidence from President Obama’s retrenchment also did not fully support this
hypothesis. However, a counterfactual argument can be made arguing that had President
Obama kept some level of forces in Iraq the United States may have been better postured
to combat ISIS. President Obama arguably could have offered to leave more troops in
Iraq to demonstrate American commitment, or he could have negotiated terms for a new
Status of Forces agreement that might have appeased domestic Iraqi political dynamics.
However, his desire to withdraw from Iraq and pivot to Asia weakened his resolve. When
Iraqi leaders would not concede to legal protections for any remaining American
servicemembers, President Obama used it as a pretext for full withdrawal. By removing
all American forces and forfeiting the United States’ ability to influence an Iraqi
government increasingly coming under the influence of Iran, President Obama left the
United States at a strategic disadvantage. Counterfactuals in both cases suggest the need
for further research regarding not only whether the rate of reductions matter, but how
they might matter.
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Implications for Academic Scholarship
My findings have implications for retrenchment scholarship and other tangential
literatures. They refute assertions made by critics and extend some arguments advanced
by retrenchment advocates. Critics contend that retrenchment is a rare, high-risk
endeavor that signals waning power and damages a state’s reputation.457 They also assert
that retrenchment from even peripheral commitments signals weakness and demonstrates
a lack of resolve.458 Since retrenchment sacrifices relative power, critics contend that it
lowers a state’s likelihood of winning if war occurs. Therefore, critics believe that leaders
adopting this strategy hasten their state’s decline, and retrenchment is rational only when
using force is not a viable option.459 From this perspective, retrenchment will rarely, if
ever, succeed since the outcomes are all negative – diminished power, influence, and
security.
Available evidence does not support these claims. First, it appears that retrenchment
is commonplace. While presenting only two cases of American retrenchment attempts,
others exist – in the 1920s during the Harding and Coolidge administrations, in 1946
under President Truman, in 1953 during the Eisenhower administration, and in 1992
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when President George H. W. Bush retrenched at the end of the Cold War. Plenty of nonAmerican examples exist as well. The universe of cases for this project included ten nonAmerican retrenchment attempt since 1870. Extending the search prior to 1870 would
undoubtably reveal many more examples. Retrenchment is not rare – it is after all the
most common response to relative decline.460 It does, however, appear to be largely
confined to great powers who have wide-ranging security commitments.
Second, at least in the American cases, it does not appear that retrenchment signaled
waning power or weakness. In fact, overcommitment in pursuit of a foreign policy goal in
one region contributed to relative decline and provided opportunities for a rival power to
advance their interests and sphere of influence in another region. America’s diplomatic
and military focus on Vietnam created a vacuum in the Middle East which the Soviet
Union attempted to exploit. President Nixon had to reorient American foreign policy to
counter the Soviet threat, and that meant retrenching from Southeast Asia. Similarly,
American overcommitment in the Middle East resulted in its inability to effectively
counter China’s rising economic and military clout in East Asia. No leader could
reasonably argue that the United States was weak given its overall economic and military
dominance. However, by rapidly withdrawing forces and diplomatically deemphasizing
the Middle East, President Obama did create conditions in which Iran expanded its
influence. This was not the result of retrenchment, however, but the failure of President
Obama to achieve rapprochement with Iran and Saudi Arabia’s unwillingness to protect
American security interests. Therefore, my findings show that it is not retrenchment that
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signals waning power, but overcommitment, and leaders can effectively correct this
through retrenchment and strategic reorientation.
Third, the belief that leaders attempting retrenchment will hasten their state’s decline
seems misguided. If overcommitment is the primary international cause of relative
decline, then continuing overcommitment will only hasten decline. Retrenchment clearly
has costs, but these costs pale when compared to the costs of prolonging the diplomatic
and military inflexibility that comes from overcommitment. Retrenchment can facilitate
reallocating resources to core interests which may signal resolve in more vital regions.
President Nixon recognized that the American focus on Vietnam was distracting it from
other pressing challenges like the Soviet Union’s achievement of strategic parity and
growing influence in the Middle East. Continuing to slog in the quagmire of Vietnam
would only have drained resources better used for military modernization to outpace the
Soviets. Moreover, prolonging the United States’ diplomatic fixation on Vietnam would
only serve to provide time for the Soviets to solidify their diplomatic gains in the Middle
East. Retrenchment freed the resources necessary for the Nixon Administration to counter
both challenges. Similar dynamics existed during President Obama’s retrenchment
attempt; however, his failure to retrench resulted in the continuing inability to effectively
counter a rising China. Both cases clearly show that retrenching does not hasten a state’s
decline but failing to retrench does.
Finally, my findings support and extend advocates’ claims in recent retrenchment
scholarship. MacDonald and Parent show that retrenchment is a common occurrence that
is remarkably successful. My findings confirm this and go further by showing
retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. MacDonald and Parent argue that the
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rate and magnitude of a state’s decline explains the extent and form of its retrenchment
choices. States with only limited decline will opt for operational retrenchment strategies
focused on the price of security, while in severe cases states will select strategic
retrenchment to minimize risks and burdens.461 One issue with their parsimonious,
structural model is that it basically presents a unidimensional prediction about whether
there will be more or less retrenchment. My findings do not dispute this, but they do
show leaders seem to prefer combining retrenchment types rather than pursuing a single
policy. That said, my findings extend MacDonald and Parent’s theory by revealing the
conditions in which retrenchment will succeed or fail, thereby building upon their
baseline realist theory.
Policy Implications
What lessons does my theory of retrenchment outcomes yield for contemporary
policymakers? Many observers argue that the United States’ position atop the
international hierarchy has become tenuous following the long wars Afghanistan and
Iraq, along with the lingering effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Even though the United
States spends more on defense than any other nation – it accounts for over 37% of world
military expenditures and spends more than the combined spending of the next seven
largest military budgets – its annual budget deficit exceeds $1 trillion. These levels are
unsustainable and will need to be reduced. The re-emergence of overt great power
competition in international relations also suggests that the capacity of the United States
to sustain its current strategic commitments will be contested and constrained. As a
result, the United States will eventually face the decision to retrench to reduce the price
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and risk of security to free resources for focusing on protecting core interests. My model
of retrenchment outcomes offers useful insights to policymakers by providing guidance
on when retrenchment will most likely succeed.
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, ceaseless
Middle East turmoil, Russian revanchism, and China’s rapid growth have led to the
realization of America’s relative decline. The United States undoubtably sits atop the
international hierarchy, but some question whether the current budgetary and geopolitical
circumstances will change this.462 Given its outsized expenditures on defense, future
deficit reduction measures will likely come at the expense of military spending. Reducing
defense budgets will constrain the United States’ capacity to station forces abroad,
sustain weapons research, development, and procurement, and respond to a wide range of
contingencies at the level required by its current foreign commitments. Even absent large
defense spending cuts, the intensifying level of great power competition suggests that the
United States will eventually be forced to abandon peripheral commitments to free
resources to confront a resurgent Russia or assertive China. Put simply, the United States
will likely have to retrench in the future, just as it has to in the past.
America’s geographically expansive and longstanding commitments to allies and
regional stability mean that any retrenchment attempt should not be implemented lightly
or without consideration of the likelihood of success. America’s military underwrites the
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security order and stability in many areas around the world, so American withdraw may
jeopardize regional stability – security and economic. Without a dependable ally or
rapprochement with a regional rival, the only option left for American leaders is to
abandon national interests in an area. If they cannot, then retrenchment will fail.
Attempting to retrench under these conditions will only result in instability and force
American leaders to intervene later and at higher cost than they would have incurred if
they opted to remain engaged.
Therefore, before attempting retrenchment, American leaders will need to evaluate
regional commitments according to the three criteria my theory identifies as crucial for
successful retrenchment. First, leaders need to assess the availability of willing and able
allies to assume a security burden. Any ally should be militarily capable and, to a large
degree, should share America’s threat perceptions in the region. The former criteria may
be supplemented by negotiating arms sales and military assistance agreements much as
Nixon and Obama did with South Vietnam and Saudi Arabia, respectively. The latter
criteria are important, because they suggest the extent to which an ally might pursue its
own versus American interests. South Vietnam shared the United States’ threat
perception of North Vietnam and fought until the end. Saudi Arabia, though sharing the
perception of an Iranian threat, opted instead to pursue its own regional interests at the
expense of America’s even after receiving sizeable arms and assistance packages.
Second, leaders will need to determine the ability to reach a settlement through
rapprochement with regional rivals or other great powers with regional interests. This is
particularly important if there is no viable regional ally or an ally who does not share
America’s threat perception. Achieving rapprochement requires a high degree of
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diplomatic focus and a willingness to forego previous claims to achieve a peaceful
settlement on outstanding security issues. Nixon and Kissinger successfully opened
relations with China and eased tensions with the Soviet Union, both of which facilitated
American retrenchment from Southeast Asia. President Obama unsuccessfully negotiated
with Iran. Though eventually reaching a nuclear weapons agreement, Obama was unable
to convince Iran to refrain from spreading its influence throughout the Middle East
following American withdrawal.
Finally, leaders will have to judge whether the United States is willing and can afford
to abandon a commitment if all else fails. This will require level-headed consideration of
the strategic importance of regional commitments. Anywhere America retains a
commitment has a degree of strategic importance; however, levels of importance are
unequal, so leaders will need to focus on those most vital to national security. Doing so
may mean abandoning a previous foreign commitment. President Nixon and President
Ford retained an interest in maintaining a free and democratic South Vietnam, but in the
face of congressional opposition and more critical security challenges Ford opted to
abandon South Vietnam. President Obama preferred to leave the interminable security
challenges in the Middle East to focus on reengaging in East Asia. As pressure from
Congress and allies increased in the wake of the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War,
Obama was forced, however reluctantly, to reengage in the region at the expense of
American reorientation to Asia. While America might have withstood the economic and
security shocks resulting from its continued disengagement, it allies could not which
forced reintervention. Ultimately, President Obama misjudged the degree to which he

180

could reduce American commitments in the Middle East. So, how will these factors play
out in future retrenchment attempts?
The Future of Syrian Withdrawal
Given the criteria mentioned above and elaborated upon in this project, it is worth
considering the prospects of success for President Donald Trump’s recent decision to
withdraw American military forces from Syria. The reaction from the media and foreign
policy elites following President Trump’s announcement largely treated the decision as
reckless and borderline illegitimate, while simultaneously implying that indefinite
military deployments were the only legitimate option.463 To be clear, I am not examining
the wisdom of President Trump’s decision, I am only assessing whether the relevant
conditions exist for a successful outcome. Below I briefly provide a background on the
Syrian conflict, discuss President Trump’s decision to withdraw all American military
forces from Syria, and apply the three criteria for retrenchment success – ally availability,
ability to affect rapprochement with a rival, and ability to abandon an interest – to
determine whether this attempted retrenchment is more likely to succeed or fail.
Syria was ruled by the Assad family for more than forty years, but antigovernment
protests broke out in Syria in March 2011 during the Arab Spring. As protests spread and
violence escalated, Syrian government forces began aggressively battling emerging
political and armed opposition groups. By August 2011, the violent Syrian crackdown
prompted President Obama to call for Syrian president Bashar al Assad to resign. Assad
refused, and the rising Syrian civilian death doll and Syrian government’s use of
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chemical weapons resulted in Congress debating whether to assist Syrian opposition
groups with lethal and non-lethal aid – they approved the latter.
President Obama requested authority and funding from Congress in 2014 to provide
lethal support. The administration’s initial focus for support was for vetted opposition
groups who would protect the Syrian people from Assad regime forces. However, the
subsequent advance of ISIS from Syria across northern and western Iraq shifted the focus
of support to counterterrorism efforts. Congress finally authorized an American-led train
and equip mission to combat terror groups in Syria to defend the United States and its
allies, and to establish the necessary conditions for a negotiated settlement to the Syrian
conflict. The United States began air strikes in Syria in September 2014. In October
2014, it established Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, which
eventually included more than 70 partner countries. The Obama and Trump
administrations also slowly increased the number of American military personnel in Syria
from a few dozen to almost 2,000 by late 2017.464
The United States and coalition-backed forces in Syria managed to retake almost all
the territory held by ISIS between 2015 and 2018. However, during this same period,
Russia, Iran, and the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah all intervened on behalf of Assad’s
regime during military campaigns against opposition groups. The conflict between the
opposing coalitions complicated the chaotic situation within Syria and contributed to a
humanitarian crisis where more than 5.6 million Syrians fled to other countries and
another 6.3 million became internally displaced. Though American-backed forces
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contributed to the collapse of ISIS’s territorial control in Syrian, the Assad regime took
advantage of this to make significant military and territorial gains at the expense of
opposition groups.465 By February 2018, the conflict decisively shifted in Assad’s favor,
thereby enabling Russia and Iran to entrench themselves in Syria and expand their
influence throughout the region.466
President Trump called for an accelerated withdrawal of American forces from Syria
in early 2018. His administration remained divided, however, with some officials arguing
for a continued American presence to prevent the re-emergence of ISIS.467 The Syrian
government under Assad had managed to weaken, defeat, or geographically isolate most
of the American-backed opposition groups, so it faced little pressure to make
concessions.468 Administration officials declared that the United States was committed to
defeating ISIS.469 Retired ambassador James Jeffrey, the Secretary of State’s Special
Representative for Syria Engagement, stated on 6 September 2018 that the Trump
administration intended to keep military forces in Syria beyond the end of the year to
ensure the defeat of ISIS.470 However, on 19 December 2018, President Trump asserted
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ISIS was defeated in Syria, stating “[w]e have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for
being there during the Trump Presidency.”471 He then abruptly announced the full and
immediate withdrawal of American forces, a policy the drew immediate criticism from
Congress, allies, the military, and within his administration.472
Regardless of the widespread criticism surrounding President Trump’s troop
withdrawal from Syria – de facto retrenchment – what is the likelihood it will succeed? I
argue that retrenchment will fail when a great power is unable to extricate itself from an
existing commitment and is unable to free resources to address more critical challenges.
A great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to
a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment
regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are
a possibility. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, retrenchment will generally succeed unless
1) there is no ally willing and able to accept responsibility, and 2) a great power fails at
rapprochement, and 3) the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest.
How do these factors play out in the current case of attempted American withdrawal
from Syria? First, is there an ally willing and able to accept responsibility for defeating
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ISIS, creating the conditions for a negotiated settlement between Assad and oppositions
groups, and countering Russian and Iranian influence in Syria? The answer appears to be
no. Three potential candidates exist – Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Kurds – but none
appear willing or capable of filling the vacuum created by the United States’ departure.
While Turkey supports American withdrawal, it remains less concerned with defeating
Assad or ISIS than it is with America’s Kurdish ally, the People’s Protection Units
(YPG). Turkey views the YPG as an ally of the Kurdish Workers Party, a Kurdish
militant group Turkey views as an enemy and terror group, a view shared by the United
States. Even before the American withdrawal, Turkey threatened to raid YPG areas. This
threat not only risked confrontation with the United States, it demonstrated that Turkey is
more interested in pursuing its own regional interests rather than America’s.473
Saudi Arabia was previously discussed, but it mimics Turkey’s behavior in that the
Saudis remain more concerned with conducting their proxy war against Iran than with
promoting American interests in Syria. The Kurdish YPG, though arguably the best
fighters against ISIS will be unable to focus on that threat if Turkey attacks them.
Moreover, abandonment of their Kurdish allies provided another example American
abandonment of allies and lack of commitment so the YPG will likely be reluctant to
pursue anything but their own interests. Lastly, allies outside of the region, like France
and Britain who both have forces in Syria, sent those troops on the assumption that the
United States was committed to the fight. President Trump’s abrupt contradiction of his
administration’s policy and failure to consult with these key allies will likely result in
their unwillingness to help.474
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Absent an ally willing to assume the United States’ security burden in Syria, can the
Trump administration pursue rapprochement with Russia and Iran? Again, the answer
appears to be no. Russia began providing support to Assad in 2011 at the beginning of the
Syrian conflict. Over the course of 2015, Russia built up the number of its military
personnel in Syria, introduced combat aircraft and other military equipment, then
launched an active military intervention in September 2015.
Russia’s military intervention on behalf of the Assad regime simultaneously
improved the capacity of the Syrian government forces and complicated operational and
technical aspects of the United States’ military mission in Syria.475 This represents a
strategic win for Russia, who backed President Assad and who will likely be unwilling to
engage in rapprochement with the United States. Russia has a strong interest in
maintaining its economic and political influence in Syria, which has long been a lucrative
market for the Russian defense and intelligence sectors.476 The United States has almost
no incentives it can offer the Russians to induce them to abandon their Syrian interests,
nor does the United States have much leverage in negotiations over a situation which is
effectively a de facto victory by the Syrian government. Therefore, rapprochement with
Russia regarding the Syrian conflict appears highly unlikely.
Iran also intervened in Syria at the invitation of President Assad. It began to empower
pro-Assad militant groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah, and the intervention placed
Iranian forces within Syria, a circumstance that Israel viewed as directly threatening its
security. United States officials also viewed the Iranian intervention as a strategic threat

Humud, Blanchard, and Nikitin, “Armed Conflict in Syria,” 27-30.
Lara Seligman, “The Unintended Consequences of Trump’s Decision to Withdraw from Syria,” Foreign
Policy, 28 January 2019, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/28/unintendedconsequences-trump-decision-withdraw-syria/.

475
476

186

to American interests in Syria and the Middle East. Then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
stated in 2018 that a goal of American policy in Syria was to reduce Iran’s influence,477
and other Trump administration officials described Iran’s presence in Syria as a
potentially greater threat than the continuation of the Assad regime.478 Iran is using soft
power and exerting its influence throughout Syria to create a land bridge from Iran to
Lebanon. Iran’s leaders are using strategies like ones they used with Hezbollah in
Lebanon to embed Iranian influence militarily, politically, economically, and culturally.
Iran is purchasing real estate, constructing Shiite mosques, and schools, and replacing
Sunni communities with pro-Assad ones, and even offering jobs to unemployed
Sunnis.479
Given Syria’s strategic importance to Iran’s regional goals, it seems unlikely Iranian
leaders would be willing to engage in rapprochement with the United States. Moreover,
President Trump’s unilateral decision to abandon the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, commonly referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal, and reimplement sanctions
against Iran further incentivizes Iranian intransigence. President Trump might attempt to
divide Russia and Iran by offering to ease sanctions against the latter; however, both have
an interest in maintaining their influence in Syria and in sticking together in defiance of
American, European, and Middle Eastern pressure.480 Therefore, as with Russia,
rapprochement with Iran regarding the Syrian conflict appears highly unlikely.
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Finally, absent an ally to assume America’s security burden in Syria, and Russian and
Iranian unwillingness to engage in rapprochement with the United States, can the Trump
administration abandon American interests in Syria? Here again, the answer appears to be
no, though President Trump’s idiosyncratic behavior may make it possible. When
President Trump announced the full withdrawal of American military forces from Syria,
he essentially reduced to zero the United States’ ability to influence events. As Russia
and Iran coordinate to expand their regional interests, this may bring them into contact
with more vital declared American interests, for instance the uninterrupted flow of oil
shipments through the Persian Gulf or Israeli security. These challenges would likely
prompt a response that would reintroduce American forces in the region to protect
interests and support diplomacy. President Trump’s decision also sparked immediate
backlash from Congress, even from within his own party,481 so it seems likely that this
domestic political opposition will influence plans for Syrian withdraw. This already
appears to be happening as President Trump’s original call for the withdrawal of
American forces within thirty days was adjusted to allow approximately 1,000 troops to
remain with no timeline for removal.482 So, it appears unlikely that the United States can
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abandon its interest in Syria and the Middle East. Therefore, President Trump’s
retrenchment from Syria is likely to fail.
Relative Decline, Retrenchment, and Reorientation
The narratives of decline and retrenchment are distinct yet interconnected. Leaders
have three choices when faced with a period of relative decline in which geopolitical
competition reveals a mismatch be their country’s foreign commitments and resources.
First, they can muddle along and hope for the best. This, however, is not a strategy, but
only a policy of inaction. Second, leaders can “rage against the dying of the light” and
launch an attack against the perceived source of decline. This choice implicitly assumes
that necessary resources for this course of action will be available and that the outcome
will be favorable. In fact, neither may be true. Third, leaders can come to grips with
emerging realities and adjust their policies within a process intended to reverse, or at least
mitigate, the consequences of decline. This option, retrenchment and strategic
reorientation, appears to offer the best chance for success, defined as regaining strategic
solvency by reducing existing commitments to free resources for addressing more critical
challenges. In evaluating these options, it is important to avoid conflating what is with
that of what is preferred.
Retrenchment is the intentional reduction of costs associated with a state’s foreign
policy, where costs are the product of security expenses, risks, and burdens.483 It is the
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core stage of strategic reorientation during which leaders mediate between existing
security goals and the need to adapt to a changing security environment. Retrenchment
alleviates the “dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources” by reducing risks,
shifting burdens, or economizing expenses to improve a state’s political and strategic
solvency.484 Regardless of a retrenchment’s form, it allows a state to redistribute
resources from peripheral to core security interests. This is important to the long-term
strategic solvency of a great power, without which relative decline may become absolute.
States that fail to retrench will eventually succumb to aggression as rivals exploit
inflexible foreign policies and military overextension.
Despite retrenchment’s benefits, scholars and policymakers continue to believe in the
importance of prestige, the need for credibility, and the dangers of appeasement. From
this perspective, even the mere perception of decline or hint of retrenchment could lead to
trouble.485 This flawed logic has buttressed policies of geopolitical overstretch and
resulted in failed geostrategic adjustment.486 Recent arguments for continued American
engagement abroad rest upon this logic which holds that any decline in American
engagement will destabilize the international order.487 Within the policymaking arena, the
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mantra about the indispensability of United States leadership for global peace and
prosperity short-circuits rational policy considerations. Rather than critically evaluate the
wisdom of retrenchment, leaders hold that America must maintain all its commitments
and credibility regardless of the cost.488
The United States now faces a dilemma as its leaders struggle to prolong the benefits
of hegemony. Political and military developments in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East
threaten important national interests, but the effects of America’s military
overcommitment and eroding domestic resource base have resulted in strategic
insolvency. Despite having the largest economy in the world, almost two decades of
sustained combat operations have left the United States poorly postured and struggling to
outpace modernizing rivals like China and Russia.489 Elite polarization also diminishes
the political capacity for purposeful action. The American public supports current defense
spending levels and an active role in foreign affairs.490 Therefore, the crux of the current
debate is whether and how leaders can reorient American foreign policy and realign the
resources necessary for continuing global leadership.
Moving forward, American foreign policy must confront two distinct challenges over
the coming decades. The first challenge is how to develop a new approach to evolving
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patterns of geopolitical competition that fits within the United States’ intellectual and
historical context of unfettered growth over the past two centuries. Another challenge
involves evaluating the wisdom of attempting to sustain American primacy within the
changing international order. These challenges, distinct but intertwined, exist at different
levels of analysis and timeframes. The first focuses on the strategic ends and the means
used to achieve them by successive presidential administrations, while the second
concerns the trajectory of American power. Each challenge grapples with a different core
question: the first concerns how American leaders use the country’s power, and the
second deals with the quantity of available national power.491
Despite these differences, the two challenges of American foreign policy are
interconnected in three ways. First, the United States’ ability to influence the
international order and shape the strategic environment will decline in proportion to the
extent that America experiences relative decline. This has implications for what exactly
the United States will be able to achieve through any strategy that links ends and means.
Second, the policy decisions of American leaders have consequences for the country’s
relative power, because these decisions will result in fiscal and strategic solvency or
insolvency. Wise decisions to adjust the nation’s strategic ends to match its means will
slow the inevitable long-term trajectory of decline, while poor decisions will have the
opposite effect. Finally, leaders’ decisions must account for both an assessment of the
country’s current relative power and an estimate of future levels. Misjudging either will
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likely result in a mismatch between foreign policy and the strategic environment, which
can hasten decline.492
If American leaders adopt a foreign policy focused on managing the loss of primacy
and relative decline, then retrenchment offers the means for reducing commitments and
ambitions. This will allow the United States to realign and reorient its power, so it can
use its available resources to preserve core security interests. The alternatives involve
maintaining a profligate foreign policy of securing every interest everywhere or
escalating conflictual relations with rivals at the risk of not having the necessary
resources when a moment of crisis arises. Either of these latter options will only hasten
relative decline, since additional resources will be drained away in strategic rivalry with
China, military provocation of Iran, involvement in interminable Middle Eastern
quagmires, and military interventions across northern Africa.493
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